Lawrence v. Pelton

• Decision Date: 16 September 2019
• Docket Number: No. 1:17-cv-289,1:17-cv-289
• Citation: 413 F.Supp.3d 701
• Parties: Frank J. LAWRENCE, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Eric PELTON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

413 F.Supp.3d 701

Frank J. LAWRENCE, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.Eric PELTON, Defendant.

No. 1:17-cv-289

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed September 16, 2019

Frank J. Lawrence, Jr., Bloomfield Hills, MI, pro se.

Heather S. Meingast, MI Dept. Attorney General, Scott Allen Mertens, Michigan Department of Attorney General Civil Litigation, Employment & Elections, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

Paul L. Maloney, United States District Judge

This lawsuit is filed by Plaintiff Frank Lawrence against members of Michigan's Board of Legal Examiners (BLE). In this lawsuit, Lawrence challenges an asserted BLE rule that bar exam scores are valid for only three years. Defendant Eric Pelton, sued in his individual and official capacities, filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) The Court will dismiss Lawrence's procedural due process claim, but not his substantive due process claim.

I.

Under the notice pleading requirements, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing how the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ; see Thompson v. Bank of America, N.A. , 773 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 2014). The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A defendant bringing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a cognizable claim has been pled in the complaint.

Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc. , 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face" and, when accepted as true, are sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Mills v. Barnard , 869 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). "The complaint must ‘contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements necessary for recovery under a viable legal theory.’ " Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ. , 807 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). "A claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano , 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all factual allegations, but need not accept any legal conclusions. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 648 F.3d at 369.

II.

Lawrence complains that the BLE has an agenda to discourage competition within the legal market by making it more difficult to obtain a license to practice law in Michigan. Lawrence raises a general challenge to BLE's rule that passing scores on the Michigan bar exam are valid for only three years. Lawrence notes that the Rules for the Board of Law Examiners do not include any time limitation for the validity of passing bar exam scores. (ECF No. 1-2 Rules for the BLE.) In contrast, the Rules indicate that an applicant's character and fitness clearance is valid for only three years. Michigan Rule for BLE 4(C). Lawrence asserts the BLE notified him that he must retake and pass Michigan's bar exam in order to be approved for a license to practice law. (ECF No. 1 Compl. ¶ 13 PageID.5.) Lawrence reasons that application of the three-year rule interferes with his protected interest in a passing bar exam score. (Compl. ¶ 29 PageID.9 and ¶ 37 PageID.11.) Lawrence asserts that the policy is arbitrary because the Michigan Supreme Court has never approved the rule.¹ Lawrence concludes that enforcement of the rule amounts to a violation of due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Lawrence seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. His prayer for relief is found in the last paragraph of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court issue a declaratory judgment that Defendant PELTON has engaged in an ongoing violation of federal law and that his enforcement of a Rule (what he refers to as a "policy") that extinguishes passing Bar Exam scores after three years, for reasons set forth above, equates to a violation of due process of law. Plaintiff further prays that this Court enjoin Defendant PELTON from enforcing this three-year expiration "policy."

(Compl. PageID.12.) Lawrence does not seek damages.

In his brief supporting this motion, Pelton does not deny the existence of the rule, and implicitly acknowledges its existence.²

III.

Pelton offers a host of reasons why the Court should dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety, as well as some of the specific claims.

A. Rooker - Feldman

First, Pelton insists the Rooker - Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of jurisdiction over the lawsuit because Lawrence is functionally challenging the denial of his fourth application to practice law.

The Rooker - Feldman doctrine evolved from two United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) ; Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The doctrine bars "state-court losers from complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 283–84, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Following Exxon , the Sixth Circuit explained the "source of the injury" requirement for application of the Rooker - Feldman doctrine; where the source of the injury is the state court's judgment, then the doctrine applies and prevents the district court from asserting jurisdiction. McCormick v. Braverman , 451 F.3d 382, 394 (6th Cir. 2006) ; see Berry v. Schmitt , 688 F.3d 290, 299 (6th Cir. 2012) ; Shafizadeh v. Bowles , 476 F. App'x 71, 72 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that Rooker - Feldman is a "narrow" doctrine that "only forbids challenges to state court judgments .") (emphasis in original).

To determine the source of the injury, and thus whether the doctrine applies, federal courts consider the relief sought by the plaintiff. Berry , 688 F.3d at 299. Generally, where a plaintiff complains about the outcome of a prior proceeding in the state courts, and the relief sought amounts to an undoing of that outcome, the federal court will lack jurisdiction under the Rooker - Feldman doctrine. See Hall v. Callahan , 727 F.3d 450, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2013).

The doctrine does not apply when the federal lawsuit is a general challenge to the constitutionality of a state court rule or policy. Shafizadeh , 476 F. App'x at 72 ; see Hood v. Keller , 341 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the doctrine does not bar federal jurisdiction "where the plaintiff's claim is merely ‘a general challenge to the constitutionality of the state law applies in the state action,’ rather than a challenge to the law's application in a particular case.") (citation omitted). Typically, when a plaintiff requests prospective relief, Rooker - Feldman will not bar the action. See, e.g., Berry , 688 F.3d at 300 ; Fieger v. Ferry , 471 F.3d 637, 644–45 (6th Cir. 2006).

Pelton is not entitled to the dismissal of this lawsuit under the Rooker - Feldman doctrine. Rooker - Feldman would prevent Lawrence from challenging the denial of his fourth bar application, but he has not asked for that retroactive relief. If Lawrence prevails here, he has not asked this Court to order Pelton to grant him a license to practice law. Lawrence asks only for prospective relief. The claim Lawrence brings and the declaration and injunction he seeks are not are not barred by Rooker - Feldman .

B. Eleventh Amendment

Second, Pelton argues the Eleventh Amendment prohibits the prospective relief Lawrence seeks.

The State itself is the actual defendant when a state employee is sued in his or her official capacity.³ Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Unless the State has waived sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits for damages against the State, its agencies and its officials sued in their official capacities. Cady v. Arenac Cty. , 574 F.3d 334, 342 (6th Cir. 2009). In Michigan, state law characterizes the Michigan State Bar as a state agency. Kish v. Michigan State Bd. of Law Examiners , 999 F. Supp. 958, 962 (E.D. Mich. 1998).

The Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity, two of which do not apply here. See Boler v. Earley , 865 F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017). Michigan has not consented to be sued under § 1983 and Congress did not expressly abrogate immunity for § 1983 suits. The third exception is the doctrine first outlined in Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Under the third exception, plaintiffs may "bring claims for prospective relief against state official sued in their official capacity to prevent future federal constitutional or statutory violations, ‘regardless of whether compliance might have an ancillary effect on the state treasury.’ " Id. at 412 (quoting S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper , 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008) ). To determine if the action falls under the Ex parte Young exception, the Court must "conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks...