Lawrence v. Lawrence

Decision Date14 June 1971
Citation181 S.E.2d 640,212 Va. 44
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesMargaret Handy LAWRENCE v. John Creig LAWRENCE.

John M. Court, Bolling R. Powell, Jr., Gloucester, on the brief, for appellant.

John C. Lawrence, pro se.

Before SNEAD, C.J., and I'ANSON, GORDON, HARRISON, COCHRAN and HARMAN, JJ.

I'ANSON, Justice.

On February 19, 1968, plaintiff, Margaret Handy Lawrence, filed in the court below a bill of complaint against her husband, John Creig Lawrence, seeking a divorce on the grounds of desertion. The bill alleged that the parties last cohabited in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, on January 20, 1968, and asked that plaintiff be awarded custody of their 17-year-old daughter, alimony and support money, attorneys' fees and court costs.

Being unable to obtain personal service on the defendant in the City of Norfolk, plaintiff filed an affidavit alleging, Inter alia, that she and her husband were tenants by the entireties of two parcels of residential real property in Norfolk and in Fairfax County, Virginia, and requesting that process issue under the provisions of our 'long arm statute.' On the basis of this affidavit, process was issued and returned pursuant to Code § 8--81.3. Defendant appeared specially and moved to quash the process, which motion was sustained.

On May 13, 1968, plaintiff obtained personal service of the original bill of complaint on the defendant in Washington, D.C. At the same time defendant was served with a petition for appointment of a sequestrator to control the parties' real property situated in Virginia and notice of a hearing for temporary alimony, custody of the daughter and support money. After a hearing the chancellor granted plaintiff's application for temporary custody of the daughter but denied the motions for alimony and sequestration of the property on the ground that he lacked jurisdiction, since defendant had not made a general appearance.

The cause was then referred to a commissioner in chancery. After receiving the commissioner's report, the chancellor, by his decree dated September 23, 1968, awarded plaintiff a divorce A mensa et thoro and custody of the daughter, but continued her renewed request for alimony, support money and sequestration of the real property.

On January 10, 1969, defendant filed a petition for a rehearing of the A mensa decree. The chancellor denied the petition but held that it amounted to a general appearance by the defendant.

Plaintiff then pressed her claim for temporary alimony and support money as of the date her bill was filed, for attorneys' fees, and for sequestration of the real property to secure the payment of these demands. She also asked the chancellor to require defendant to account for and deliver to her certain securities standing in the name of their daughter.

The cause was again referred to a commissioner in chancery. Pursuant to the commissioner's preliminary report, the chancellor awarded plaintiff temporary alimony in the amount of $50 per week, which he later increased to $100 per week.

While the cause was pending before the commissioner, plaintiff filed a motion requesting the chancellor to permit her to amend the prayer of her bill to seek dissolution of the tenancies by the entireties, which was promptly denied.

After a hearing, at which defendant appeared and testified, the commissioner filed his report recommending that plaintiff's divorce A mensa be merged into a divorce A vinculo matrimonii and that she be granted custody of the daughter. The report also recommended that defendant pay plaintiff $340 per month alimony and $225 per month as support for the daughter, but concluded that the court was without jurisdiction to sequester the real property for the payment of these sums.

Following a July 11, 1969, hearing on the exceptions to the commissioner's report, the chancellor held, in a letter opinion dated August 15, 1969, that the wife was entitled to a divorce A vinculo matrimonii and awarded her $300 per month alimony and $200 per month support money, to begin as of July 11, 1969. The opinion affirmed the commissioner's finding that the real property should not be sequestered as security for the payment of alimony and support money. A decree embodying the chancellor's holdings, including a denial of the request that defendant be required to give an accounting of and deliver to plaintiff the securities held by him for their daughter, was entered on October 17, 1969.

Numerous errors and cross-errors have been assigned, but the controlling questions presented are whether the chancellor erred (1) in not ordering the final award of alimony and support money to commence from the date plaintiff filed her suit; (2) in failing to award adequate alimony, support money and attorneys' fees; (3) in not requiring defendant to deliver to her the securities registered in the name of the daughter; (4) in denying plaintiff's motion for a bond as security for the monetary awards in the final decree; and (5) in denying defendant's motion for a rehearing of the A mensa decree.

Plaintiff says the chancellor erred in refusing to make the final award of alimony effective Nunc pro tunc the date she filed her bill, which would have reimbursed her for necessary expenses incurred in support of herself and daughter prior to the award of alimony Pendente lite.

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17 cases
  • Morrill v. Morrill
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Virginia
    • June 7, 2005
    ...to the appropriate relief required." Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va.App. 21, 26-27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1986) (citing Lawrence v. Lawrence, 212 Va. 44, 47, 181 S.E.2d 640, 643 (1971)). "The Supreme Court has defined the authority of a commissioner in chancery in an equity proceeding as `an offic......
  • Haase v. Haase
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Virginia
    • August 22, 1995
    ...refers a cause to a commissioner in chancery, it does not delegate its judicial functions to the commissioner. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 212 Va. 44, 47, 181 S.E.2d 640, 643 (1971). Thus, the commissioner, while functioning as an independent judicial officer, is a surrogate for the chancellor an......
  • Lapidus v. Lapidus
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Virginia
    • January 20, 1984
    ...Va. 641, 645, 299 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1983); Watkins v. Watkins, 220 Va. 1051, 1054, 265 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1980); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 212 Va. 44, 48, 181 S.E.2d 640, 643 (1971); Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699, 704, 172 S.E. 252, 253 (1934), and "cannot be acquired by the courts inferentially......
  • Hur v. Virginia Dept. of Social Services Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Klopp
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Virginia
    • September 10, 1991
    ...suit." Young v. Young, 215 Va. 125, 126, 207 S.E.2d 825, 825 (1974) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lawrence v. Lawrence, 212 Va. 44, 47, 181 S.E.2d 640, 642 (1971)). We find no reason why this same rule should not apply to child support orders. Thus, it was within the trial co......
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