Laws v. Richland County School Dist. No. 1, 1

Citation270 S.C. 492,243 S.E.2d 192
Decision Date20 March 1978
Docket NumberNo. 1,M,No. 20649,1,20649
PartiesGeorge E. LAWS, Jr., Respondent, v. RICHLAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, a body politic and corporate, Dr. Brandon B. Sparkman, Superintendent of Education; and members of the Board of Trustees of Districtr. Joe E. Bales, Dr. Edward E. Kimbrough, Dr. William H. Lindler, Mr. Sam E. McGregor, Mrs. Rosalind Sargent, Mrs. Barbara Scott, and Mr. Donald N. Upton, all such Individuals named as Defendants being sued in their official capacities only, Appellants. *
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Francis P. Mood, of Boyd, Knowlton, Tate & Finlay, Columbia, for appellants.

John R. Harper, II, Columbia, for respondent.

RHODES, Justice:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court reversing the decision of the Board of School Commissioners for Richland County School District No. 1 to non-renew the respondent's teaching contract. The lower court found that the grounds upon which the Board's decision was predicated were not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and reverse.

The respondent in this action was employed as a music teacher at Hand Middle School for the 1974-75 school year. On April 2, 1975, he was advised by letter from the Director of Personnel for the school district that he was not being recommended for employment for the following school year because of the following grounds:

(a) Lack of sufficient class room control to insure a good program of instruction;

(b) Unwise use of disciplinary action;

(c) Lack of response to suggestions from the principal in better methods of class room management.

After a hearing held at the respondent's request, the Board issued its decision confirming the recommendation to nonrenew the respondent's contract.

The only issue raised by this appeal is whether the grounds given for nonrenewal of the respondent's contract are sufficiently supported by the evidence presented at the hearing before the Board. The respondent has not challenged the legal adequacy of his hearing before the Board. He does not contend that the procedural requirements of the Teachers Employment and Dismissal Act of 1974 1 have not been complied with. Neither does he except to the adequacy of the grounds stated in the notice mailed him on April 2, 1975.

The threshold determination in deciding whether the evidence relied upon by the Board is sufficient to support the allegations against the respondent is that of the scope and standard of review to be employed in a judicial review of the Board's decision. The lower court found the scope of review to be a limited one with the standard by which the Board's decision is to be gauged being whether the grounds given for termination of the respondent's employment are supported by "substantial evidence". We feel the lower court was correct in this determination with the result that much of the following discussion on the applicable scope and standard of review is taken from the lower court's order.

The 1974 Teachers Employment and Dismissal Act does not delineate the scope and standard applicable to judicial review of school board decisions encompassed by the Act. The Act merely states that an "appeal" may be had from the decision of the school board to the circuit court and from the circuit court to the Supreme Court. S.C.Code § 59-25-480 (1976). Consistency with relevant precedent requires that the scope of judicial review be a limited one. In view of the powers, functions, and discretion which must necessarily be vested in educational authorities if they are to execute the duties imposed upon them, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of these authorities. Board of Bank Control v. Thomason, 236 S.C. 158, 113 S.E.2d 544 (1960).

In Board of Bank Control v. Thomason, supra, this Court discussed at length the standards of judicial review applicable to the actions of administrative arms of the government. In conformity with that opinion, we conclude that the decision of the Board in this case can be set aside only if the allegations made against the respondent are unsupported by "substantial evidence".

" Substantial evidence" is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action. Texas Liquor Control Board v. Cervantes, 333 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Civ.App.1960).

Turning to the present case, a conclusion that any one of the three charges against the respondent is supported by substantial evidence will dictate that the school board's decision be sustained. Applying the principles set out above, we find there is substantial evidence to support a finding that there was a "lack of response to suggestions from the principal in better methods of classroom management".

From a reading of the record, it is clear that the allegations against the respondent are rooted in disciplinary problems prevalent in his classes. Considerable testimony was directed to these problems. Testimony indicated that some of these disciplinary problems were traceable to scheduling changes which resulted in disorder among the students. However, from the evidence, reasonable minds could easily have...

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