Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship Co.

• Decision Date: 20 February 1948
• Docket Number: No. 11928.,11928.
• Citation: 166 F.2d 13
• Parties: LAWSON v. SUWANNEE FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

166 F.2d 13 (1948)

LAWSON v. SUWANNEE FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO. et al.

No. 11928.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

February 20, 1948.

H. S. Phillips, U. S. Atty., of Tampa, Fla., and Edith House, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Jacksonville, Fla., for appellant.

Harry T. Gray, of Jacksonville, Fla., for appellees.

Before HUTCHESON, McCORD, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

McCORD, Circuit Judge.

John Davis, through causes unconnected with industry and not attributable to injury by accident, lost the sight in his right eye to such an extent that he became industrially blind in that eye. Later, while in the employ of Suwannee Fruit and Steamship Company, and through accident sustained in the course of his employment, he lost the sight in his left eye to the extent that he also became industrially blind in that eye Davis is now permanently and totally disabled, as a result of permanent industrial blindness in both eyes.

The sole question with which we are concerned is whether the employer, Suwannee Fruit and Steamship Company, is liable for compensation to its employee, Davis, for permanent total disability, under provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 8(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 908(a), or whether it is liable only for permanent partial disability, with the remainder of the allowed compensation to be paid out of the special fund created by Section 44 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. A. § 944.

The employer, Suwannee Fruit and Steamship Company, contends that under section 8(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 908 (f), it is relieved from liability for permanent total disability, and is only required to provide compensation for permanent partial disability.¹

Appellant Commissioner contends that by virtue of the construction and interpretation placed on Section 8(f) of the Act by the courts, an employee is nevertheless entitled to total permanent disability compensation from an employer in such cases, regardless of any previous disability not sustained through industrial accident; that such construction is in accord with the intent and purpose of the compensation law, and that to hold otherwise would cast upon the special fund created by Section 44 of the Act burdens which it was never intended to bear.

We are of opinion and so hold, that appellees are liable to the employee, Davis, for permanent partial disability only, and that the remainder of the compensation allowed for total disability must come from the special fund created by the Act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 944.

Section 8(f) of the Act is clear and unambiguous, and therefore needs no construction. When read in its ordinary sense it can have but one meaning. It was clearly intended to restrict the liability of employers to only those employees disabled as a result of accidental injury sustained during their employment. Congress, in passing this section of the Act, intended to relieve industry from compensating for disabilities not caused by it. To give to Section 8(f) of the Act the strained and ingenious construction urged by the Commissioner is but to distort its true sense and meaning. United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 52 S.Ct. 65, 76 L.Ed. 224. When we come to use the phrases "previous disability", and "subsequent injury", in Section 8(f), they should be construed in their plan and ordinary sense, and one which produces a consistent and logical result. To interpolate into this section the defined meaning of those terms from Section 2 alone leads to an anomaly. We can give to this section no reasonable construction which would make an...