Lawrence v. Florida

Decision Date20 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05–8820.,05–8820.
PartiesGary LAWRENCE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

549 U.S. 327
127 S.Ct.
1079
166 L.Ed.2d 924
75 BNA USLW 4095

Gary LAWRENCE, Petitioner,
v.
FLORIDA.

No. 05–8820.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 31, 2006.
Decided Feb. 20, 2007.




[127 S.Ct. 1079]Syllabus*

The 1–year statute of limitations for seeking federal habeas relief from a state-[127 S.Ct. 1080]court judgment is tolled while an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” “is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner Lawrence filed a state postconviction relief application 364 days after his conviction became final. The trial court denied relief, the State Supreme Court affirmed, and this Court denied certiorari. While the certiorari petition was pending, Lawrence filed the present federal habeas application. Then-applicable Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosed any argument that the limitations period was tolled by the pendency of the certiorari petition. Thus, the District Court dismissed Lawrence's application as untimely because he waited 113 days after the State Supreme Court's mandate—well beyond the one day that remained in the limitations period—to file the application. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. Section 2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1–year limitations period during the pendency of a certiorari petition in this Court. Pp. 1082–1085.

(a) Read naturally, the statute's text means that the statute of limitations is tolled only while state courts review the application. A state postconviction application “remains pending” “until the application has achieved final resolution through the State's postconviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260. This Court is not a part of those “procedures,” which end when the state courts have finally resolved the application. The application is therefore not “pending” after the state court's postconviction review is complete. If it were, it is difficult to understand how a state prisoner could exhaust state postconviction remedies without filing a certiorari petition. Yet state prisoners need not petition for certiorari to exhaust state remedies. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435–438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837. Pp. 1082–1084.

(b) Lawrence argues that § 2244(d)(2) should be construed to have the same meaning as § 2244(d)(1)(A), which refers to “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” (Emphasis added.) While “direct review” has long included review by this Court, Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527–528, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 155 L.Ed.2d 88,§ 2244(d)(2) refers exclusively to “State post-conviction or other collateral review,” language not easily

[549 U.S. 328]

interpreted to include participation by a federal court. And although the “time for seeking” direct review includes the period for filing a certiorari petition, § 2244(d)(2) makes no reference to the “time for seeking” review of a state postconviction court's judgment. Instead, it seeks to know when a state review application is pending. A more analogous statutory provision, § 2263(b)(2), contains a limitations period that is tolled “from the date on which the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral relief is filed until the final State court disposition of such petition.” Although this differs from § 2244(d)(2)'s language, the language used in both sections clearly provides that tolling hinges on the pendency of state review. This interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) results in few practical problems. Because this Court rarely grants review of state postconviction proceedings, it is unlikely that a federal district court would duplicate this Court's work or analysis. In any event, a district court concerned about duplication can stay a habeas application until this Court acts. Even in the extremely rare [127 S.Ct. 1081]case in which a state court grants relief and the State prevails on certiorari, a prisoner who files a subsequent federal habeas petition may be entitled to equitable tolling in light of arguably extraordinary circumstances and the prisoner's diligence. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, and n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669. In contrast to these hypothetical problems, allowing the statute of limitations to be tolled by certiorari petitions would provide incentives for state prisoners to file such petitions as a delay tactic, regardless of the merit of their claims. Pp. 1083–1085.

2. Assuming, without deciding, that § 2244(d)(2) allows for equitable tolling, Lawrence falls far short of showing “extraordinary circumstances,” Pace, supra, at 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, necessary to support equitable tolling of his otherwise untimely claims. Pp. 1085–1086.

421 F.3d 1221, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 1086.


Mary Bonner, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, appointed by this Court, for petitioner.

Christopher Kise, Tallahassee, FL, for respondent.


William M. Norris, Miami, FL, Prof. Diane E. Courselle, Univ. of Wyoming College of Law, Laramie, WY, Mary Catherine Bonner, Counsel of Record, Wanda Raiford, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General of Florida, James A. McKee, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney, Tallahassee, FL, Christopher M. Kise, Counsel of Record Foley & Lardner, LLP, Tallahassee, FL, Special Counsel to the Attorney General.

Jeffrey T. Green, Courtney A. Smith, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C., Mary Catherine Bonner, Counsel of Record, Wanda Raiford, Mary Catherine Bonner, PA, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, for Petitioner.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

[549 U.S. 329]

Congress established a 1–year statute of limitations for seeking federal habeas corpus relief from a state-court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and further provided that the limitations period is tolled while an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” “is pending,” § 2244(d)(2). We must decide whether a state application is still “pending” when the state courts have entered a final judgment on the matter but a petition for certiorari has been filed in this Court. We hold that it is not.

I

Petitioner Gary Lawrence and his wife used a pipe and baseball bat to kill Michael Finken. A Florida jury convicted

[549 U.S. 330]

Lawrence of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, auto theft, and petty theft. The trial court sentenced Lawrence to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Lawrence's conviction and sentence on appeal, and this Court denied certiorari on January 20, 1998. 522 U.S. 1080, 118 S.Ct. 863, 139 L.Ed.2d 761.

On January 19, 1999, 364 days later, Lawrence filed an application for state postconviction relief in a Florida trial [127 S.Ct. 1082]court.1 The court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, issuing its mandate on November 18, 2002. See Lawrence v. State, 831 So.2d 121 (per curiam). Lawrence sought review of the denial of state postconviction relief in this Court. We denied certiorari on March 24, 2003. 538 U.S. 926, 123 S.Ct. 1575, 155 L.Ed.2d 319.

While Lawrence's petition for certiorari was pending, he filed the present federal habeas application. The Federal District Court dismissed it as untimely under § 2244(d)'s 1–year limitations period. All but one day of the limitations period had lapsed during the 364 days between the time Lawrence's conviction became final and when he filed for state postconviction relief. The limitations period was then tolled while the Florida courts entertained his state application. After the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate, Lawrence waited another 113 days—well beyond the 1 day that remained in the limitations period—to file his federal habeas application. As a consequence, his federal application could be considered timely only if the limitations period

[549 U.S. 331]

continued to be tolled during this Court's consideration of his petition for certiorari. Then-applicable Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosed any argument that § 2244's statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of a petition for certiorari seeking review of a state postconviction proceeding. SeeCoates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227 (2000)(per curiam). Accordingly, the District Court concluded that Lawrence had only one day to file a federal habeas application after the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 421 F.3d 1221 (2005). We granted certiorari, 547 U.S. 1039, 126 S.Ct. 1625, 164 L.Ed.2d 332 (2006), and now affirm.

II

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, sets a 1-year statute of limitations for seeking federal habeas corpus relief from a state-court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This limitations period is tolled while a state prisoner seeks postconviction relief in state court:

“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” § 2244(d)(2).

Based on this provision, the parties agree that AEDPA's limitations period was tolled from the filing of Lawrence's petition for state postconviction relief until the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate affirming the denial of that petition. At issue here is whether the limitations period was also tolled during the pendency of Lawrence's petition for certiorari to this Court seeking review of the denial of state postconviction relief. If it was tolled, Lawrence's federal habeas application was timely. So we must decide whether, according to § 2244(d)(2), an “application for State post-convictionor

[549 U.S. 332]

other collateral [127 S.Ct. 1083]review” “is pending” while this...

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