Lawson v. State

• Decision Date: 09 April 1908
• Citation: 46 So. 259,155 Ala. 44
• Parties: LAWSON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

46 So. 259

155 Ala. 44

LAWSON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 9, 1908

Appeal from City Court of Gadsden, John H. Disque, Judge.

Lee Lawson was convicted of murder in the second degree for the killing of one McCollum by shooting him with a gun, and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 40 years. From this judgment he appeals. Affirmed.

At the request of the state the court gave the following written charges: "(1) To make out a case of justifiable self-defense, the evidence must show that the difficulty was not provoked or encouraged by the defendant, that he was or appeared to be so menaced at the time as to create a reasonable apprehension of danger to his life or of grievous bodily harm, and that there was no other reasonable hope of escape from such present impending peril. (2) To make the plea of self-defense available, the defendant must be without fault. If he himself was the first aggressor, he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense, even if the deceased was approaching him in a hostile manner; and whether the necessity to take the life of deceased was real or only apparent, if brought about by the designed contrivance or fault of defendant, he cannot be excused on the plea of self-defense. (3) If a party dangerously armed provokes a hostile demonstration with an undue advantage, he is guilty of murder if he slays his adversary pursuant to previously formed design to use his weapon in an emergency. Previous preparation for a rencounter evinces deliberation and premeditation, and, unexplained, is evidence of express malice. (4) If the defendant had a good reason to apprehend an attack from the deceased, he had the right to arm himself for self-defense, but not for aggression. His responsibility for the subsequent use of his weapon is not diminished because of the right he had to obtain and carry it, if, after having obtained it, he traveled the public road expecting to meet the deceased and provoke the fatal rencounter. The degree of his guilt is the same as it would have been if no reason for apprehending an attack had been furnished by the previous conduct of the deceased. If, notwithstanding the existence of apprehension, the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was malicious, that the weapon was obtained and carried by defendant, not for the purpose of defense alone, but with a view to a rencounter, in which he intended to take the life of the deceased, and which he intended to provoke, or did not intend to avoid, the degree of the offense was not mitigated. (5) If the deceased when within a short distance of defendant, approaching him in a public street, made a hostile demonstration with his hands rocks, or otherwise, which impressed the defendant with the belief that the deceased intended when they met to attack him with a rock or otherwise, yet, if the defendant could have reasonably avoided the threatened danger by leaving the public road and taking a bypath, or by going into the woods it was his duty to have done so; and, if he did not, he cannot be excused on the plea of self-defense, if he had previously armed himself with a gun to be used against the deceased in case of a difficulty, and he anticipated there would be a difficulty when they met."

The defendant requested the following written charges, which were refused: "(33) The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence that Lee Lawson was on his way home, and that he did nothing to foster or bring on the difficulty with McCollum, the mere fact of his going to the store and getting a gun would not, of itself alone, and with no act or demonstration of using it until he was forced to do so by the act of McCollum, take from him the right to shoot in self-defense, if he could not have escaped danger by retreating." (34) Not necessary to be set out. "(35) The court charges the jury that Lee Lawson had a right to carry a gun and to arm himself against an apprehended attack. (36) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury that if you find from all the evidence in this case that at the time the defendant fired the fatal shot he did not fire at a vital portion of deceased's body, and did not intend to kill him, but only to stop him from advancing on defendant, then you cannot find him guilty of murder either in the first or second degree. (37) The court charges the jury that the following principles are correct principles of law: When...