Lawrence v. State

Decision Date10 February 2023
Docket NumberCR-21-0061
PartiesGordon Douglas Lawrence v. State of Alabama
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Appeal from Covington Circuit Court (CC-19-113.73)

COLE Judge.

Gordon Douglas Lawrence appeals the revocation of his probation based on his failure to submit to substance-abuse treatment and monitoring by failing to enter and complete a 12-month residential substance-abuse rehabilitation program. We reverse and remand because the circuit court revoked Lawrence's probation based on a technical violation and because the record indicates that Lawrence was provided neither written notice of nor an explanation of the condition with which he was to comply.

Facts and Procedural History

The record indicates that Lawrence was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a violation of § 13A-12-21, Ala. Code 1975, and was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment on March 15, 2019. (C. 5.) Lawrence's sentence was split, and he was ordered to serve six months' imprisonment; the remainder of his sentence was suspended, and Lawrence was placed on probation for three years. (C. 5.) On July 28, 2021, Lawrence's probation officer filed a delinquency petition, alleging that Lawrence had committed a "technical violation" by failing to "submit to treatment and monitoring" as required by his "modified" conditions of probation. (C. 5.) Specifically, according to the petition, on June 10 2020, "Lawrence's probation was modified [and he was] to complete a 12-month residential substance abuse rehabilitation program." (C. 5.) The petition also alleged that this was Lawrence's fourth probation violation, three of which were based on his failure to submit to treatment and monitoring, and the other was based on his commission of a new criminal offense. (C. 6.) In addition, the petition alleged that Lawrence's probation had been modified twice because of his prior violations. (C 6.)

Lawrence was represented by appointed counsel at his probation-revocation hearing, which was held on September 7, 2021. (C. 12; R. 2.) Although neither Lawrence's delinquency petition nor any court orders were admitted into evidence, the following testimony was presented.

Lawrence's original probation officer testified that he had reviewed Lawrence's initial probation order containing the conditions with him, and that Lawrence had signed the order. (R. 5.) Lawrence's probation order, which was admitted into evidence, required Lawrence to, among other things, generally "submit to behavioral treatment, substance-abuse treatment, Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring and other treatment deemed necessary by the court or Probation Officer." (C. 35.)

Lawrence's current probation officer testified that this was the third delinquency petition filed against Lawrence for "failure to submit to treatment and monitoring" (R. 10) and that the instant petition was filed because Lawrence specifically "failed to complete the Hope Recovery program." (R. 7.) His probation officer further testified that a June 10, 2021, order had "modified" Lawrence's probation, requiring Lawrence to "enter and complete a six-month residential rehab program." (R. 12.)

The drug-court coordinator testified that, after pleading guilty to another criminal offense in a different case, Lawrence was placed in the drug-court program and was "ordered to do a 12-month rehab." (R. 14.) According to her "sources," Lawrence left one program, was terminated from another program, and never began the latest program he was ordered to report to in June 2021. (R. 14-16.) In addition, the drug-court coordinator stated that she was testifying about another one of Lawrence's cases, CC-20-164. (R. 14-16.) No sentencing or probation-modification orders were admitted at Lawrence's hearing.

Lawrence did not testify at the hearing, but he argued that the State had presented "nothing other than hearsay." (R. 21.) Lawrence also argued that he had not received proper notice of the conditions of his probation because the circuit court's June 10, 2021, order "just said that he's to be held until rehab," but "[i]t doesn't say how long he's got to go, and it doesn't say where he's got to go." (R. 22.) Finally, Lawrence argued that failing to submit to treatment and monitoring is a technical offense and that, even if he violated his probation, he was subject "to only a 45-day dunk" because he "had no dunks prior to this" and, further, that the "[t]ermination from alternative programs" provision of § 13A-5-8.1, Ala. Code 1975, did not apply to probation. (R. 21, 25.) The State's response was, generally, that "by not availing himself of the many opportunities he has had to go to rehab," Lawrence "has shown that he has no interest in rehab." (R. 23.) The State's only specific argument, which was unsupported by any document, was that Lawrence was to be "held in the '19 case until he … obtained bed space in a rehab ... [H]e had bed space at Hope Recovery, was released, and did not thereafter report to that program." (R. 23-24.)

On September 22, 2021, the circuit court issued a written order, finding that Lawrence had "violated the condition of his probation that he submit to treatment and monitoring as ordered by this Court by failing to enter and complete the previously-ordered twelve (12) month residential substance abuse rehabilitation program." (C. 25.) The circuit court stated that it was revoking Lawrence's probation because it believed, under "§ 13A-5-8.1, Ala. Code 1975, the limitation on revocation of probation [for technical violations] does not apply." (C. 25.)

On October 13, 2021, Lawrence moved the court to reconsider his probation revocation, arguing that "[t]he only evidence indicating [he] did not, in fact, enter a six (6) months' residential rehabilitation program pursuant to the June 10, 2021, probation modification order were the hearsay statements" of his probation officer. (C. 27-29.) Lawrence further argued that "[t]here was no testimony that a probation officer reviewed the probation modification dated June 10, 2021, with [him] nor was a 'probation modification order/contract' entered into evidence signed by" him, and, thus, his probation could not be revoked under Rules 27.1 and 27.6, Ala. R. Crim. P. (C. 29.) Lawrence also argued that, even if he violated probation, it was a technical violation, warranting a dunk under § 15-22-54(e), Ala. Code 1975, not revocation under § 13A-5-8.1. (C. 30-31.) The circuit court denied Lawrence's motion. (C. 42.) This appeal follows. (C. 36.)

Standard of Review

"A probationer is entitled to minimum standards of due process, but not the higher standards of a formal trial." Beckham v. State, 872 So.2d 208, 210 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (citing Williams v. State, 673 So.2d 829, 830 (Ala.Crim.App.1995)).

" '"'A proceeding to revoke probation is not a criminal prosecution, and we have no statute requiring a formal trial. Upon a hearing of this character, the court is not bound by strict rules of evidence, and the alleged violation of a valid condition of probation need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
"'Martin v. State, 46 Ala.App. 310, 312, 241 So.2d 339, 341 (Ala.Crim.App.1970) (quoting State v. Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 154 S.E.2d 53 (1967) (citation omitted)). Under that standard, the trial court need "only to be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has violated the conditions of his probation." Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 103, 312 So.2d 620, 623 (1975).'
"Ex parte J.J.D., 778 So.2d 240, 242 (Ala. 2000)."

Singleton v. State, 209 So.3d 529, 533 (Ala.Crim.App.2015).

"Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's conclusions in a probation-revocation proceeding, including the determination whether to revoke, modify, or continue the probation. See, e.g., Ex parte J.J.D., 778 So.2d 240 (Ala. 2000) (holding that [] a trial court's order in a probation-revocation proceeding will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion); and Moore v. State, 432 So.2d 552, 553 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), quoting Wright v. State, 349 So.2d 124, 125 (Ala.Crim.App.1977) ('[o]nly a gross abuse of discretion will justify the reviewing court in disturbing the trial court's conclusions.') A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where the record contains no evidence on which it rationally could have based its decision. See State v. Jude, 686 So.2d 528 (Ala. Crim. App.); Dowdy v. Gilbert Eng'g Co., 372 So.2d 11 (Ala. 1979)."

Williams v. State, 895 So.2d 1012, 1016 (Ala.Crim.App.2004).

Analysis

On appeal, Lawrence argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by revoking his probation because: (1) the circuit court revoked his probation based solely on hearsay, (2) nothing in the record showed that he was provided written notice, under Rules 27.1 and 27.6(e), that he was to complete either a 12-month or a 6-month residential rehabilitation program, and (3) the circuit court erroneously relied on § 13A-5-8.1 to revoke his probation instead of ordering a "45-day dunk" as required by § 15-22-54. Each of these arguments was preserved below, both at Lawrence's probation-revocation hearing and in his timely motion to reconsider. However, this Court need not address the first issue Lawrence raises, that his revocation was based solely on hearsay,[1] because his second and third arguments require the reversal of his probation revocation for the reasons set forth below.

Lawrence argues that he did not receive proper written notice, as required by Rules 27.1 and 27.6(e), Ala. R. Crim. P., of the modification of his conditions of probation, allegedly requiring him to complete a residential rehabilitation program of any length, much...

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