Lawrence v. DAP Prods.

• Decision Date: 23 June 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action ADC-22-651
• Parties: CURTIS LAWRENCE, individually and as Owner of SKYWARD TRANSPORTATION, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. DAP PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

CURTIS LAWRENCE, individually and as Owner of SKYWARD TRANSPORTATION, LLC, Plaintiffs,
v.
DAP PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. ADC-22-651

United States District Court, D. Maryland

June 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A. David Copperthite, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs Curtis Lawrence, individually and as Owner on behalf of Skyward Transportation, LLC, (“Skyward”), (collectively, “Plaintiffs), brought action in this Court alleging unlawful interference with Plaintiffs' contract because of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I), unlawful termination of Plaintiffs' contract because of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II), retaliation for protected activity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III), and breach of contract (Count IV).^[1] ECF No. 1. Defendant DAP Products, Inc. (“Defendant” or “DAP”) now brings the present Motion to Partially Dismiss, seeking to dismiss Mr. Lawrence as a Party Plaintiff and to dismiss Count I of the Complaint. ECF No. 24. After considering Defendants' Motion and the responses thereto (ECF Nos. 26, 28), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2021). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

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Background

Mr. Lawrence, an African American man, is the Owner, President, and Chief Financial Officer for Skyward, a limited liability corporation. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2. On April 1,2019, Skyward entered into a contract with DAP to perform pick up and delivery services, including transportation of DAP's products from its manufacturing facility at 13555 Jupiter Road, Garland, Texas, to its distribution center at 3102 Miller Park South, Garland, Texas. Id. ¶ 7. Prior to its contract with Skyward, DAP contracted with a white-owned transportation company. Id. ¶ 8. Skyward began providing services on or about April 15, 2019, and it contends it “performed its duties in a workman-like manner and per the Contract's requirements” at all relevant times. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. However, from August 2019 through July 2020, Plaintiffs allege the manager of the manufacturing facility, Robert Nagel, made repeated false complaints against Skyward to bring about the termination of the contract, and that he stated that “he would not stop until he got rid of Skyward.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 53, 56. Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Nagel treated Skyward less favorably than other white-owned companies and that Skyward's drivers encountered a hangman's noose at the manufacturing facility Mr. Nagel managed. Id. ¶¶ 17, 55, 58. Plaintiffs assert that as a result of Mr. Nagel's actions and race discrimination, DAP terminated the contract with Skyward without valid cause, failed to comply with the contract terms, and failed to provide written notice of any perceived breach of contract by Skyward. Id. ¶¶ 59-61.

On March 16, 2022, Plaintiffs brought the action in this Court. Defendant now brings the present Motion to Partially Dismiss the Complaint, seeking to dismiss Mr. Lawrence as a Party Plaintiff and to dismiss Count I in its entirety. ECF No. 24. Plaintiffs responded in opposition on May 6,2022, and Defendant replied on May 19,2022. ECF Nos. 27, 29.

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Discussion

A. Standard of Review

1. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the Complaint, not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206,214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Upon reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts “all well-pleaded allegations as true and construe[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” In re Willis Towers Watson plc Proxy Litig., 937 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). However, it does not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). The Complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists when Plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [Defendant] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. An inference of a “mere possibility of misconduct” is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id. at 679. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

B. Defendant's Motion

Defendant argues that (1) Mr. Lawrence should be dismissed as a Party Plaintiff because he lacks standing to bring all claims alleged in the Complaint, and (2) Count I should be dismissed in its entirety because, under Maryland law, a party cannot interfere with its own contract. ECF No. 24-1 at 3-4.1 address each argument below.

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1. Mr. Lawrence as a Party Plaintiff

Defendant asserts that Mr. Lawrence lacks standing to bring this action individually because shareholders cannot recover damages for injuries to a corporation. ECF No. 24-1 at 3 (quoting Seton v. United Gold Network, LLC, DKC-06-1246, 2008 WL 1925180, at *4 (D.Md. Apr. 30, 2008)). Defendant contends that the alleged injury here is to Skyward, not Mr. Lawrence personally, and he therefore lacks individualized injury separate and apart from Skyward. Id. at 34. Defendant supports its argument with case law from this Court. Id. at 3 (citing Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, No. CIV.A. RDB-11-1607, 2012 WL 576640, at *5 (D.Md. Feb. 21, 2012), aff'd, 716 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2013)). In response,...