Lawson v. Sumter County Sheriff's Office, No. 3113.

CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Writing for the CourtHUFF.
Citation528 S.E.2d 86,339 S.C. 133
PartiesBarbara LAWSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Randolph Lawson, Appellant/Respondent, v. SUMTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Respondent/Appellant. Harold V.Thames, Respondent/Appellant, v. Barbara Lawson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Randolph Lawson, Appellant/Respondent.
Docket NumberNo. 3113.
Decision Date07 February 2000

339 S.C. 133
528 S.E.2d 86

Barbara LAWSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Randolph Lawson, Appellant/Respondent,
v.
SUMTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Respondent/Appellant.
Harold V.Thames, Respondent/Appellant,
v.
Barbara Lawson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Randolph Lawson, Appellant/Respondent

No. 3113.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard December 7, 1999.

Decided February 7, 2000.


339 S.C. 134
Edward M. Brown, of Brown & Roache; and Russell Brown, both of Charleston, for Appellant/Respondent

George C. James, Jr., and John E. James, both of Richardson & James, of Sumter, for Respondent/Appellant.

HUFF, Judge:

Barbara Lawson (Mrs. Lawson) brought this action under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act against the Sumter County Sheriffs Office for the death of her husband, William Randolph Lawson (Mr. Lawson). Mr. Lawson was shot by a Sumter County sheriffs deputy, who was injured trying to effect Mr. Lawson's arrest. The deputy, in turn, filed suit for his injuries against Mrs. Lawson as the personal representative of her husband's estate, and she counterclaimed for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties entered a settlement,

339 S.C. 135
which included a provision for attorney's fees equal to 40% of the settlement. Mrs. Lawson, on behalf of her attorney, subsequently petitioned for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Sheriffs Office and Thames in turn moved for attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to the petition. The trial court denied the request for additional attorney's fees, finding the previous settlement conclusive of the matter. He further denied the Sheriffs Office's and Thames' request for fees and costs. Mrs. Lawson as well as the Sheriffs Office and Thames appeal. We affirm

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 22, 1996, the decedent, Mr. Lawson, was stopped by a deputy with the Sumter County Sheriffs Office and charged with speeding, open container violation, threatening the life of an officer, and carrying a concealed weapon. Thereafter, Lawson applied for pretrial intervention on certain of the charges. Lawson was apparently tried in his absence on some of the charges and was found guilty.

Subsequently, on February 26, 1996, Mr. Lawson was stopped by Harold V. Thames, a deputy with the Sumter County Sheriffs Office, who attempted to serve a warrant on Lawson. When Officer Thames attempted an arrest, Mr. Lawson tried to escape in his vehicle. Officer Thames became entangled in the open window of Mr. Lawson's moving vehicle. When Mr. Lawson purportedly refused to stop the vehicle or allow Officer Thames to disembark, Thames shot him, resulting in his death. Mrs. Lawson, as personal representative of her husband's estate, filed an action on March 25, 1996, against the Sumter County Sheriffs Office, asserting claims under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Officer Thames subsequently sued Mr. Lawson's estate for the injuries he received in the accident. Mrs. Lawson counterclaimed, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Mrs. Lawson reached a settlement on all claims with the Sumter County Sheriffs Office and Officer Thames for $125,000. Of this amount, $115,000 was allocated to a wrongful death cause of action, and $10,000 for a survival claim and "any and all other claims of this estate arising from this accident." The settlement was approved by circuit court

339 S.C. 136
order dated October 7, 1997. The order provided that in accordance with the agreement of the parties, Mrs, Lawson's attorney, Edward M. Brown, was to receive 40% of the settlement amount as payment of attorney's fees. That same day, Mrs. Lawson executed a "RELEASE" which released the Sumter County Sheriff's Office and Thames from "all claims made or that could be made by the undersigned" arising from the incident. Lawson received payment in accordance with the settlement and order approving the settlement

Although Brown was paid the $50,000 in fees pursuant to the settlement, in November 1997 he filed a petition for attorney's fees in connection with this action. In the petition, Brown asked for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $120,006.25, for 685.75 hours at $175 per hour. Officer Thames and the Sheriffs Office opposed the petition and moved for attorney's fees and sanctions under Rule 11, SCRCP on the basis Brown's petition was "frivolous."

Subsequent to the hearing on the petition, Brown submitted a document dated November 19, 1996 signed by Mrs. Lawson which purportedly assigned to him any right to attorney's fees under § 1988. On December 10, 1997, the trial court issued its order denying the petition for additional attorney's fees, finding the issue was disposed of in the October 7, 1997 order putting into effect the settlement of the parties. The court noted the settlement disposed of all claims between the parties and authorized Mrs. Lawson to pay Brown from the gross proceeds of the settlement. The court stated if the parties had intended to reserve the issue of additional attorney's fees, "such intention should have been disclosed at the hearing [on the petition for settlement]."

The trial court subsequently granted the Rule 59(e), SCRCP motion of the Sheriffs Office and Thames to amend the order denying additional...

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1 practice notes
  • Vaughn v. Bernhardt, No. 3114.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • February 7, 2000
    ...any documentation surrounding the establishment of the joint account and provides no other evidence of an inter vivos gift. Accordingly, 339 S.C. 133 we are constrained by the general presumption in section 62-6-103 and are compelled to reach this unfortunate The court was correct in placin......
1 cases
  • Vaughn v. Bernhardt, No. 3114.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • February 7, 2000
    ...any documentation surrounding the establishment of the joint account and provides no other evidence of an inter vivos gift. Accordingly, 339 S.C. 133 we are constrained by the general presumption in section 62-6-103 and are compelled to reach this unfortunate The court was correct in placin......

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