Lawrence v. Woods
| Decision Date | 25 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-cv-02663 (CJN) |
| Parties | NAVAL LAWRENCE, Petitioner, v. W.L. WOODS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Naval Lawrence's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pet's. Mem., ECF No 1, ECF No. 1-1, exhibits in support ( ), ECF No. 1-2, and supplement, ECF No. 3. Lawrence argues that his trial counsel, appellate counsel and counsel for collateral review proceedings were each unconstitutionally ineffective. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition will be denied, and this action will be dismissed.
On October 17, 2001, Lawrence was charged in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“Superior Court” or “trial court”) with one count of assault with the intent to kill while armed, one count of aggravated assault while armed, one count of mayhem while armed, one count of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, one count of carrying a pistol without a license, one count of unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm, and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition. See United States v Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2001) at Indictment. A jury trial, held before Judge Wendell Gardner concluded on June 5, 2002, and Lawrence was found guilty on all counts. See id. at Trial Entries and Guilty-Jury Trial.
Mr James Rudasill, Esq., represented Lawrence at trial. See id. at Trial Entries. After Lawrence's conviction but before sentencing, Mr. Rudasill withdrew his appearance, and Lawrence retained Mr. Paul Hunt, Esq., who entered his appearance on February 6, 2003, id. at Attorney Retained, and represented him at sentencing, see id. at Sentencing Entries. On August 4, 2003, Lawrence was sentenced by Judge Eugene E. Hamilton to 35 years in prison. See id. at Sentencing Entries and Judgment and Commitment Order.
Lawrence filed a timely notice of appeal on August 29, 2003. See Lawrence v. United States, No. 03-CF-1029 (D.C. 2003) at Notice of Appeal. During the pendency of the direct appeal, on October 13, 2004, Lawrence also filed a first D.C. Code § 23-110 motion. See Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 at Post-Trial Motion Entries; Pet's. Exs. at 41-50.[1] Hunt continued to represent Lawrence during the first collateral review and the direct appeal. See id.
In the first § 23-110 motion, Lawrence raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, alleging that Mr. Rudasill undermined his ability to present a defense of misidentification, and further strongarmed him into testifying, thereby unfairly forcing him to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Pet's. Exs. at 4. The Superior Court denied the motion without a hearing on March 24, 2006. See Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 at Order Entered on the Docket (Mar. 27, 2006). Lawrence appealed the denial of the first § 23-110 motion on April 21, 2006. See id. at Notice of Appeal; Lawrence v. United States, No. 06-CO-0561 (D.C. 2006).
On March 15, 2007, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Lawrence's judgment and conviction on direct appeal but remanded the matter to the Superior Court for the specific purpose of merging the mayhem-while-armed and aggravated-assault-while-armed convictions. See Lawrence v. United States, 919 A.2d 1173 (D.C. 2007) (unpublished table opinion).
On July 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's denial of Lawrence's first § 23-110 motion. Lawrence v. United States, 928 A.2d 730 (D.C. 2007) (unpublished table opinion).
Several years later, on September 28, 2012, Lawrence, proceeding pro se, filed a second § 23110 motion. See Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 at 23-110 Motion Filed; Pet's. Exs. at 20-29. On May 7, 2013, he supplemented that motion with additional arguments. See Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 at Movant's Pro-Se Motion to Supplement and/or Amend. Lawrence contended that his trial counsel, Mr. Rudasill, was ineffective in failing to (1) properly advise him regarding his sentence exposure, (2) disclose a conflict of interest, and (3) advise him of a second plea offer. See Pet's Exs. at 4. He also argued that his appellate and collateral review counsel, Mr. Hunt, was ineffective on direct appeal and in pursuing the first § 23-110 motion, by not raising Mr. Rudasill's failure to advise him regarding his sentencing exposure. See id. at 5-7.
On May 12, 2016, Superior Court Judge Thomas J. Motley issued an opinion denying Lawrence's second § 23-110 motion. See id. at 2-18. First, he held that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the claims against appellate counsel, Mr. Hunt, which had to be addressed through a motion to recall the mandate in the direct appeal. Id. at 6. He also noted that, in general, any sentencing exposure claims were procedurally barred because even though Mr. Rudasill failed to properly advise him, Lawrence was admittedly “aware of the sentencing exposure issue before sentencing” and, therefore, also “at the time appellate counsel noticed an appeal and filed the first § 23-110 motion.” Id. at 6-7; see also Reply Ex. 1 at 1-2. And even if the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the claims against Hunt, any such claims would be moot because Lawrence suffered no prejudice arising from Mr. Rudasill's failure to advise. See Pet's. Exs. at 5-7. Third, Judge Motley found that the conflict of interest claim against Mr. Rudasill--which Lawrence later voluntarily withdrew--was also procedurally barred because there was no showing of actual prejudice arising from any existing conflict. See id. at 7.
Only the final claim then remained: the alleged failure of Mr. Rudasill to convey a second plea offer. See Pet's. Exs. at 8-18. Judge Motley carefully explored this claim, appointed new counsel, Mr. Ian Williams, Esq., to represent Lawrence, and conducted several evidentiary hearings. See Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 at Order Appointing Post Disposition CJA Counsel; Pet's. Exs. at 2-3. The court ultimately found that Mr. Rudasill's performance was deficient because he failed to communicate a second plea offer to Lawrence a few weeks before trial. Pet's. Exs. at 11-12. This second plea would have reduced Lawrence's sentencing exposure from 45 years if he went to trial, down to 30 years had he pleaded guilty. Id. at 15. But the court concluded this deficiency was not prejudicial because (1) Lawrence failed to demonstrate that he would have accepted the plea offer because “from the perspective of a twenty-four-year-old” (Lawrence's age at the time of the plea) 45 years and 30 years “both represent similarly dire sentences,” Lawrence had steadfastly maintained his innocence, and he had plausible defenses. Id. at 12-17. And, independently, (2) Lawrence did not show that a trial court would accept the plea because, as evidenced by his trial testimony, Lawrence had a viable self-defense claim and so “the trial judge would have had difficulty accepting [the] plea.” See id. at 17-18.
On May 17, 2016, Lawrence filed an appeal challenging the denial of the second § 23-110 motion. See Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 at Notice of Appeal Filed By Defense; Lawrence v. United States, 16-CO-0489 (D.C. 2016).
During the pendency of that appeal, on December 5, 2016, Lawrence, again proceeding pro se, filed a third § 23-110 motion. See Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 at § 23-110 Motion Filed. Lawrence again alleged that his appellate counsel on direct review, Mr. Hunt, was ineffective by failing to raise his sentence exposure issue on direct appeal or in the first § 23-110 motion, or to file a motion to supplement the sentencing record with transcripts that were apparently missing during the direct appeal. See Pet's. Exs. at 64-65.
In the meantime, on November 22, 2017, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's denial of Lawrence's second § 23-110 motion, see Lawrence, 16-CO-0489 at Affirmed by MOJ; AR Ex. 6, ECF No. 11-6, at 2-11, and the mandate was formally issued on December 14, 2017, see Lawrence, 16-CO-0489 at Affirmed by MOJ, Mandate. On December 18, 2017, Lawrence first attempted to challenge this determination by filing a motion for extension of time to file a motion for rehearing en banc. See AR Ex. 1, ECF No. 11-1, at 1-2; id. at Ex. 2, ECF No. 11-2, at 3-5. After corresponding with the Clerk for the Court of Appeals on January 12, 2018, Lawrence learned that he was first required to file a motion to recall the mandate, as the Court of Appeals could take no action until its mandate was recalled. See AR Ex. 2 at 4-5.
Meanwhile, on January 17, 2018, the Superior Court denied Lawrence's claims in his third § 23-110 motion for the same reasons it denied those claims in his second § 23-110 motion. See Lawrence, 16-CO-0489 at Order Denying Defendant's Third Motion; Pet's. Exs. at 64-66. Lawrence filed a timely notice of appeal. See Lawrence, No. 2001 FEL 006544 at Notice of Appeal Filed By Defense; Lawrence v. United States, No. 18-CO-0091 (D.C. 2018).
On January 23, 2018, Lawrence filed a motion to recall the Court of Appeals' mandate affirming the trial court's denial of his second § 23-110 motion; he included a request for a 30-day extension to file an application for rehearing en banc. See Lawrence, 16-CO-0489 at Motion to Recall the Mandate (Appellant); AR Ex. 2 at 5-6. In the motion, Lawrence specifically sought to “recall the mandate . . . and to reissue the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment (dated November 22, 2017) affirming the Honorable Thomas J. Motley's Order of the Superior Court denying Appellant's [second] D.C. Code [§] 23-110 [motion] requesting the Court to vacate his sentence.” ...
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