Lawrence v. Welch
Decision Date | 03 June 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 07-1026.,07-1026. |
Citation | 531 F.3d 364 |
Parties | Frank J. LAWRENCE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janet K. WELCH, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Dennis B. Dubuc, Essex Park Law Office, South Lyon, Michigan, for Appellant. Richard C. Kraus, Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, Lansing, Michigan, Denise C. Barton, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Dennis B. Dubuc, Essex Park Law Office, South Lyon, Michigan, for Appellant. Richard C.
Kraus, Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, Lansing, Michigan, Denise C. Barton, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, John R. Oostema, Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellees.
Before: ROGERS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*
BERTELSMAN, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court. SUTTON, J. (pp. 373-74) delivered a separate concurring opinion, in which ROGERS, J., joined.
Plaintiff-Appellant Frank J. Lawrence, Jr. ("Lawrence") appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials of the State Bar of Michigan in connection with their denial of his application for a license to practice law. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
Frank J. Lawrence, Jr. graduated from an accredited Michigan law school and passed the Michigan bar exam in 2001. He first applied for a license to practice law in Michigan the same year. For reasons not relevant here, that application was ultimately withdrawn.
Between 2001 and 2004, a contentious relationship developed between Lawrence, the State Bar of Michigan ("SBM"), and the Michigan Board of Law Examiners ("BLE"). In 2003, Lawrence filed a federal lawsuit against the BLE, the SBM, certain of its officials and employees, and justices of the Michigan Supreme Court. See Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 Fed.Appx. 442 (6th Cir.2006). Lawrence sought declarations that certain rules of the state bar were unconstitutional, and he alleged, among other things, that the state bar had violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in processing his 2001 application for admission prior to its withdrawal. The district court dismissed Lawrence's claims on various grounds, and this court affirmed. Id.
In 2003, Lawrence also began operating a registered website called "StateBarWatch" on which he actively criticized the SBM and BLE for alleged dishonesty within the Michigan attorney licensing system. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 17 (Compl. at ¶ 21).
On August 18, 2004, Lawrence reapplied for admission to the Michigan bar. On August 15, 2005, Lawrence was interviewed by three members of a SBM District Character and Fitness Committee: David H. Baum ("Baum"), Randy A. Musbach ("Musbach"), and Sonal Hope Mithani ("Mithani"). During this interview, Lawrence stated that he had little respect for the Michigan state court system, and he expressed the view that the federal courts are the "guardians of the constitution" and that the Michigan state court system fails adequately to protect individuals' constitutional rights. J.A. at 19 (Compl. ¶ 24).
Following this interview, the District Committee forwarded to the SBM a Report and Recommendation stating: "The Committee does not believe that the applicant, Frank J. Lawrence, Jr., has shown by clear and convincing evidence that he currently possesses the requisite good character and fitness to be recommended to the practice of law in this state." J.A. 278. With respect to the above opinions expressed by Lawrence during his interview, the report stated: "We are concerned about providing a law license to someone who, even before he has handled his first case as a member of the bar, has effectively written off such a huge component of the justice system." J.A. 280.
Following the issuance of this Report and Recommendation, Lawrence made several communications to the employers of the members of the District Committee. He telephoned the University of Michigan Law School, where Baum was the Assistant Dean of Student Affairs. Lawrence told Baum's assistant that he wanted to address the student bar association to let them know how poorly he thought he had been treated. Lawrence also sent a letter to a board member of the legal services organization for which Mithani was a director. In the letter, Lawrence stated how poorly he had been treated and how Mithani had manipulated Lawrence's stated views about the state court system.
The District Committee recommendation was sent directly to the BLE, which voted to accept the recommendation. Lawrence then requested a hearing.
A hearing was held before the BLE on April 20, 2006. Lawrence was questioned about his communications with Baum's and Mithani's employers, but he denied that they were inappropriate. J.A. 37-57. On June 14, 2006, the BLE issued a written opinion denying Lawrence's application for admission to practice law. Id. Lawrence did not seek review of this decision in the Michigan Supreme Court.
On September 6, 2006, Lawrence filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as defendants John T. Berry, executive director of the SBM, in his official capacity; Louis A. Smith, President of the BLE, in his official capacity; and Baum, Musbach, and Mithani, all in their individual capacities. Lawrence alleged that the BLE's denial of his bar application violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring defendants to issue him a license to practice law. Second, and in the alternative, Lawrence sought prospective relief to prohibit defendants from using his protected First Amendment activities as the basis for denying his future applications for a Michigan law license. Finally, the third count sought damages from Baum, Musbach, and Mithani for their alleged retaliation against Lawrence for the exercise of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Lawrence also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requesting the same relief sought in the first two counts of the complaint.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss. In an opinion dated December 14, 2006, the district court granted those motions and denied Lawrence's motions for preliminary injunctive relief. J.A. 63. The district court held that Lawrence's attack upon the BLE decision denying his bar application was squarely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Alternatively, the court held that Lawrence's challenge to the constitutionality of the bar admission process had been rejected by this court in Lawrence's prior appeal.
As to Lawrence's second claim, the district court held that a "decision granting prospective relief would necessarily imply that the hearing panel's decision was improper and forbidden by the constitution" and thus was equally barred by Feldman. J.A. 67-68. Further, the court held that, due to the discretion involved in such future decisions, an injunction could not be "meaningfully crafted or enforced." J.A. 68. Third, because Lawrence had not yet filed another application for admission, the district court held that the matter was speculative and not ripe for review. Id.
Finally, the district court held that Lawrence's claims for damages against the individual District Committee members were barred because those defendants were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. Id.
Lawrence timely appealed.
This court reviews de novo the district court's ruling that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded subject matter jurisdiction. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir.2006) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 41, 169 L.Ed.2d 40 (2007).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Section 1257(a) states that a final judgment of the highest court of a state may be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on the negative inference that, if appellate court review of such state judgments is vested in the Supreme Court, then it follows that such review may not be had in the lower federal courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).
In Exxon, the Supreme Court recently summarized the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.
In the wake of Exxon, this circuit has "distinguished between plaintiffs who bring an impermissible attack on a state court judgment — situations in which Rooker-Feldman applies — and plaintiffs who assert independent claims before the district court — situations in which Rooker-Feldman does not apply." Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children and Family Serv., 241 Fed.Appx. 285, 287 (6th Cir.2007) (citing McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir.2006)).
In McCormick, we explained that the pertinent inquiry after Exxon is whether the "source of the injury" upon which plaintiff bases his federal claim is the state court judgment:
The inquiry then is the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint. If the source...
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