Lawson v. Kurtzhals

• Decision Date: 30 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-1766.,08-1766.
• Citation: 792 N.W.2d 251
• Parties: William Neal LAWSON, Appellee, v. Linda Irene KURTZHALS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

792 N.W.2d 251

William Neal LAWSON, Appellee,

v.Linda Irene KURTZHALS, Appellant.

No. 08-1766.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 3, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 2010.

Rosalynd J. Koob and Alan E. Fredregill of Heidman Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellant.

Paul W. Deck of Deck & Deck, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.

BAKER, Justice.

The defendant in a tort action appeals from the district court's ruling granting the plaintiff's request for voluntary dismissal without prejudice on the fourth day of a jury trial. We hold that the district court erred in concluding it had no discretion to deny a motion for voluntary dismissal, and find that under the facts of this case, had the court exercised discretion in granting the voluntary dismissal, it would have been an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we reverse the district court's decision granting dismissal. We, however,affirm the district court's ruling on defendant's motion in limine prohibiting the admission of evidence on damages not timely provided and its award of attorney fees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On April 19, 2007, the plaintiff, William Lawson, was riding his bicycle in Sioux City, Iowa, when he was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant, Linda Kurtzhals. Two months later, Lawson filed a petition alleging he suffered bodily injury and property damage as a result of Kurtzhals's negligent and reckless driving. In response, Kurtzhals filed an answer and jury demand. The next day Kurtzhals also served interrogatories on Lawson. Included in these interrogatories were two interrogatories requesting Lawson to detail the losses he incurred and the damages he was seeking. Lawson provided the following responses to the interrogatories. With respect to his losses, he replied, "My clothing was destroyed (pants and underclothes)." To the interrogatory seeking his damages claimed, he replied, "Not as yet determined—will supplement."

The trial was set for July 15, 2008. Lawson was deposed on January 29, 2008. At the deposition, he was again asked about the specific amount of compensation he was seeking from Kurtzhals. Lawson responded that he had past medical bills, but that he and his attorney had not determined the specific amount of compensation he would seek. On April 9, Kurtzhals's counsel wrote to Lawson's attorney requesting a settlement demand. Two days later, Lawson's attorney inquired as to Kurtzhals's insurance policy limitations. Kurtzhals's attorney responded with that information the same day. Lawson's attorney did not respond. On May 23, Kurtzhals filed an offer to confess judgment for $25,000. Again, Lawson did not respond.

One week before the scheduled trial date, Lawson moved for a continuance. The motion was granted over Kurtzhals's objection, and the trial was rescheduled for September 23, 2008. The court's order continuing the trial did not allow for the extension of any deadlines previously set, including the deadline to designate expert witnesses.

A settlement conference was held on September 17. It was unsuccessful. On that same day, Kurtzhals filed a motion in limine requesting that the court prohibit Lawson from presenting any evidence of damages not previously set forth in his interrogatory responses. On September 18, Lawson provided supplemental answers to the interrogatories.

Kurtzhals's motion in limine was presented to the court on the day before trial. At that time, the court denied Kurtzhals's motion; however, the court preserved the issue for reconsideration later in the proceedings. That afternoon, Kurtzhals filed a second brief in support of the motion in limine. The court addressed Kurtzhals's supplemental arguments in support of her motion in limine the following morning, the day the trial was scheduled to begin. After hearing arguments from both parties, the court reversed its denial from the previous day, ruling that Lawson was only allowed to present damages with regard to past medical expenses; all other damage evidence was precluded. At that time, Lawson's counsel raised the possibility of requesting a dismissal without prejudice or an interlocutory appeal, but counsel made no formal motions.

The trial went on for three days before Lawson rested his case-in-chief. At the close of Lawson's case, Kurtzhals moved for a directed verdict. The court took Kurtzhals's motion under advisement. The following morning, Lawson moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice underIowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943 (2007). Kurtzhals resisted the motion, arguing it would severely prejudice her case. The court concluded pursuant to case law a plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss the case without prejudice. The court granted the dismissal without prejudice and taxed the costs to Lawson. ¹

Lawson then immediately filed a new petition against Kurtzhals that was essentially identical to the claim dismissed earlier that day. Kurtzhals filed a motion for sanctions against Lawson for his late dismissal pursuant to rule 1.413. The court found Lawson's counsel violated the spirit and substance of rule 1.413 and imposed sanctions for attorney fees on counsel. The court did not assess any sanctions against Lawson.

Kurtzhals filed a notice of appeal. Lawson cross-appealed. The new action instituted by Lawson is still pending.

II. Discussion and Analysis.

The parties have raised two issues for our review: (1) Did the district court err in ruling Lawson had a right to voluntarily dismiss his tort action without prejudice on the last day of a jury trial, and (2) did the court abuse its discretion in limiting Lawson's damages because of his untimely disclosure?

A. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice. Kurtzhals claims the district court erred in concluding a plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss his cause of action without prejudice.² The trial judge granted Lawson's motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943. The rule provides:

A party may, without order of court, dismiss that party's own petition, counter-claim, cross-claim, cross-petition or petition of intervention, at any time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled to begin. Thereafter a party may dismiss an action or that party's claim therein only by consent of the court which may impose such terms or conditions as it deems proper; and it shall require the consent of any other party asserting a counterclaim against themovant, unless that will still remain for an independent adjudication.

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943.

It is clear from the plain language of rule 1.943 that the court lacks the discretion to deny a party's motion to voluntarily dismiss "at any time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled to begin." Id. The phrase "without order of court" indicates that this may be done at the will of the party; thus, the court retains no discretion to prevent such dismissal. See, e.g., Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Iowa 1994).

The meaning of the second sentence of rule 1.943 is less clear. This sentence, which applies when the trial is scheduled to begin in ten days or less, states that "a party may dismiss an action ... only by consent of the court which may impose such terms or conditions as it deems proper." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943 (emphasis added). A review of the legislative history surrounding voluntary dismissals reveals that, prior to the enactment of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure in 1943, plaintiffs had the absolute right to dismiss lawsuits at any time up to the moment before "final submission to [the] jury or court." Jeffords v. Stockton, 254 Iowa 273, 276, 117 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1962). In 1943, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215, now renumbered as rule 1.943, was enacted. The language of the rule provided:

A party may, without order of court, dismiss his own petition ... at any time before trial has begun. Thereafter a party may dismiss his action or his claim therein only by consent of the court which may impose such terms or conditions as it deems proper....

Iowa R. Civ. P. 215 (1.943). The official comment to rule 215 provides:

This rule substantially changed the law on voluntary dismissal. It ... adopted the substance of Federal Rule 41. The prior statutes allowed a voluntary dismissal at any time before "final submission", without prejudice. This rule shortens the time and makes it expire when the trial has begun.

Id. r. 215 official cmt. The advisory committee declared "[t]he rule [was] designed to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of actions by the parties litigant." Id.

The rule for voluntary dismissal was amended in 1990. The drafters substituted "at any time before trial has begun" with "at any time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled to begin." Iowa R. Civ. P. 215 (1990). When enacting this amendment, however, the drafters backed away from some of the substantive provisions contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The committee declined to recommend adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) and (2). The committee concluded the federal rule was too harsh for plaintiffs when there might be good reasons for dismissing cases. The committee recommended allowing the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action at any time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled to begin. Thereafter the plaintiff would have to have the approval of the court and the dismissal could be on such terms and conditions as the court might impose, such as the payment of costs and/or attorney fees which might be occasioned by a late dismissal.

Id. r. 215 official cmt.

The provisions specifically disclaimed by the drafters only allow voluntary dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment, or when a stipulation of dismissal is signed by all the parties who have appeared before the court. Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1), (2). The drafterswished to make the requirements for voluntary dismissal in Iowa more lenient. They did not, however, intend to take away the...