Lawson v. Brown

• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Writing for the Court: DALTON
• Citation: Lawson v. Brown, 349 F.Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1972)
• Decision Date: 13 October 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 72-C-66-R.
• Parties: Virginia Louisa LAWSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Otis L. BROWN, Director, et al., Defendants.

349 F. Supp. 203

Virginia Louisa LAWSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Otis L. BROWN, Director, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 72-C-66-R.

United States District Court, W. D. Virginia, Roanoke Division.

October 13, 1972.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David G. Karro, Legal Aid Society of Roanoke Valley, Roanoke, Va., for plaintiffs.

James N. Kincanon, City Atty., H. Ben Jones, Jr., Asst. City Atty., Roanoke, Va., and T. J. Markow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for defendants.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT

DALTON, District Judge.

The present case is a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 against defendants who are connected with the Virginia welfare system.

The issue before the court is the constitutionality of § 63.1-105(a) of the Virginia Code and Regulation 204.1(A) of the Manual of Policy and Procedures for Local Welfare Departments. The plaintiffs in this action contend that this section and regulation are in conflict with 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 and are therefore rendered unconstitutional by the Supremacy Clause. It is also alleged that these contested sections deny plaintiffs equal protection of the law.

§ 63.1-105(a) reads: "A person shall be eligible for aid to dependent children if he: (a) Has not attained the age of sixteen years, or, if regularly attending school, has not attained the age of twenty-one years; ..." Regulation 204.1 states "A child is eligible for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) if he: (A) is under sixteen years of age; or, if sixteen to twenty-one years of age, is regularly attending school; or is a physically or mentally incapacitated child sixteen or seventeen years of age for whom no suitable educational opportunities are available: ..." § 602(a) reads "A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must ... (10) provide, effective July 1, 1951, that all individuals wishing to make application for aid to families with dependent children shall have opportunity to do so, and that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals; ..." (Emphasis supplied). § 606(a)(2) defines a dependent child as one "... who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or, (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment ..."

Plaintiffs Virginia Lawson, Wanda Lawson, and William Lawson, proceeding in forma pauperis, are respectively a mother and her minor children who are over sixteen but less than eighteen years old. The mother has been denied assistance under the Virginia aid to dependent children program (hereinafter referred to as ADC) because her children are over sixteen but under eighteen years of age and are not presently attending school. Plaintiffs Ruby Duvall and Debra Lucas, also proceeding in forma pauperis, are respectively a mother and her daughter, who is presently sixteen. The mother, when this suit was filed, was receiving aid under the ADC program but alleged that it would be discontinued if her daughter failed to attend school this fall. These plaintiffs allege that the Virginia statute and regulation are unconstitutional in that they prescribe a stricter standard to be eligible for ADC relief than does the federal act, which defines a dependent child as one who is under eighteen without the additional requirement that such person regularly attend school.

Viola Cardwell, Audrey Thompson and Deloris Cardwell petitioned to this court and were granted on August 22, 1972 the right to intervene in this suit as party plaintiffs to protect their own interests. They also are proceeding in forma pauperis. Viola Cardwell is the mother of Audrey Thompson, who was eighteen years old on September 27, 1972, and Deloris Cardwell, who is now sixteen years old. Deloris Cardwell alleged that her aid under the ADC program would be terminated in September because she does not plan to attend school. Audrey Thompson alleged that her aid was terminated April 1, 1972 because she was not regularly attending school and that she did not plan to attend school this September.

Should this case proceed as a class action, the remaining plaintiffs are all persons similarly situated who have children over sixteen and under eighteen years of age and who have been denied ADC relief because these children do not regularly attend school.

Defendant Brown is the Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions for Virginia. Defendants Wheeler, Trice, Ashe, Gray, Mays, Penn, Allen, Cohen, and Hough are all members of the Board of Welfare and Institutions. Finally, defendant Jones is the Director of the Roanoke City Department of Welfare. All jointly filed answers and motions to dismiss the suit, except defendant Jones, who has filed a motion to dismiss her as a defendant as well as a motion to dismiss the complaint.

Defendant Jones alleges that her duties are purely ministerial, and that she has no authority to vary from the law, rules, and regulations. It appears to this court that this defendant's duties are of a ministerial nature, that she is presently following all rules, regulations, and statutes, that she has no power in her own position as City Director of Welfare to initiate changes in the welfare system without approval of the other named defendants, and that the plaintiff's claim lies not with her but with her superiors who direct her actions and with the State of Virginia. She is therefore dismissed from this suit.

The remaining defendants have moved to dismiss this suit on the following grounds:

1) that Virginia Lawson has consented to the reduction in the aid given to her;

2) that Debra Lucas, Ruby Duvall, Viola Cardwell, Audrey Thompson, and Deloris Cardwell are not representative of the class;

3) that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies;

4) that this is not a proper class action; and

5) that no claim has been stated for which relief may be granted.

The defendants' first ground arises from the fact that when Mrs. Lawson was advised that her aid was being reduced, she signed a form which stated: "I understand this reason and agree that it is correct. I accept this decision and am in accord with it." This form also has a provision for a person whose aid is being reduced to obtain a conference.¹ A state statute cannot be allowed to so easily escape federal scrutiny. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, 578 (1972). Plaintiffs in the present case are all poor, and this court seriously questions whether or not they actually knew the consequence of what they were signing. Nor can this court allow someone to forfeit his rights when there exists serious doubt that such person even knew he had these rights. In the present case it does not appear that plaintiffs were versed in the law. Indeed, it is highly likely that plaintiff Lawson signed merely because she felt that she had no remedy—even in the allowed conference with the agency representative. In criminal cases one cannot waive those rights which he does not know he has. So, too, in civil cases this court is of the opinion that a person unskilled in the law and of the lower economic levels with apparently no extensive educational background cannot waive constitutional objections of which he is totally unaware to actions taken against him by state agencies.

Defendants next contend that it has not been shown that plaintiff Lucas is representative of the class and that her mother's claim is not yet ripe because she is presently receiving aid and there has been no threat to curtail it, since it will not be known until September whether or not her daughter will attend school.

When this action was filed in April, 1972, Debra Lucas was not a member of the class with which this suit is concerned because she was at that time regularly attending school. While she alleged that she would become a member of this class by September, 1972, nevertheless, the threat against her and her mother posed by the welfare department was merely hypothetical. This court has now learned that Debra Lucas is not regularly attending school at present and that aid to her mother will be suspended in November, 1972. Thus Debra Lucas has become a member of the class unless some other fact removes her from it.

Defendant Jones, who has been dismissed from this suit, filed on September 22, 1972 an amendment to her answer alleging an additional ground for dismissing Debra Lucas and Ruby Duvall from this suit. She has alleged that these two plaintiffs are no longer entitled to ADC relief because Debra Lucas is now and has been married since May 10, 1971 to a man now living in North Carolina.

Because defendant Jones' second ground in her motion to dismiss has been incorporated by reference in the remaining defendants' answer, and because this amendment falls within the second ground, it also will be considered by this court to have been made by the remaining defendants.

The welfare department now contends that she has been emancipated and is therefore not entitled to ADC relief. This court must therefore decide whether a child sixteen or seventeen years of age, who does not regularly attend school, and who is married is included within the definition of a dependent child under 42 U.S.C. § 606(a).

There is no question that such a person is excluded under the Virginia statute because of the mandatory school attendance requirement for the group under § 63.1-105(a). 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) reads:

the term `dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother,

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