Lawson v. The State
| Decision Date | 26 May 1908 |
| Docket Number | 21,122 |
| Parties | Lawson v. The State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied December 16, 1908.
From Tippecanoe Circuit Court; Richard P. DeHart, Judge.
Prosecution by the State of Indiana against Alice Lawson. From a judgment of conviction, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
John F McHugh and Will R. Wood, for appellant.
James Bingham, Attorney-General, Daniel P. Flanagan, Prosecuting Attorney, George P. Haywood, Charles A. Burnett, A. G Cavins, E. M. White and H. M. Dowling, for the State.
Appellant was charged by indictment with having, on September 21, 1906, at the county of Tippecanoe, and State of Indiana, feloniously, purposely and with premeditated malice, killed and murdered one Charles A. Lawson, by then and there shooting him with a deadly weapon called a revolver. The case was tried by a jury, and a verdict returned finding her guilty of murder in the second degree, and fixing her punishment at imprisonment for life in The Indiana Women's Prison. Over motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, the court rendered judgment on the verdict. From this judgment she appeals and assigns that the court erred in overruling her motion for a new trial.
The evidence in the case shows that the deceased, Charles A. Lawson, was the husband of appellant. These parties had been married fifteen years. At the time of the marriage the deceased was engaged as a bartender in a saloon, but subsequently he purchased a saloon in the city of LaFayette, and then engaged in retailing intoxicating liquors, in which business he continued, barring some short intervals, to the day of his death. The crime was committed in his own saloon in the city of LaFayette, Tippecanoe county, Indiana, on September 21, 1906. A few years after marrying appellant he became addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors, was frequently drunk, and when in this condition he was quarrelsome, and on several occasions, when under the influence of liquor, he beat appellant and knocked her down. She at times was accustomed to "tend the bar" at his saloon, and she also became addicted to the free use of intoxicating liquors. The relations existing between her and her husband at and for some time prior to the murder were not amicable. The following may be said to be an epitome of her evidence as detailed and given by her upon the trial:
On the day of the murder she went to her husband's saloon and delivered some laundry. He was there at the time, but no words appear to have been exchanged between them. From the saloon she went to see a dressmaker, then returned to the saloon, and drank some liquor therein. Her husband was not present at the time. She went out into the city of LaFayette, called at several drygoods stores, and finally returned to the saloon about 5 o'clock p. m. Shortly after arriving at the saloon at that time her husband came in. He spoke to her, and asked what business she had there. Some conversation took place between them, and he told her that he was sick and tired of her, and it pained him to look at her; that she was an annoyance to him, and he requested that she leave. Some further conversation took place between them relative to some money he had. He said he had sufficient money to leave the town, etc. The deceased then went to his safe in the saloon and put some money he had in the safe. He then, as appellant stated, went behind the bar for the purpose of getting a drink of liquor, and she called to her little girl, who was with her, to come on and they would go home. She started to leave the saloon, and her husband hurled a large, heavy beer glass at her head. The glass missed her and struck a picture frame hanging upon the wall, breaking the glass over the picture. Deceased then started towards her and threw another beer glass at her, which also missed her, but struck the wall and was broken. She then ran to her hand satchel, which she had left in the saloon. In this satchel was a revolver. The deceased then proceeded towards her, and she stated that, knowing his disposition and his prior conduct, and fearing injury either to her body or to her life, she drew the revolver from the satchel, and, as he approached her, she fired several shots. He pursued her around the bar, she backing away from him all the time. She finally slipped, and at this time she discovered that he was within a few feet of her with an uplifted glass ready to strike her, and she again fired at him. She fired some four or five shots, some of which proved fatal. At the trial she attempted to excuse her act in killing her husband on the ground of self-defense, stating that she believed she was in great danger of bodily harm or of losing her life, and that she acted purely in self-defense. The evidence which she gave upon the trial was materially contradicted by evidence introduced on the part of the State.
John S Cantrell testified at the trial on behalf of the State. His evidence in part contradicted that given by appellant in regard to what occurred at the saloon between her and her husband at the time the latter was shot. This witness testified that on the day of the murder he was in front of the saloon in question and heard noises and voices therein, and went into the saloon to see what the difficulty was. When he entered the saloon the deceased started towards the telephone and said: "I'll call an officer." Appellant, in response to this, said that she dared him to call an officer, and that he would not live to call one. At that time she had a revolver in her hand, and was pointing it towards her husband, who was then about two feet from her. The witness testified that the deceased did not do anything so far as he saw. Witness then walked out of the saloon. No objection was made by appellant, at the time Cantrell testified, in respect to his incompetency on the ground that he was a person of unsound mind. Appellant, however, in her defense, introduced one Slayback as a witness, by whom she sought to prove that Cantrell was, at and prior to the time he gave his testimony, a person of feeble and unsound mind. This evidence was offered for the purpose, as stated, of affecting the credibility of Cantrell. The record discloses that Slayback, upon being introduced as a witness by appellant, gave his name, his residence and business, and place where he conducted his business. He testified that previous to his locating in LaFayette he had resided at Dayton, Indiana, for about fourteen years; that he was acquainted with John F. Cantrell, the witness in question, and had known him for twelve years; that during that time Cantrell had lived within one and onehalf squares of the witness's residence, and he saw him every day; that since moving to LaFayette he had seen him frequently. Following these statements made by the witness, counsel for appellant propounded to him the following question: "State, Mr. Slayback, whether or not Cantrell is a man of sound or feeble mind, and was on September 21, 1906." To this question the State objected. Thereupon, the record recites that the defendant offered to prove in answer to this question, and the witness would have testified, if permitted, that the witness John F. Cantrell is a person of feeble and unsound mind, and that he was a person of feeble and unsound mind on September 21, 1906, and this offer was made as going to the credibility of the witness. Thereupon the court sustained the objection of the State, to which the defendant at the time excepted. Appellant complains and urges as error this ruling of the court in refusing to permit the witness to answer the question propounded. Conceding, without deciding, that appellant had the right to prove that the witness Cantrell was a person of feeble or unsound mind at the time he testified, for the purpose of affecting his credibility, still the question which her counsel propounded to the witness Slayback, to which the State objected, was not proper. He was a nonexpert witness on the question of insanity, and it will be noted that the testimony given by him in regard to what he knew about Cantrell was somewhat meager. He did not testify to any conversation which he had with Cantrell, nor did he state anything in respect to any peculiarity or mental disposition which he had observed in respect to this witness. It is not shown that in propounding this question counsel for appellant sought to obtain the opinion of the witness in respect to the mental condition of Cantrell, as the same was founded upon the facts and circumstances which the witness had given to the jury. The question as asked invited the witness to give a mere naked opinion. Had the witness been permitted to answer the question as propounded, there was nothing included therein or coupled therewith to disclose to the jury that he was basing the opinion upon any of the facts which he had previously given in respect to his acquaintance with Cantrell. In fact, counsel for appellant state that they offered to prove by the witness, in his answer to this question, that John F. Cantrell was a person of feeble and unsound mind, and was in that condition on September 21, 1906. Under the rule prevailing in this State, appellant, in making proof to show the...
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