Lawrence v. State
| Decision Date | 29 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 982S368,982S368 |
| Citation | 464 N.E.2d 923 |
| Parties | Billy E. LAWRENCE, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Harry W. Hanson, Washington, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant, Billy E. Lawrence, Sr., was convicted on four counts of the offense of child molesting in violation of Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-3(a). Appellant was forty-four years of age at the time of the alleged offense, and the putative victim in each count was a nine year-old neighborhood girl. The separate counts charged fondling, sexual intercourse, and anal and oral copulation. He received sentences totalling fifty years.
The first question is whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a rape conviction of appellant twenty-two years before the charged offenses, in Illinois in 1959. The evidence was objected to on the basis that it was irrelevant. The objection was overruled. The gravamen of the argument on appeal is that the 1959 conviction and the sexual misconduct which it represented had no logical relevancy at all after taking place to prove alleged acts of sexual misconduct subsequently charged, and that any strand of relevance extending into the future time from 1959, became attenuated and then totally non-existent by the passage of time prior to 1981, when the acts forming the basis of the present charges took place.
Relevancy is the tendency of evidence to establish a material proposition. In order to be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, evidence must be probative of guilt.
The general rule in Indiana for the admission of evidence of separate, independent and distinct crimes in establishing the guilt of the defendant is that such evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible subject to several exceptions. Among them is the exception for the admissibility of prior criminal acts which show the defendant had a depraved sexual instinct, when the charges upon which he is being tried involve that same instinct. Miller v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 296, 268 N.E.2d 299; Austin v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 529, 319 N.E.2d 130. Appellant's prior rape conviction was admitted on the basis that it was circumstantial evidence of his guilt of the sexual misconduct charged in this case. Consent of the victim is not at issue.
In this case, appellant was twenty-two years old in 1959 and forty-four years old in 1981. Throughout this span of years, a man normally maintains an active sexual interest in and at least some degree of sexual aggression toward women. Achieving sexual connection with a nine year-old child is a sexually aggressive act, accomplished by overpowering and intimidation. It is similar in character to the sexual aggressive attitude accompanying an approach to a woman by force, threat and engendering fear. Since the male sexual attitude normally continues and persists through these years, the passage of time alone would not end any strand of relevance having it as its basis. The argument made is not sustained. Augustine v. State, (1984) Ind., 461 N.E.2d 101.
Faced with limited evidence of physical trauma to support these charges, the witness, Norma Newman, a clinical social worker, was called to the stand during the State's case-in-chief immediately following the testimony of the child. She first explained that she had spent six hour long sessions with the child over a five-month period following the alleged assaults. She also stated that the exact nature of the assaults was not touched upon in any of the sessions. Under questioning by the prosecutor in the case-in-chief, the following occurred:
"Q. Have you come into any conclusions concerning her perception of reality?
A. I believe (the alleged victim) has a strong ability to know what happens to her.
* * *
* * *
Q. Did you receive any indication or is it your opinion that it is possible that she fabricated the story concerning her sexual trauma, out of some sort of need?
* * *
* * *
A. None. The only thing I noted was a great anxiety on (her) part to be very sure she was telling the truth very precisely. She had anxiety about preciseness."
Defense counsel made continuing and immediately contemporaneous objections to these questions on the basis that th...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Goodson v. State
...277, 278 (Colo.Ct.App.1987); Tingle v. State, 536 So.2d 202 (Fla.1988); Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind.1988); Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind.1984); State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 378-79 (Iowa 1986) (court held that testimony that a young child could not fantasize......
-
Lehiy v. State
...the depraved sexual instinct exception was not relied on in Watkins to admit the evidence or to affirm the admission. Lawrence v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 923, involved a prosecution on four counts of child molesting. Evidence of a rape committed by the defendant was admitted and the ......
-
State v. Taylor
...some states led to the candid recognition of the admissibility of other acts which show "a depraved sexual instinct", Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923, 924 (Ind.1984); or an "emotional propensity for sexual aberration", State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 590 P.2d 1366, 1372 (banc 1979); or ......
-
Miller v. State
...her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone. This type of evidence of course would not have been admissible under Lawrence v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 923, in the State's However, in view of the fact that appellant saw fit to present evidence that he had no tendency to be sadis......