Lawrence v. Imagine...!

• Decision Date: 25 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV. RDB 02-3224.,CIV. RDB 02-3224.
• Citation: 333 F.Supp.2d 379
• Parties: Jeffrey F. and Donna LAWRENCE, Plaintiffs, v. The "IMAGINE...!" YACHT, LLC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

333 F.Supp.2d 379

Jeffrey F. and Donna LAWRENCE, Plaintiffs, v. The "IMAGINE...!" YACHT, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. RDB 02-3224.

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Northern Division.

August 25, 2004.

Prabir Chakrabarty, Resnick Abraham and Schwartzman LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Jonathan Adrian Cusson, Robert H. Bouse, Jr., Anderson Coe and King LLP, David W. Skeen, Wright Constable and Skeen LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

Eric N. Stravitz, Mesirow and Stravitz PLLC, Washington, DC, for Third-Party Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BENNETT, District Judge.

Plaintiff Jeffrey F. Lawrence is a partner in the law firm of Sher & Blackwell, LLP ("Sher & Blackwell"). Plaintiff Donna Lawrence is his wife. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lawrence sustained hearing damage from the loud sound that was emitted upon the firing of a small cannon by the crew of the vessel owned and operated by the "IMAGINE...!" Yacht, LLC ("IMAGINE"). Mr. Lawrence was on board the vessel for a social outing sponsored by Sher & Blackwell when the incident occurred, on September 16, 2001. The Lawrences filed the instant action against IMAGINE, and IMAGINE's "charter broker," Latitude 38ELLC d/b/a Annapolis Bay Charters ("Annapolis Bay") on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint sets forth four Counts: Count I for negligence; Count II for breach of contract; Count III for violation of Md. Ann.Code, Natural Resources, § 8-725.4 (West 2004) (operating a vessel on the waters of the state so as to exceed a noise level of 90Db); and Count IV for loss of consortium. Annapolis Bay has filed a crossclaim against IMAGINE seeking indemnification or contribution. IMAGINE and Annapolis Bay filed third-party complaints against Sher & Blackwell contending that the law firm is at least partially liable for Plaintiffs' injuries.

Three motions for summary judgment are now pending before the Court. Annapolis Bay moved for summary judgment arguing that it bears no liability for Plaintiffs' injuries as the mere broker arranging the charter of the IMAGINE. Sher & Blackwell filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that it is not a proper Defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) and that the Charter Agreement between the parties absolves the law firm of all liability. IMAGINE moved for partial summary judgment claiming that Count III of Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed because the Maryland statute on which it is based confers no private right of action. The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.2004).

For the foregoing reasons, Annapolis Bay's Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED, IMAGINE's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count III will be GRANTED, Sher & Blackwell's Third-Party Motion for Summary Judgment will be DENIED, and Count III will be DISMISSED.

I. Background

Annapolis Bay is a "charterer's agent," or "booking agent" which markets boat charters and handles various administrative aspects of the boat charter on behalf of the boat owner. (Davis Dep. at 56-57.) More specifically, the company provides the interested group with a charter agreement, schedules the excursions on various vessels, hires the caterers, tells the vessel where to show up, tells the vessel how many passengers will be going on a trip, and collects the proceeds of the trip for distribution to the boat owner and the caterer. (Bagley Dep. at 73-74.) In exchange for these services, Annapolis Bay receives a ten percent commission. (Davis Dep. at 36.)

In September of 2001, Annapolis Bay served as the charter broker for the Yacht IMAGINE. The Yacht IMAGINE is a 73' schooner which is Coast Guard certified for carrying passengers. (Lee Aff. at ¶ 3.) Michael Bagley is a Coast Guard Certified captain who operated the schooner with a crew of two. (Id.) The vessel was owned by Yacht IMAGINE, LLC, whose shareholders included Michael Bagley and T.C. Schweer. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Prior to 2001, Annapolis Bay had brokered many charters between the Yacht IMAGINE and various groups and had received no complaints. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Captain Bagley and his crew enjoyed an excellent reputation in the Annapolis boating community. (Id.)

At some point in September of 2001, Lisa Henshaw of Sher & Blackwell contacted Annapolis Bay to inquire about chartering a boat for the firm's outing. Ms. Henshaw spoke with Krystal Davis of Annapolis Bay, who gave her price quotes and eventually supplied her with a copy of a proposed charter agreement for the Yacht IMAGINE. Ms. Henshaw executed the finalized Charter Agreement on behalf of Sher & Blackwell on September 13, 2001. (Def. Annapolis Bay's Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 1.) The Charter Agreement sets forth the details of the itinerary for a 3-hour sail including catering and bar service. (Id.) The Agreement was executed by Ms. Davis on behalf of Annapolis Bay on that same date. (Id. at 1.) Paragraph 5 of the "Conditions" attached to the Charter Agreement¹ provides, in relevant part:

GUEST AREAS: CHARTERER UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT AT ALL TIMES THE POSSESSION AND USE OF THE PASSENGER AREAS UNDER CARE AND CUSTODY OF THE CHARTERER, WHO AGREES TO KEEP THESE AREAS CLEAN AND SAFE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR GUESTS. IN THE EVENT ANY GUESTS ARE INJURED IN THE PASSENGER AREAS DURING THE CHARTER, UNLESS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE OWNER, THE CHARTERER AGREES TO HOLD OWNER HARMLESS FROM LIABILITY.

(Id. at 2.)

At some point after the cruise was under way, the crew announced that refreshments were available below deck. (Lawrence Dep. at 24:18-21.) Mr. Lawrence went below deck to get something to eat and to use the restroom facilities. (Id. at 25:4-8.) Just after Mr. Lawrence returned to the main deck of the Yacht, there was a loud explosion off to his left, which resulted from the firing of a small cannon. (Id. at 25:15-20.) As a result of the cannon blast, Mr. Lawrence immediately experienced hearing loss and ringing in his ears. (Henshaw Dep. at 20:20-21:19.) He was later diagnosed with permanent hearing loss and tinnitus as a result of exposure to the cannon blast. (Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Def.s' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. F.)

The cannon was fired as part of a nautical tradition whereby the schooner captain salutes a fellow captain when passing another ship. (See Henshaw Dep. at 14:11-16.) Prior to firing the cannon, a member of the IMAGINE crew announced that they were going to fire a cannon, that it would be loud, and that passengers should cover their ears and move away. (Id.) Mr. Lawrence did not hear the warning because he was below deck.

II. Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Supreme Court explained that only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law" are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, a dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The court further explained that, in considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge's function is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence supporting a claimed factual dispute exists to warrant submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In that context, a court is obligated to consider the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

However, "[w]hen the moving party has met its responsibility of identifying the basis for its motion, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 101 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, Rule 56 mandates summary judgment against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment must be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Similarly, the existence of a mere "scintilla" of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's case is insufficient to preclude an order granting summary judgment. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Furthermore, District Courts have an "affirmative obligation ... to prevent `factually unsupported claims and defenses' from proceeding to trial." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

When multiple parties file motions for summary judgment, as here, the court applies the same standards of review. Taft Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir.1991); ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 45 n. 3 (4th Cir.1983) ("The court is not permitted to resolve issues of material facts on a motion for summary judgment-even where ... both parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment.") (emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215, 105 S.Ct. 1191, 84 L.Ed.2d 337 (1985).

The role of the court is to "rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, in each case, whether a judgment may be...