Lawson v. FCI McDowell Warden, Civil Action No: 1:19-00364
Decision Date | 30 March 2020 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No: 1:19-00364 |
Parties | DUSTIN C. LAWSON, Plaintiff, v. FCI MCDOWELL WARDEN, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
By Standing Order, this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley for submission of proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge submitted his proposed findings and recommendations ("PF&R") on May 28, 2019. In the PF&R, Magistrate Judge Tinsley recommended that the court dismiss plaintiff's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and dismiss this matter from the court's docket. In the alternative, the PF&R recommended that this court construe the motion as a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and transfer it to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the parties were allotted fourteen days, plus three mailing days, in which to file any objections to Magistrate Judge Tinsley's Findings and Recommendation. The failure of any party to file such objections constitutes a waiver of such party's right to a de novo review by this court. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Moreover, this court need not conduct a de novo review when a petitioner "makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff filed objections to the Proposed Findings and Recommendation on June 12, 2019. The court has conducted a de novo review of the record as to those objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ().
Lawson, who at the time he filed the instant action, was in federal custody at FCI McDowell, a BOP facility in the Southern District of West Virginia. Lawson was serving a term of imprisonment based upon the revocation of his term of supervised release in the Eastern District of Kentucky. Magistrate Judge Tinsley concluded that Lawson's challenge to the revocation of his supervised release should be brought in the court of conviction via a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The PF&R acknowledged the § 2255 savings clause but concluded that Lawsonwas unable to show that § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to address Lawson's claims.
Lawson objects to the PF&R's ultimate conclusion that his claims are not cognizable in § 2241. In so doing, he relies on a portion of the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings which states: Based on the foregoing, Lawson contends that ECF No. 8 at 3-4.
Motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the exclusive remedy for testing the validity of federal judgments and sentences unless there is a showing that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. See Hahn v. Moseley, 931 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2019) (). The remedy under§ 2241 is not an additional, alternative or supplemental remedy to that prescribed under § 2255.
"Nonetheless, § 2255 includes a 'savings clause' that preserves the availability of § 2241 relief when § 2255 proves 'inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a [prisoner's] detention.'" Hahn, 931 F.3d at 300 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)); see also In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000) (). "In determining whether to grant habeas relief under the savings clause, [a court should] consider (1) whether the conviction was proper under the settled law of this circuit or Supreme Court at the time; (2) if the law of conviction changed after the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (3) if the prisoner cannot meet the traditional § 2255 standard because the change is not one of constitutional law." Hahn, 931 F.3d at 300-01 (citing In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34).
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of a § 2255 motion. See McGhee v. Hanberry, 604 F.2d 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1979). The fact that relief under § 2255 is barred procedurally or by the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255 does not render the remedy of § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. See In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 332-33; Young v. Conley, 128 F.Supp.2d 354, 357 (S.D.W. Va. 2001); see also Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2002) () (citations omitted). A section 2241 petition that seeks to challenge the validity of a federal sentence must either be dismissed or construed as a section 2255 motion. Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).
Courts have considered the aforementioned advisory committee note and, nevertheless, rejected the notion that probation and supervised release revocation proceedings are not appropriately dealt with under § 2255. With respect to the advisory committee note upon which Lawson relies, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated:
Milnes v. Samples, 861 F.2d 265, at *2-3 (4th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Wren, 682 F. Supp. 1237, 1238 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1988) () . In affirming the district court's dismissal of a § 2241 petition challenging the revocation of probation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that Wood v. Jenkins, 914 F.2d 260, *3 (7th Cir. 1990).
Courts have likewise concluded that, the advisory committee note notwithstanding, challenges to supervised release revocations are properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Loiseau v. United States, Criminal Action No. 3:15CV417, 2016 WL 5019165, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2016) (...
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