Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp.

Citation955 F.3d 908
Decision Date10 April 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18-14490,18-14490
Parties Amanda LAWSON-ROSS, Tristian Byrne, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. GREAT LAKES HIGHER EDUCATION CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Katherine Earle Yanes, Gus M. Centrone, Kynes Markman & Felman, PA, TAMPA, FL, Brian Shrader, Dunlap Bennett & Ludwig, PLLC, TAMPA, FL, Daniel A. Zibel, National Student Legal Defense Network, WASHINGTON, DC, for Plaintiffs - Appellants.

Matthew J. Conigliaro, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, PA, TAMPA, FL, Constantinos George Panagopoulos, Ballard Spahr, LLP, WASHINGTON, DC, Christopher Mark Paolini, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, PA, ORLANDO, FL, for Defendant - Appellee.

Faith E. Gay, Gus M. Centrone, Selendy & Gay PLLC, NEW YORK, NY, for Amicus Curiae AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS.

Mark Adam Griffin, Keller Rohrback, LLP, SEATTLE, WA, Benjamin Jerauld Roesch, Jensen Morse Baker PLLC, SEATTLE, WA, for Amici Curiae VETERANS EDUCATION SUCCESS, THE RETIRED ENLISTED ASSOCIATION, THE IVY LEAGUE VETERANS COUNSEL.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO,* District Judge.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Dr. Amanda Lawson-Ross and Tristian Byrne (the "Borrowers") each took out federal student loans to finance higher education. The Borrowers’ federal student loans were serviced by defendant Great Lakes Higher Education Corporation. The Borrowers alleged that Great Lakes made affirmative misrepresentations to them and other borrowers that they were on track to have their student loans forgiven based on their public-service employment when, in fact, their loans were ineligible for the forgiveness program. The Borrowers sued Great Lakes, bringing a variety of claims under Florida law, including the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), Fla. Stat. § 559.55 et seq .

The district court ruled that the Borrowers’ claims were preempted by a provision of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. ("HEA"), which prohibits the application of state law disclosure requirements to loans made under federal student loan programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1098g. In this appeal, we must decide whether the HEA preempts state law claims alleging that student loan servicers made affirmative misrepresentations to borrowers regarding their eligibility for a federal program that forgives student loan balances. We hold that the HEA—which expressly preempts state law disclosure requirements—does not preempt the Borrowers’ claims here. We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of the claims and remand for further proceedings.

I. STUDENT LOAN REGULATION

Congress enacted the HEA, the primary statute governing federal student loans, "to keep the college door open to all students of ability, regardless of socioeconomic background." Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. , 559 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a). To fulfill this goal of improving access to higher education, the HEA established the Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP"). See 20 U.S.C. § 1071.

Under the FFELP, lenders used their own funds to make loans, known as FFEL loans, to students attending postsecondary institutions. These loans were guaranteed by private guarantors and reinsured by the federal government. See id. § 1078(a)-(c). Although the federal government did not directly fund these loans, it served as the ultimate guarantor of the loans through the reinsurance program.1 Lenders for FFEL loans contracted with loan servicing companies to manage borrowers’ repayment of the loans.

In time, Congress shifted away from the FFELP to the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program. See id. §§ 1087a-1087j. Under this program, the federal government itself served as the lender, directly providing the funds for student loans. Because the federal government directly provided the funds for these loans, they aptly became known as "direct loans." Id. § 1087a(b)(2). The government contracted with non-government entities to service direct loans.

To encourage student loan recipients to enter and remain employed in public service jobs, Congress created the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program ("PSLF" or the "PSLF Program"), to forgive direct loan balances for borrowers employed in government or not-for-profit organizations. See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84 § 401, 121 Stat. 784, 800 (2007). Under the PSLF Program, the federal government forgives outstanding student loan balances for borrowers who: (1) made 120 payments on their loan after October 1, 2007; (2) made these payments on an eligible direct loan; (3) were on a qualifying repayment plan; and (4) were employed in public service at the time of the loan forgiveness and had been employed in public service during the period in which the 120 payments were made. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1).

A key requirement of the PSLF Program is that the 120 payments must be made on an "eligible Federal Direct Loan." Id. § 1087e(m). Congress defined an "eligible Federal Direct Loan" to include "a Federal Direct Stafford Loan, Federal Direct PLUS Loan, or Federal Direct Unsubsidized Stafford Loan, or a Federal Direct Consolidation Loan." Id. § 1087e(m)(3)(A). Borrowers with other types of federal student loan debt—including FFEL loans—are ineligible for the PSLF Program. Borrowers with FFEL loans are not entirely out of luck, however. They may consolidate their loans into a Federal Direct Consolidation Loan to become eligible. See id. §§ 1078-3(b)(5); 1087e(m)(3)(A). But any payments they made before consolidation do not count toward the 120 payments required for the program.

The HEA also imposes obligations on student loan lenders and loan servicers.2 Most relevant to the Borrowers’ claims here are the requirements that lenders and servicers make various disclosures to borrowers. See id. § 1083. Although the HEA does not define the term "disclosure," it specifies the information that must be disclosed and when the disclosures must occur. Id. § 1083(a)-(b), (e). The HEA mandates disclosures at or during particular points in time, including: (1) at or before the disbursement of loan proceeds (19 required disclosures); (2) at or before the start of repayment (13 required disclosures); and (3) periodically during repayment. See id. § 1083(a)-(b), (e). Certain information must be provided with each bill or statement sent to the borrower, including the original principal amount of the loan, the borrower’s current outstanding loan balance, the loan’s interest rate, and the total amount the borrower has paid in interest and in the aggregate. Id. § 1083(e)(1). Additional information must be disclosed when the borrower either has provided notice that she is having difficulty making payments or is 60 days delinquent in making payments. See id. § 1083(e)(2)-(3).

Along with imposing these disclosure requirements, the HEA expressly preempts the imposition of state law disclosure requirements. Section 1098g, entitled "Exemption from State disclosure requirements," provides:

Loans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by Title IV of the [HEA] ... shall not be subject to any disclosure requirements of any State law.

Id . § 1098g.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

Defendant-appellee Great Lakes services the Borrowers’ federal student loans. The Borrowers allege that Great Lakes representatives told them they were eligible for forgiveness of their loans through the PSLF Program, and only later did they discover they were not eligible—after they had already made payments that could not then be counted toward the PSLF Program.3

Plaintiff-appellant Lawson-Ross has a master’s degree and a doctoral degree in counseling psychology. She borrowed to finance both degrees. The majority of her loans were not Federal Direct Loans.4 Since completing her doctorate, Lawson-Ross has been employed at the University of Florida working in its Counseling and Wellness Center and also at Florida Gulf Coast University’s Counseling and Psychological Services Office. Given this work in public service, Lawson-Ross expected that after 10 years of working her student loans would be forgiven through the PSLF Program.

Once she began repaying her student loans in 2007, Lawson-Ross regularly contacted Great Lakes to "ensur[e] that she was on track to receive the benefits of the PSLF." Doc. 24 at ¶ 41.5 During her communications with Great Lakes representatives, she inquired about her eligibility for the PSLF Program, and the representatives "repeatedly and explicitly" told her that she was "on track to benefit [from] PSLF, that her loans qualified under that program , and that she would not need to complete any additional forms until her 10 years of public service was completed." Id. at ¶ 42 (emphasis added).

In July 2017, however—almost 10 years later—a Great Lakes representative told Lawson-Ross that she was ineligible for the PSLF Program. She was ineligible because most of her loans were not Federal Direct Loans—the only loans eligible for the PSLF Program. As a result, none of the payments she had made during those 10 years counted toward the PSLF Program. Had Lawson-Ross known that her loans were ineligible for the PSLF Program, she either could have made sure she was eligible for forgiveness under the PSLF Program (presumably by consolidating her loans) or undertaken a different career path.

Plaintiff-appellant Byrne graduated with an associate degree in criminal justice. She took out FFEL loans to help finance her education. Byrne learned about the PSLF Program while working for the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. When she learned about the program, she reached out to Great Lakes to ask whether her job with the sheriff’s office would qualify her for the program. A Great Lakes representative informed her that to qualify for the PSLF Program, she needed only to work full time in her current job, complete an application, have human...

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