Lawrence v. McGuire

• Decision Date: 08 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 83 Civ. 8155 (SWK).,83 Civ. 8155 (SWK).
• Citation: 651 F. Supp. 312
• Parties: John LAWRENCE, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. McGUIRE, individually and as Police Commissioner of the Police Department of the City of New York and as Executive Chairman, Ex-Officio of the Police Pension Fund Article II, Kenneth Conboy, individually, and as Deputy Commissioner, Legal Division, of the Police Department of the City of New York, and as Acting Chairman of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, Philip Caruso, individually and as President of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and as Trustee of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, Louis Matarazzo, individually, and as a member of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, and as acting Trustee of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, the Department of the City of New York, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., and Richard Hartman, individually and as an attorney doing business under the name of Law Office of Richard Hartman, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

651 F. Supp. 312

John LAWRENCE, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. McGUIRE, individually and as Police Commissioner of the Police Department of the City of New York and as Executive Chairman, Ex-Officio of the Police Pension Fund Article II, Kenneth Conboy, individually, and as Deputy Commissioner, Legal Division, of the Police Department of the City of New York, and as Acting Chairman of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, Philip Caruso, individually and as President of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and as Trustee of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, Louis Matarazzo, individually, and as a member of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, and as acting Trustee of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, the Department of the City of New York, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., and Richard Hartman, individually and as an attorney doing business under the name of Law Office of Richard Hartman, Defendants.

No. 83 Civ. 8155 (SWK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

January 8, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Carol Mellor, New York City, for plaintiff.

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel of The City of New York by Richard Feiner, New York City, for defendants.

Lysaght, Lysaght and Kramer by James Lysaght, Mineola, N.Y., for Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n.

KRAM, District Judge.

This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It arises from a determination by the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, Article II ("Board of Trustees" or "Board") which denied plaintiff John Lawrence's application for accident disability retirement benefits. Lawrence, a retired police officer, alleges that the injury which led to his retirement occurred when another individual ran into him. He claims he has statements from three witnesses to substantiate that claim. Lawrence further alleges that the signature which appears on the line of duty report inaccurately describes how the injury occurred, and is not his signature. Lawrence claims that this evidence was neither presented to, nor taken into consideration by, the Board of Trustees when it denied his application for accident disability retirement. Lawrence also alleges that these facts were not presented to the New York State courts in a proper and timely manner, and consequently his petition was dismissed and his motion for reargument was denied.

Lawrence seeks a judgment from this Court ordering the Board of Trustees to reconsider and reevaluate his application for accident disability retirement in accordance with due process of law and for an award of damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. Lawrence asserts the following claims:

1. All of the named defendants except Hartman deprived Lawrence of property (accident disability retirement benefits) without due process of law by denying him an opportunity to present evidence on his behalf to the Board of Trustees.

2. All of the named defendants except Hartman denied Lawrence of property without due process of law by treating the line of duty report as conclusive evidence of the circumstances regarding Lawrence's injury and by not providing Lawrence with an opportunity to refute the information contained in that report.

3. All of the named defendants conspired to conceal the actions of the Board of Trustees which denied Lawrence property rights without due process. Defendants conspired to and did omit Lawrence's allegations and proof regarding the inaccuracy of the line of duty report from the state court proceedings. This conspiracy deprived Lawrence of effective and meaningful access to the state courts.

4. Defendants Matarazzo and Hartman made material misrepresentations to Lawrence on which Lawrence relied to his detriment. Matarazzo falsely represented that he would present Lawrence's claims to the Board of Trustees and Hartman falsely represented that he would present Lawrence's claims to the state courts. As a result of his reliance on these misrepresentations, Lawrence was denied disability retirement benefits by the Board of Trustees and was denied relief from that determination by the state court.

5. Hartman represented Lawrence in an improper, negligent and reckless manner in connection with his state court action. Hartman failed to present the court with all of the relevant facts and claims for relief and as a result Lawrence's claim was dismissed and his motion for reargument was denied.¹

This action is currently before this Court on two motions. The first motion, by defendants McGuire, Conboy, Caruso, Matarazzo, The Board of Trustees, The New York City Police Department, and the City of New York (collectively, "City Defendants") seeks summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing the complaint against the City Defendants on the grounds that Lawrence's claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel and that Lawrence fails to state a claim of conspiracy upon which relief can be granted.

The second motion before this Court, a cross-motion by the defendant Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York ("PBA"), seeks to have the PBA dropped as a party to the action pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the PBA was misjoined as a party and is without liability. In the alternative, the PBA moves the Court for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 dismissing the complaint against the PBA on the grounds that the claims are barred by res judicata or for a judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissing the cause of action against the PBA.

The following facts are undisputed. John Lawrence is a former police officer who is retired on an ordinary disability pension. Lawrence became a police officer in the New York City Police Department on February 1, 1955, and became a member of the pension fund.

On July 4, 1979, Lawrence sustained a back injury while on duty in the stationhouse. Pursuant to departmental rules, a line of duty report was prepared which stated the injury occurred when Lawrence carried a cardboard box of summonses from one office to an adjacent office and lifted the box to place it on top of a cabinet. The Board of Trustees used this line of duty report when considering Lawrence's application for accident disability retirement benefits. The Medical Board of the Police Pension Fund examined Lawrence, found him disabled, and recommended that the Board of Trustees grant him an accident disability retirement pension.

While considering Lawrence's disability application, the Board of Trustees questioned whether Lawrence's injury, described in the line of duty report, was accidental within the meaning of the City Administrative Code, as required before accident disability retirement benefits can be granted. On December 2, 1980, the Board denied Lawrence's application, and he was retired on an ordinary disability pension.

Thereafter, Lawrence, represented by the law office of Richard Hartman ("Hartman"), commenced a proceeding in New York State Supreme Court pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, challenging the determination of the Board of Trustees denying him accident disability retirement benefits. In his petition Lawrence requested a remand to the Board of Trustees for reconsideration and redetermination of his application "in a manner which complies with and protects petitioner's due process rights ..." See City Defendants' Exhibit A, P. 23. Lawrence did not seek to recover damages in the Article 78 proceeding.

The New York State Supreme Court upheld the determination of the Board of Trustees and entered judgment dismissing Lawrence's petition.

After dismissal, Lawrence moved for reargument of his petition. In the affirmation in support of the motion, Lawrence alleged that his injury occurred when another individual ran into him and that this fact was not reflected in the line of duty report. In support of this allegation, Lawrence attached four affidavits to his motion papers; three were prepared by police officers who witnessed the injury and one, prepared by Lawrence himself, alleged that the signature appearing on the line of duty report was not his own.

By Order and Memorandum dated October 17, 1981, the New York Supreme Court denied Lawrence's motion for reargument. Thereafter, Lawrence appealed the dismissal of his petition.

In his appellate brief, Lawrence realleged that he was injured when another person ran into him, which was not reflected on the line of duty report, and that the signature appearing on the line of duty report was not his own. Lawrence also attached to his appellate brief his own affidavit and the affidavits of the three police officers who witnessed his injury. On May 24, 1983, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Lawrence's petition. Lawrence v. McGuire, 94 A.D.2d 982, 463 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't. 1983).

Thereafter, Lawrence commenced the present action seeking a judgment ordering the defendants to reconsider and reevaluate his application for accident disability retirement benefits in accordance with due process of law and for damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys fees.

CITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON GROUNDS OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which implements the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution (Article IV, Sec. 1), "a federal court must give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered." Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). Claims brought in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not exceptions to the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. Issues that were actually litigated in the prior state action are precluded...