Lawson v. FCA U.S., LLC
| Decision Date | 23 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 7:19-cv-00484 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | PAULETTE LAWSON and LEE TRINKLE LAWSON, JR, Co-Executors of the Estate of Lee Trinkle Lawson, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US, LLC, Defendant. |
This is a products liability action alleging that a 2016 Dodge Journey automobile with a push button (keyless) ignition mechanism was unreasonably dangerous because it did not automatically shut off when the driver exited the car. Before the court is defendant FCA US, LLC's (“FCA”) Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 52. The matter has been fully briefed, and the court heard oral argument on the motion on June 1, 2021.
On July 17, 2017, Lee Trinkle Lawson tragically died from carbon monoxide poisoning. Returning to his home for the evening Lawson parked his car in his basement garage, but left the motor running. The vehicle, a 2016 Dodge Journey, was equipped with a push button ignition system activated by a key fob.[1] With the key fob in his pocket, Lawson went upstairs into his home and was later overcome by carbon monoxide while he slept. Plaintiffs allege that the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous because it did not automatically turn off the engine some period after Lawson removed the key fob from the car.
FCA moves for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs' design defect claim fails for lack of evidence sufficient to establish that the 2016 Dodge Journey was unreasonably dangerous because it did not conform to a government standard, industry norm, or the reasonable expectations of consumers. Plaintiffs agree that the 2016 Dodge Journey was manufactured and sold in compliance with government and industry standards. Plaintiffs also fail to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that consumers in 2016 reasonably expected that Lawson's Dodge Journey would automatically shut off after he exited. As such, the court will GRANT FCA's motion for summary judgment.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the court must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013). When making this determination, the court should consider “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with . . . [any] affidavits” filed by the parties. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Whether a fact is material depends on the relevant substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Id. (citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If that burden has been met, the non-moving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts in dispute to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court views the facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Glynn, 710 F.3d at 213 (citing Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011)). Indeed, “[i]t is an ‘axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'” McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 13-2044, 2014 WL 2871492, at *1 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal alteration omitted) (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014) (per curiam)). Moreover, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, the non-moving party “must set forth specific facts that go beyond the ‘mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.'” Glynn, 710 F.3d at 213 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Instead, the non-moving party must show that “there is sufficient evidence favoring the non[-]moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Res. Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 407 F.3d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). “In other words, to grant summary judgment the Court must determine that no reasonable jury could find for the non[-]moving party on the evidence before it.” Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Perini Corp. v. Perini Const., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990)).
As a federal court sitting in diversity, the court must apply the substantive law and choice-of-law rules of the forum state. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226 (1991) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). Lawson's death occurred in Virginia, so Virginia products liability law applies. See Fry v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 376, 345 S.E.2d 267, 272 (1986).
In a products liability case, whether proceeding on an implied warranty or negligence theory of liability, the standard imposed on a manufacturer “is essentially the same.” Slone v. General Motors Corp., 249 Va. 520, 526, 457 S.E.2d 51, 54 (1995) (quoting Logan v. Montgomery Ward, 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975)). Under either theory, the plaintiff must show that a product contained a defect that rendered it “unreasonably dangerous for the use to which it would ordinarily be put or for some other reasonably foreseeable purpose and that the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the [product] left the seller's hands.” Sutherlin v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-368, 2014 WL 7345893, at *8 (E.D. Va. Dec. 23, 2014) (citing Logan, 216 Va. at 428, 219 S.E.2d at 687). Manufacturers are not required to produce “accident-proof products, ” Slone, 249 Va. at 526, 457 S.E.2d at 54, or even “incorporate the best or most highly-advanced safety devices.” Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson, 623 F.2d 882, 885 (4th Cir. 1980)). Thus, to determine if a product is unreasonably dangerous, a court “will consider safety standards promulgated by the government or the relevant industry, as well as the reasonable expectations of consumers.” Alevromagiros, 993 F.2d at 420. For a plaintiff to prove that an “unreasonably dangerous” defect existed, “[h]e or she must establish the violation of industry or government standards, or prove that consumer expectations have risen above such standards.” Id. at 422.
“Government safety standards and industry practices are highly relevant on the question of whether the manufacturer's design was negligent because they permit an inference that the manufacturer exercised (or failed to exercise) ordinary prudence.” Evans v. NACCO Materials Handling Grp., Inc., 295 Va. 235, 247, 810 S.E.2d 462, 449 (2018). But compliance with governmental or industry standards alone will not carry the day for FCA. Id. ().
Both the federal government and the automotive industry have issued safety standards relating to keyless ignition systems. Neither the government nor industry standard requires cars with keyless ignition systems to automatically shut off after a period of time once the key fob leaves the car.
The applicable government safety standard is Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (“FMVSS”) 114, entitled “Theft protection and rollaway protection.” FMVSS 114 does not require vehicles with keyless ignition systems to automatically shut off when the key is removed from the vehicle. 49 C.F.R. § 571.114
In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued on December 12, 2011, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) proposed a rule requiring that an audible warning be given to any driver who exits a vehicle without first turning off the engine. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Theft Protection and Rollaway Protection, 76 Fed.Reg. 77, 183 (Dec. 12, 2011), ECF No. 53-36. In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, NHTSA declined to propose a rule requiring an automatic shutoff, opting instead to propose an audible warning when a driver exits a vehicle without first turning off the propulsion system. On the issue of an automatic shutoff, the notice of proposed rulemaking stated:
[W]e considered requiring the engine to shut down after a specified period of time, however, there are many situations in which a driver intends to leave some electrical system or the engine in the vehicle running without his or her presence. An example is leaving a passenger with heat or air conditioning on while the driver runs an errand, or keeping the engine running to prevent the inability to restart the engine in a very cold climate. After reviewing many possible scenarios and careful consideration, we decided we could not propose a...
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