Lawson v. State
| Citation | 199 N.E.3d 829 |
| Decision Date | 07 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CR-448 |
| Parties | Robert LAWSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Attorney for Appellant: John F. Kautzman, Ruckelshaus, Kautzman, Blackwell, Bemis, Duncan & Merchant, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Catherine E. Brizzi, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] The State charged Officer Robert Lawson with obstruction of justice, a Level 6 felony; perjury, a Level 6 felony; battery, a Class A misdemeanor; false informing, a Class B misdemeanor; and official misconduct, a Level 6 felony. During the jury trial, Officer Lawson made two Trial Rule 50 motions for judgment on the evidence both of which were denied. At the conclusion of the parties’ cases in chief, Officer Lawson proposed several jury instructions that were rejected by the trial court. The jury found Officer Lawson guilty of perjury, false informing, and official misconduct. The trial court entered convictions on all three counts, but at Officer Lawson's request later vacated the perjury and false informing convictions. Officer Lawson was then sentenced to 365 days with 363 days suspended to probation.
[2] Officer Lawson now appeals, raising multiple issues for our review which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Officer Lawson's motions for judgment on the evidence; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Officer Lawson's convictions; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give Officer Lawson's proposed jury instructions. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Officer Lawson's motions for judgment on the evidence, the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give his proposed jury instructions, we affirm.
[3] On August 29, 2019, Officer Lawson of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was dispatched to Shortridge High School at the request of Indianapolis Public Schools ("IPS") following a large fight that broke out in the school. Upon Officer Lawson's arrival, A.W. was handcuffed and in the custody of IPS officers. A.W.’s aunt, Danielle Porter, came to the school so that A.W. could be released into her custody.
[4] When Officers unhandcuffed A.W. and took him outside to meet Porter, she began to shout and berate the officers. A.W. walked toward Officer Lawson, pulled his pants up, and appeared to get into a fighting stance. Officer Lawson then hit A.W. in the face. Officers put handcuffs back on A.W. and arrested him.2
[5] After the encounter, Officer Lawson spoke to Officer Marzetta Jenkins. In the probable cause affidavit he prepared, Officer Lawson reported that Officer Jenkins "stated she observed [A.W.] swing his fist at Officer Lawson a split second before Officer Lawson threw the palm strike, however [A.W.] did not make contact."3 Amended Exhibits, Volume I at 8. Officer Jenkins testified at trial that she told Officer Lawson that it looked "as if [A.W.] was about to swing" but that she did not tell Officer Lawson she saw A.W. throw a punch. Transcript of Evidence, Volume III at 25 (emphasis added). Because Officer Lawson used force during the incident, a use of force report was completed. Detective John Howard from the Special Investigations Unit was assigned to investigate Officer Lawson's use of force. As part of the investigation, Detective Howard reviewed the video of Officer Lawson's use of force and testified that he did not see A.W. throw a punch.
[6] On September 16, 2019, the State charged Officer Lawson with obstruction of justice, perjury, battery, false informing, and official misconduct. During the trial, Officer Lawson made a Trial Rule 50 motion for judgment on the evidence twice, once at the close of the State's evidence and again at the close of his own evidence. Both motions were denied.
[7] Subsequently, Officer Lawson proposed the following jury instructions:
Appendix of Appellant, Volume II at 135; App. of Appellant, Vol. III at 60, 62-63 (citations omitted).
[8] The jury found Officer Lawson guilty of perjury, false informing, and official misconduct. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction on all three counts. At Officer Lawson's request, the trial court then vacated the perjury and false informing convictions due to double jeopardy concerns. The trial court sentenced Officer Lawson to 365 days with 363 days suspended to probation. Officer Lawson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[9] Indiana Trial Rule 50(A) provides:
Where all or some of the issues in a case tried before a jury or an advisory jury are not supported by sufficient evidence or a verdict thereon is clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence because the evidence is insufficient to support it, the court shall withdraw such issues from the jury and enter judgment thereon or shall enter judgment thereon notwithstanding a verdict.
[10] The purpose of a motion for judgment on the evidence is to test the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the nonmovant. Overshiner v. Hendricks Reg'l Health , 119 N.E.3d 1124, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. A motion for judgment on the evidence should be granted "only when there is a complete failure of proof because there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference supporting an essential element of the claim." Stewart v. Alunday , 53 N.E.3d 562, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Raess v. Doescher , 883 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Ind. 2008) ). Judgment on the evidence is proper if there is a total absence of evidence in favor of the plaintiff or if the inference intended to be proven by the evidence cannot logically be drawn from the evidence without undue speculation. Hill v. Rhinehart , 45 N.E.3d 427, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. But if there is evidence that would allow reasonable people to differ as to the result, then judgment on the evidence is improper. Stewart , 53 N.E.3d at 568.
[11] Our supreme court has noted that a judgment on the evidence "does not alter the critical, invaluable, and constitutionally protected role of the jury in Indiana's system of jurisprudence." Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank , 972 N.E.2d 835, 842 (Ind. 2012). A trial court is not free to engage in weighing evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses to grant judgment on the evidence in a case where reasonable people may come to competing conclusions, as weighing evidence and judging witness credibility has always been within the purview of the jury. Id. Id.
[12] Thus, the grant or denial of a Trial Rule 50 motion is within the broad discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Hill , 45 N.E.3d at 435. When we review a trial court's ruling on such a motion, we use the same standard as the trial court: we must consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stewart , 53 N.E.3d at 568. When, as in this case, the trial court denies the motion and declines to intervene, "it is not the province of this Court to do so unless the verdict is wholly unwarranted under the law and the evidence." Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Ind. Drywall & Acoustics, Inc. , 970 N.E.2d 674, 685 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[13] Officer Lawson argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment on the evidence as to his perjury charge. A person commits the crime of perjury when he "makes a false, material statement under oath or affirmation, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true[.]" Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-1(a)(1). To support a conviction for perjury, the State must present sufficient evidence to show that the defendant: (1) made a false statement under oath; and (2) said statement was material to a point in the case. Daniels v. State , 658 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). It is well-settled that confusion or inconsistency alone is not enough to prove perjury. Id.
[14] Officer Lawson contends that his inclusion of Officer Jenkins’ statement in the probable cause affidavit was not material and therefore does not constitute perjury.5 See White v. State , 25 N.E.3d 107, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (), trans. denied , cert. denied. 577 U.S. 1035, 136...
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