Lawrence v. Lew
| Decision Date | 12 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-cv-1854 (KBJ) |
| Citation | 156 F.Supp.3d 149 |
| Parties | Rachelle Lawrence, Plaintiff, v. Jacob J. Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Gary T. Brown, Gary T. Brown & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
William Mark Nebeker, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Rachelle Lawrence (“Plaintiff”) has sued the Department of the Treasury (“Defendant”), alleging that the agency discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, race, and age, and retaliated against her for participating in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
–2000e–17, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 –634. Plaintiff's claims in this matter relate to two settlement agreements that she entered into with Defendant pertaining to a prior discrimination and retaliation complaint that Plaintiff had filed against Defendant—one dated February 2008 (“February Agreement”) and the other dated October 2008 (“October Agreement”)—and the allegations of the instant complaint also concern a circumstance that arose during the execution of those settlement agreements; specifically, Defendant's apparent realization that it had overpaid Plaintiff under the terms of the agreements and its garnishment of her subsequent wages to recoup those overpayments. On February 10, 2014, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment (ECF No. 29), a motion that Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 33). On April 21, 2015, nearly a year after Defendant's motion became ripe for this Court's consideration, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend her complaint (ECF No. 38), seeking to add allegations related to different discrimination complaints that Plaintiff filed in 2013 and 2014. On February 24, 2015, this Court referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge for full case management.
Before this Court at present is the Report and Recommendation that the assigned Magistrate Judge, G. Michael Harvey, has filed regarding Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment and Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint. (See ECF No. 40.) The Report and Recommendation, which is attached to this Memorandum Opinion, reflects Magistrate Judge Harvey's opinion that this Court should treat Defendant's motion as one for summary judgment, and so construed, should grant that motion and deny Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint. (Id. at 153.) Specifically, Magistrate Judge Harvey first finds that Plaintiff's response to Defendant's statement of material facts largely fails to meet the requirements of this Court's Rules or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it is argumentative and in many instances fails to cite to the factual record. (Id. at 153–56.) He further finds that Plaintiff's claim that she was coerced into signing the October Agreement fails both because she has not established any adverse employment action, and also because she has not shown that Defendant did anything more than encourage her to sign the agreement or that Defendant was animated by discriminatory or retaliatory motive in offering such encouragement. (Id. at 163–66.) With respect to her claims regarding purported breach of the February Agreement, Magistrate Judge Harvey finds that the exclusive forum for any such claim is the Court of Federal Claims and not this Court, and that even if this Court could hear her claim, Defendant has offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons—reasons that Plaintiff has failed to rebut—for any violations of the February Agreement. (Id. at 166–73.) The Report and Recommendation further finds that Plaintiff's wage garnishment claim fails because Defendant has offered legitimate, non-discriminatory, and unrebutted reasons the garnishment. (Id. at 172–73.) Finally, Magistrate Judge Harvey recommends that this Court deny Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint to add allegations regarding additional EEO complaints that Plaintiff filed in 2013 and 2014, finding that the proposed amendment would broaden the scope of this litigation, delay trial of this matter, and unduly prejudice Defendant. (Id. at 173–75.)
Magistrate Judge Harvey's Report and Recommendation further advises the parties that the failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of further review of the matters addressed in the Report and Recommendation. (Id. at 175.) Under this Court's local rules, any party who objects to a Report and Recommendation must file a written objection with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days of the party's receipt of the Report and Recommendation. LCvR 72.3(b)
. As of this date—over a month after the Report and Recommendation was issued—no objections have been filed.
This Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Harvey's report and agrees with its careful and thorough analysis and conclusions. Therefore, the Court will ADOPT the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Accordingly, as set forth in the separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion, Defendants' [29] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED and Plaintiff's [38] Motion for Leave to Amend Her Complaint will be DENIED .
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. This case was referred to the undersigned for full case management on February 24, 2015. Before the undersigned are two motions: (1) defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment and (2) plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. Upon consideration of the motions, the undersigned recommends that defendant's motion be granted and plaintiff's motion be denied.1
As in every motion for summary judgment,2 defendant, the movant, submitted a statement of material facts which defendant claims support the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff. See Def. Mot., Statement of Material Facts (“SOF”). Plaintiff, in turn, responded to defendant's statement of facts. See Pl. Opp., SOF. Based on those submissions, the undersigned must determine which material facts, if any, remain in dispute. Accordingly, before the undersigned can set forth the facts pertinent to the adjudication of defendant's motion, the undersigned must address that threshold matter.
The facts set forth in Part B of this section are compiled primarily from the facts submitted in connection with defendant's motion which went unchallenged by plaintiff in her response. See L. Civ. R. 7(h) (). Where relevant facts are properly disputed, those disputes are addressed as they arise in the analysis. Facts not properly disputed are treated as conceded. The undersigned's reasons for doing so are explained below.
In her response to defendant's motion, plaintiff often attempts to raise a dispute of fact but fails to meet the standards for doing so imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
and our Local Rules. Rule 56 requires a party disputing an asserted fact to support the dispute with citation to “particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Rule further states that a court need not consider materials not cited by a party in determining whether a genuine dispute of fact exists. Id. 56(c)(3). Finally, the Rule warns that failing to properly address a fact permits a court to find that the fact is undisputed for purposes of the summary-judgment motion. Id. 56(e). Similarly, Local Rule 7(h) provides, in relevant part: “[a]n opposition to ... a motion [for summary judgment] shall be accompanied by a separate concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated, which shall include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the statement .” L. Civ. R. 7(h) (emphasis added).
Our Court of Appeals has repeatedly warned litigants against shirking their duties under Rule 56
and Local Rule 7(h) in responding to motions for summary judgment. For example, in Jackson , the D.C. Circuit upheld the decision of the district court to grant summary judgment to the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff had not properly responded to the defendant's assertions of fact. Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner , 101 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C.Cir.1996). There, the plaintiff failed to cite to parts of the factual record and instead “blend[ed] factual assertions with argument regarding their legal significance.” Id. at 148. The district court found such responses inadequate under the predecessor to our Local Rule 7(h) and concluded that the defendant's statements of fact were therefore undisputed. Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, noting that the district court need not comb through the factual record to ferret out disputes of material fact. Id. at 151. Instead, rules like our Local Rule 7(h) appropriately “plac[e] the burden on the parties and their counsel, who are most familiar with the litigation and the record, to...
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