Laws v. Laws, 77-1766
| Decision Date | 08 November 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1766,77-1766 |
| Citation | 364 So.2d 798 |
| Parties | Robert Leith LAWS, Appellant, v. Sandra Ayres LAWS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Joe Teague Caruso of Wolfe, Kirschenbaum, Caruso & Mosely, P.A., Cocoa Beach, for appellant.
Benjamin Y. Saxon of Saxon & Richardson, P.A., Melbourne, for appellee.
Appeal by the Husband from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding the Wife, as special equity, (1) all of the Husband's interest in certain real property theretofore held as a tenancy by the entireties, (2) the furniture and furnishings located in the real property, and (3) a 10% Interest in stock of the Bendix Corporation and Facet, Inc., which was in the sole name of the Husband. The Wife has filed a cross appeal alleging error by the trial judge in awarding the Husband a 10% Special equity in the real property and furniture and furnishings, plus the Court's refusal to award her alimony of any description.
The parties were married in 1967, a little over ten years prior to the filing of the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, and 174 days after the Wife was divorced from her former Husband. Under the terms of a "Separation, Custody, and Property Settlement Agreement", the Wife received from her former Husband the real property which is the subject of this appeal, said property being described as " . . . the residence of the parties and four rental units . . . ". At the time of her prior divorce, the real property was encumbered by a $39,000.00 first mortgage, a $10,000.00 second mortgage, $1,410.76 owed on the furniture a $1,996.25 swimming pool loan, and a $1,500.00 personal loan, with the former Husband assuming responsibility to pay the second mortgage ($10,000.00) and the $1,500.00 personal loan.
In the case sub judice, the parties moved into the home and rented the apartments, the rental proceeds going into a joint account to pay bills and the mortgage payment. The Wife was employed for a short time after the marriage and then again for a year in 1973 or 1974, becoming continuously employed for the last 21/2 years prior to the instant dissolution. During the six years the Wife was unemployed, the Husband was the sole support of the family (including the Wife's two children by the former marriage), his money being placed in the joint account and used to pay, among other things, the first mortgage payment on the property ($395.00 per month). During the marriage, the Husband considerably improved the landscaping of the property, performed the minor maintenance and repair work, and shared responsibility for collecting the rents and keeping the books.
At the time of the final hearing, the first mortgage balance was $28,400.00 (down from $39,000.00); the second mortgage balance was $2,600.00 (down from $10,000.00); the pool loan had been fully paid; the home and apartments were valued at $100,000.00.
The real property in question remained in the Wife's former married name until January of 1968 when she, joined by the Husband, conveyed it to a strawman who, in turn, conveyed it back to the Wife, this time in her married name. At the time of this conveyance in January of 1968, the Wife executed a will leaving the property at her death to her Husband, Robert Laws. In December of 1968, the Wife, by warranty deed, conveyed the property to herself and her Husband, creating therein an estate by the entireties in and to the property here in question. The Wife testified that (1) she did not intend to make a gift of the property to her Husband, and (2) the deed was executed to put the property " . . . in both of our names in the event something should happen to me, he would have a place to take care of my children." and (3) " . . . because I felt that we were married and that it wasn't right that it was just left strictly in my name and I did that as a gesture of good faith in the marriage." At the time of conveying the property to her husband and up until two months prior to the final hearing, the Wife's will continued to name the Husband as sole beneficiary of the property.
The case of Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5 (Fla.1976) and its progeny, is dispositive of the issue as to donative intent.
As stated in Ball, supra, at pages 7 and 8:
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Marsh v. Marsh, 80-451
...(houseboat); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 383 So.2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Hart v. Hart, 377 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Laws v. Laws, 364 So.2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Sanders v. Sanders, 362 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).17 See, e. g., Wright v. Wright, 388 So.2d 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Sm......
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Sanford v. Sanford
...The issue is whether the presumption was rebutted by a showing that a gift was intended. This is an issue of fact. Cf. Laws v. Laws, 364 So.2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Ball, 335 So.2d at 5. See also Ward v. Ward, 502 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d ......
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Rosen v. Rosen, 79-2321
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