Lawson v. United States
| Decision Date | 16 February 1950 |
| Citation | 88 F. Supp. 706 |
| Parties | LAWSON v. UNITED STATES et al. RETZ v. AMERICAN PETROLEUM TRANSPORT CORPORATION et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Gay & Behrens, New York City, for libellants, Edward J. Behrens, New York City, of counsel.
Irving H. Saypol, United States Attorney, New York City, for respondent, United States, Howard F. Fanning, Special Assistant to the United States Attorney, New York City, of counsel.
These suits are brought under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761-768, by the personal representatives of Antonio Scull Cardenas and Donald Retz, two members of the crew of the steamship Crow Wing who lost their lives on March 30, 1945, when that vessel collided with another on the high seas.
After a trial before the Hon. Alfred V. Bryan, it was adjudged by the court that the deaths of the two seamen were caused by the negligence of employees of the defendant United States of America. After the fault was found the matter was referred to a Commissioner:
(a) To ascertain and compute the fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by each of the persons for whose benefit these suits have been brought;
(b) To apportion among such persons the amount of damages in proportion to the loss they severally suffered by reason of the death of the persons by whose representatives these suits have been brought;
(c) To ascertain the amount received in pursuance of the Second Seaman's War Risk Policies of insurance, by each of the persons for whose benefit these suits have been brought, and to deduct such amounts from the separate recovery of each beneficiary who shall have thus received part of the proceeds of such policies;
(d) To report to the Court with all convenient speed.
The Court has before it exceptions filed by the libellants to the report of the Commissioner which question his conclusion concerning the status of one Antonia Martinez as a beneficiary, and the adequacy of the amounts awarded to other beneficiaries.
The status of Antonia Martinez as a beneficiary of the deceased Antonio Scull Cardenas will be considered first.
On June 9, 1943 Cardenas married Paula Liendo in New Orleans. (Note: Maiden names will be used in reference to the Cardenas suit). On July 27, 1943, he signed on a steamship as an ordinary seaman and executed a form of beneficiary designation naming Paula Liendo as his wife. Cardenas left Paula Liendo after they had lived together for about seven weeks, and she did not hear from him again. They were never divorced.
Antonia Martinez met the deceased about Christmas of 1944. On March 9, 1945, Cardenas executed an affidavit in the Borough of Manhattan of the City of New York for the purpose of procuring a license to marry Antonia Martinez in which he swore that he had not previously been married. The two were married in a church in New York City the next day. Cardenas joined the steamship Crow Wing March 20, 1945 and lost his life ten days later. He was 25 years old at the time of his death and was a citizen of Cuba.
The Commissioner found that Paula Liendo was the lawful widow of the deceased and the libellants do not challenge that finding. They do maintain, however, that Antonia Martinez has some rights under the Death on the High Seas Act, in that she was a "wife" or "dependent relative" of the deceased under that Act.
The Death on the High Seas Act provides as follows:
The question presented is whether a putative wife, i. e., one who goes through a marriage ceremony but is not legally married because of an impediment existing on the part of the man which was unknown to the woman at the time of marriage, has any rights under the Act.
The Court of Appeals for this Circuit has held that in interpreting the Act federal law and not state law is applicable. Middleton v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 2 Cir., 1934, 70 F.2d 326, 327. The Death on the High Seas Act does not establish classes of beneficiaries, but rather permits any one falling within the category of "wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative" to recover without regard to the existence of other beneficiaries. The amount of recovery is determined by the actual pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiary due to the wrongful death. From the purpose of the Act, the breadth of the language used in the Act, and the absence of classes of beneficiaries, it would appear that Congress desired to compensate those who actually lose substantial rights of support by reason of a wrongful death to the greatest extent permissible under the provisions of the Act.
There is almost a complete dearth of legal precedent on the problem herein raised. The Court could summarily dispose of the question by stating, as have some courts under similar acts, that a putative wife "is not included in the terms `widow' and `wife,' which necessarily imply a lawful marriage." Beebe v. Moormack Gulf Lines, 5 Cir., 1932, 59 F.2d 319, 320. However, this Court does not believe that deciding the case in such a manner meets the problem involved, nor does it do substantial justice.
The Death on the High Seas Act uses the terms "wife" and "dependent relative". The Court does not believe that Antonia Martinez properly comes within the class of "dependent relative". Is she, however, a "wife"? The Act does not define the requirements that constitute one a "wife".
Antonia Martinez went through a religious ceremonial marriage with the deceased. She saw a bona fide marriage license procured by the fraudulent statement of the deceased. She had not previously been married nor, as far as she knew, had the deceased. The two lived together as man and wife. Cardenas paid the rent and gave Antonia Martinez $50 before he sailed; on the shipping articles he named her as his next of kin and made an allotment of $100 a month to her. Now this Court is asked to find that Antonia Martinez was not the "wife" of the deceased under this statute. This the Court cannot do. Where a marriage is void because of some legal impediment, modern enlightened jurisprudence will not in all instances take the position that the marriage never occurred. Indeed there are purposes for which the marriage must and will be recognized, and the social conscience dictates that the instant case is one which falls in that category. Antonia Martinez was dependent upon the deceased for support, and had she brought suit in the New York courts for an annulment of the marriage, she could have obtained an order for support pursuant to Section 1140-a of the New York Civil Practice Act. The Death on the High Seas Act was intended to compensate those who lost the financial support of the deceased — Antonia Martinez did have a right to support. The Act also intended to cover a "wife" — Antonia Martinez was a wife in fact, if not entirely in law.
It should be noted that the law of New York, though not determinative of the interpretation of the word "wife", does refer to the spouses in a void marriage as "husband" and "wife". Sec. 1140-a, N.Y. C.P.A. Even in the cases cited by the respondents, the woman was designated as a "putative wife", and she had certain civil and property rights. See Beebe v. Moormack Gulf Lines, supra; United States v. Robinson, 5 Cir., 1930, 40...
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