Lawrence v. United States

• Decision Date: 29 December 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 80-3321.
• Citation: 631 F. Supp. 631
• Parties: Frank E. LAWRENCE v. UNITED STATES of America, Interstate Commerce Commission, Anthony W. Bummara, Joel Burns, William Love and Lewis Teeple.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

631 F. Supp. 631

Frank E. LAWRENCE v. UNITED STATES of America, Interstate Commerce Commission, Anthony W. Bummara, Joel Burns, William Love and Lewis Teeple.

Civ. A. No. 80-3321.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 8, 1982.

On Motion for Summary Judgment December 29, 1982.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kathleen M. Lynch, Lawrence J. Fox and Louis T. Bologini, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

James G. Sheehan and Alexander Ewing, Jr., Asst. U.S. Attys., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants U.S., Anthony W. Bummara, Joel Burns, William Love and Lewis Teeple.

Charles A. Stark, I.C.C., Washington, D.C., for I.C.C.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HANNUM, District Judge.

The plaintiff in this case was formerly employed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. He seeks "compensatory and punitive damages, reinstatement, transfer and backpay for the intentional, wanton and malicious violation of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment."¹ Presently before the Court is defendants' Amended Motion To Dismiss.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff was formerly employed as a special agent at the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in Philadelphia.² In early 1976, at the request of Congressional investigators, plaintiff wrote a letter to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives. This letter presumably contained information of what plaintiff considered to be "certain misdeeds" at the ICC.³ The contents of this letter came to the attention of the defendants. As a result of supplying this information to the Congressional committee, plaintiff was "harassed and tormented" by defendant Bummara with the knowledge and encouragement of defendants ICC, Burns, Love and Teeple.⁴ This harassment of the plaintiff occurred during the period from February, 1976 to March, 1977. The complaint alleges that this campaign of harassment resulted in the infliction of severe emotional distress upon the plaintiff injuring his emotional and physical health and compelling him to retire. Specifically, paragraph fourteen of the Amended Complaint states:

As a result of Defendant Bummara's retaliatory harassment and extreme and outrageous conduct, Plaintiff developed a life threatening heart condition, suffered emotional distress, humiliation and embarassment, and experienced a heart attack.

Plaintiff took a medical disability retirement on August 26, 1977 due to his heart condition "caused by Defendant Bummara's retaliatory harassment and extreme and outrageous conduct."⁵

Plaintiff has grounded jurisdiction upon the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; the Mandamus Act, compelling an officer or employee of the United States to perform a duty owed, 28 U.S.C. § 1361; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

In their motion defendants urge numerous grounds for dismissal of plaintiff's amended complaint, respecting this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over the action as well as the question of whether the Amended Complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because differing bases for relief apply to the individual defendants as opposed to the governmental defendants, (the United States of America and the Interstate Commerce Commission), they will be treated separately.

Individual Defendants

Defendants urge dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment claims on grounds that the allegations of the Amended Complaint do not constitute actionable violations of plaintiff's First Amendment rights and consequently, there is no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It is contended, in this regard, that the Amended Complaint is deficient for failure to allege that defendants "restrained, prevented, or chilled" plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights. However, in order to dismiss Lawrence's Amended Complaint as jurisdictionally insubstantial under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court must find that the claims asserted therein are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, or clearly foreclosed by the decisions of the Supreme Court so as to leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of the controversy." Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F.2d 1066, 1068 (3d Cir.1974). Far from being "devoid of merit," the Court finds that plaintiff's allegations regarding the severe harassment he received in retaliation for a letter he sent to a House subcommittee, state a cognizable First Amendment claim sufficient to establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It is well settled that a suit for damages against federal officials based on deprivations of Constitutional guarantees, including First Amendment rights, is within the reach of federal question jurisdiction. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481, 486 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2897-98, 2900 n. 9, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir.1975). Cf. Hochman v. Board of Education of the City of Newark, 534 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1976) (dismissal of non-tenured teacher in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment rights was proper invocation of federal jurisdiction under civil rights statute). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 403 U.S. 388, 391, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2002, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

A more telling objection is raised as respects the timeliness of plaintiff's claims for money damages against the individual defendants. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants last harassed him in March, 1977 and that he was compelled to take a medical disability retirement from the Commission on August 26, 1977. Three years later, on August 26, 1980, plaintiff filed his original complaint in this action.

Because no federal statute of limitations exists to govern Bivens-type actions for violation of constitutional rights, the Court must apply the limitation period which would be applicable in the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting, had an action seeking similar relief been brought under state law. Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Association, 559 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir.1977). "The present action having been brought in federal court in Pennsylvania, our task is to determine which Pennsylvania statute of limitation would govern a similar action under state law in a Pennsylvania state court." Id. In this regard, defendants contend that the plaintiff's claim is most analogous to the state law tort action for intentional infliction of mental distress, a claim to which Pennsylvania courts would apply the two year limitations period provided in 42 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 5524(2).⁶See Stringer v. Commonwealth of Pa., Department of Community Affairs, 446 F.Supp. 704, 706 (M.D.Pa. 1978). Plaintiff, on the other hand would characterize the action as being analogous to those torts involving the wrongful interference with another's contractual or employment rights, to which the six year residuary statute of limitations, 42 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN. § 5527(6), would apply.⁷Meyers, supra at 902-03.

In choosing among alternative statutes of limitation, the Court must follow the framework for analysis set forth in Meyers, supra. First, the Court notes, that the plaintiff's action sounds in tort, rather than in contract. Id. at 901.

The determination that the action sounds in tort is only the first step, however; we must identify the specific state tort most similar to the acts alleged in the complaint. We can best assess the similarity of the various state law torts to ... the plaintiff's federal claim from three perspectives: (1) the defendant's conduct, (2) the plaintiff's injury, and (3) the relief requested.

559 F.2d at 901.

From the standpoint of both the defendants' conduct and the plaintiff's injury, the present action bears a marked resemblance to the cause of action for the tortious infliction of mental distress.⁸ As respects the defendants' conduct, it is alleged that defendants engaged in a campaign of harassment and torment designed to injure plaintiff's health and compel him to retire. Amended Complaint at ¶ 9. The alleged acts of defendant Bummara were "extreme and outrageous" and through this conduct, Bummara "intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on Plaintiff." Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 11-12. The ICC and other individual defendants, it is averred, "wrongfully encouraged Defendant Bummara to harass Plaintiff and to injure his emotional and physical health and compel him to retire." Amended Complaint at ¶ 13.

As respects Plaintiff's injuries, it is alleged that as a result of defendants' outrageous conduct, "Plaintiff developed a life threatening heart condition, suffered emotional distress, humiliation and embarassment, and experienced a heart attack." Amended Complaint at ¶ 14. As a further result, "Plaintiff was compelled to take a medical disability retirement from the ICC because of the severe heart condition" he suffered. Amended Complaint at ¶ 16. Plaintiff, nonetheless, maintains that the most apt analogy is the group of tort claims

... such as fraudulent interference with contractual rights, wrongful interference with another's business, violation of seniority rights, and breach of an express trust. All these torts involve the wrongful interference with another's financial, commercial, or business rights. A victim of one of these torts suffers not so much from an emotional or mental trauma as he does from the actual denial of his right to lawfully pursue his business, employment, or personal affairs.

Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Association, 559 F.2d 894, 902 (3d Cir.1977). See also Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsbury State College, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.1978) (claim of non-tenured college professor for employment termination in violation of his First Amendment rights resembled a state law claim for wrongful interference with contract); Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335...