Laws v. Fisher

Decision Date19 June 1973
Docket NumberNo. 44494,44494
Citation1973 OK 69,513 P.2d 876
PartiesLeland E. LAWS, Appellant, v. Oliver D. FISHER, Appellee.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

A husband's right to recover special damages for loss of his wife's services, or for medical and hospital expenses arising out of her injuries, is derivative only, so that if she has no valid claim for such injuries, he is likewise without right to recover for such damages.

Appeal from the District Court of Kingfisher County; J. Russell Swanson, Trial Judge.

Appeal from Order of District Court that sustained Motion For Judgment For Defendant which stated that the issues of negligence between the parties had previously been litigated and determined in action by plaintiff's wife against defendant. Affirmed.

Charles W. Stubbs, Stubbs & Stiner, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Dale Reneau, Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

LAVENDER, Justice:

The issue is the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, to a husband's action brought after the wife of plaintiff had previously brought an action against the same defendant for damages arising from injuries to her. The doctrine requires an identity of parties and subject matter in the two actions.

The wife's injuries occurred in an automobile accident in which her huaband had been driver of a car in which she was a passenger, and the car struck the rear of defendant's truck stopped on the highway. There was judgment for defendant in the wife's action, and her husband brought this action for loss of his wife's services, society and companionship, i.e., consortium, and other damages to himself because of his wife's injuries, and for damages to and loss of use of his automobile.

Defendant moved for judgment for defendant, stating that the issues of negligence between the parties had been litigated in the prior action. The trial judge sustained the motion. Plaintiff has appealed and defendant urges the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent litigation of the husband's cause of action. Both parties have briefed the matter, and plaintiff also urges the statutory separatedness of rights of husband and wife to appeal to courts for redress. He also points out that damages sought were not considered in the earlier action by his wife.

We find that the subject matter of circumstances of the accident and the determinative issues of the negligence of the plaintiff husband and defendant was litigated in trial of the wife's action, and that there was therefore an identity of subject matter in the two actions. Further, that there was an identity of plaintiff parties in the two actions because the husband's cause of action was derived from that of his wife. There being the same defendant in both actions, there was an identity of parties. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies and the trial judge properly sustained the Motion For Judgment For Defendant.

It was said in Smittle v. Eberle, 1960, Okl., 353 P.2d 121, quoting from Schneider et al. v. Republic Supply Co., 123 Okl. 98, 252 P. 45 that:

'For a judgment to be an estoppel, there must be an identity of parties, as well as of subject-metter; and the parties between whom the judgment is claimed to be an estoppel must have been parties to the action in which it was rendered in the same capacities and in the same antagonistic relation, or in privity with parties to such former action.'

Again, this court in Hankins v. District Court of Jackson County, 1967, Okl., 424 P.2d 26, quoted from Lewis v. Aubrey, Okl., 404 P.2d 1005, regarding the doctrine:

'Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a judgment, whether in favor of plaintiff or defendant, is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties on a different claim, as to issues raised in the subsequent action which were actually litigated and determined in the prior action; the test in each case is whether a given issue was necessary to the determination in the former trial.'

Therefore, although identity of causes of action is not a necessary element in a plea of collateral estoppel, it is necessary that the point on which the plea of estoppel by the prior judgment is based be in issue in the later case, and have been in issue and decided in the former. Wilson v. Lee Evans Drilling Co., 1957, Okl., 322 P.2d 630; Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Thompson, 1963, Okl., 380 P.2d 705. Or, as stated in a syllabus to Wilkey v. Southwestern Greyhound...

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34 cases
  • McCoy v. Colonial Baking Co., Inc., s. 07-CA-58766
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • November 28, 1990
    ...issue in the husband's action, we hold that the husband was and is collaterally estopped from litigating the issue. Laws v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876, 878 (Okla.1973). The first federal court to publish an opinion on the application of collateral estoppel to loss-of-consortium actions concurred ......
  • Farley v. City of Claremore
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • May 5, 2020
    ...attributes for either a wrongful death action and damages or loss of consortium damages in various actions. Compare , Laws v. Fisher , 1973 OK 69, 513 P.2d 876, 878 (loss to husband of spousal services was based on derivative damages arising from an injury to his wife, and derivative claim ......
  • Davis v. Gracey, 95-6245
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • April 21, 1997
    ...(10th Cir.1995). Collateral estoppel only applies to issues actually and necessarily determined in the prior proceeding. Laws v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876, 877 (Okla.1973). The officers concede the earlier proceedings in state court did not resolve the statutory claims raised by plaintiffs. The ......
  • Carris v. John R. Thomas and Associates, P.C., 82952
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • April 4, 1995
    ...Anderson v. Falcon Drilling Co., 695 P.2d 521, 526 (Okla.1985).15 Bras v. First Bank & Trust Co., see note 12, supra; Laws v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876, 877 (Okla.1973); Runyan v. City of Henryetta, see note 5, supra.16 The arbitration award merely orders the power authority to pay the contracto......
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