Lawrence v. Com., Record No. 0625-02-2.
| Decision Date | 18 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0625-02-2. |
| Citation | 40 Va. App. 95,578 S.E.2d 54 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Erie LAWRENCE v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Joseph W. Kaestner (Kaestner & Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: FITZPATRICK, C.J., BENTON and KELSEY, JJ.
The trial judge denied Erie Lawrence's motion to suppress heroin seized from his pocket and convicted him of possession of heroin. Lawrence contends the warrantless search was unlawful. We agree and reverse the conviction.
The evidence proved Officer Christopher Jernigan went to a residence to investigate "a trouble unknown" report, which vaguely suggested someone was inside the residence. While walking to the residence, the officer saw a woman sleeping in an automobile with the engine running. After learning that the homeowner, who only spoke Spanish, was attempting to report cars racing along the street, the officer left the residence. Believing "something [was] not right" with the woman who was sleeping in the automobile, the officer initiated a conversation with her. She told the officer she was waiting for the driver to return.
The officer "ran the tags" on the automobile and learned they were registered to a pickup truck. After he obtained that information, the woman exited the automobile and asked if she was free to leave. The officer testified that he Shortly after she walked away, Lawrence approached the automobile. When the officer asked "is that your car?," Lawrence said it was. The officer then directed Lawrence to step toward him, told Lawrence he was "not free to leave," and "put him in handcuffs." The officer testified that he uses "the same" procedure when detaining persons and that he had no reason to believe Lawrence posed a threat to him.
The officer described the events that followed:
The trial judge denied Lawrence's motion to suppress the heroin. At the conclusion of further evidence, which consisted of the officer's testimony concerning the heroin, the trial judge convicted Lawrence of possession of heroin.
Lawrence contends that the officer lacked authority to handcuff and to search him. The Commonwealth replies that all aspects of the detention were lawful and that the search was based upon Lawrence's consent or, in the alternative, upon probable cause to believe "Lawrence's driver's license was in his pocket and ... would be `useful as evidence.'"
We apply the following standards on our review:
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, "[t]he burden is upon [the appellant] to show that th[e] ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the Commonwealth, constituted reversible error." "Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search" involve questions of both law and fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal. In performing such analysis, we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless "plainly wrong" or without evidence to support them.... We analyze a trial judge's determination whether the Fourth Amendment was implicated by applying de novo our own legal analysis of whether based on those facts a seizure occurred.
McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (footnote and citations omitted).
The essential facts are not disputed. The officer first noticed the automobile because its engine was running and it was occupied by a woman who was asleep. When he spoke to the woman, she said she had come to that location with the driver but did not know his name, or the house he entered, or when he was expected to return. The officer "ran the tags on the [automobile]" and learned that they belonged to a truck.
Various statutes, including Code § 46.2-715, require that license plates assigned to a motor vehicle be displayed on that motor vehicle. Under certain conditions, however, the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles may permit "the use of license plates on a vehicle other than the vehicle for which the license plates were issued." Code § 46.2-719. See also Code § 46.2-720. Nonetheless, the officer had a sufficient basis to reasonably suspect a violation of Code § 46.2-715 and to detain Lawrence for an investigation when Lawrence identified himself as the operator of the automobile. Unless otherwise stated, however, violations of the motor vehicles statutes are "traffic infractions," Code § 46.2-113, and ordinarily subject the violator to the issuance of a summons. See Code § 46.2-936.
The Commonwealth argues that the officer could have "reasonably ... suspect[ed] that the car was stolen." We disagree. The evidence in the record did not prove circumstances that raised a reasonable suspicion the automobile had been stolen. After the officer "ran the tags," he received no report either that the automobile in his presence had been stolen or that the truck whose license plates were on the automobile had been stolen. The officer did not testify that he observed any damage suggesting a forced entry or rigging of the ignition. The automobile's keys were in the ignition, and a person was in the automobile. Significantly, when the woman in the automobile asked if she could leave, the officer At that time, the officer knew that the license plates belonged to another vehicle. The totality of the circumstances negates any suggestion of a reasonable belief the automobile was stolen.
In light of the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the officer to put handcuffs on Lawrence while investigating a traffic violation that would warrant only the issuance of a summons for the violation.
[T]he investigative methods employed [during an investigative detention] should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to...
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