Lawson v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 June 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:12-cv-719-MEF
• Parties: BESSIE E. LAWSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

BESSIE E. LAWSON, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:12-cv-719-MEF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONE: June 21, 2013

(WO - Do Not Publish)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bessie Lawson ("Ms. Lawson") brings this action against the United States of America ("Defendant") to recover for injuries she suffered when she slipped and fell in the entranceway of the United States Post Office in Enterprise, Alabama. Now pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. #20.) After considering the parties' submissions and supporting evidence, the Court concludes that Defendant's motion is due to be GRANTED.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA grants district courts original jurisdiction over civil suits against the United States as if it were a private person for, among other things, personal injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of government employees committed in the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b)(1). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations supporting both.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing that there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) "requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the materialfacts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the non-moving party and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, if the evidence on which the non-moving party relies "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242 (citations omitted). "Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact . . . ." Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). Likewise, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).

IV. FACTS

The Court has carefully considered all the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Lawson, as the non-movant, establish the following facts.

At around 7:00 a.m., on July 21, 2011, Mark Nelson ("Mr. Nelson"), a laborer-custodian at the United States Post Office in Enterprise, Alabama, cleaned the floors of the customer entranceway—the area between the exterior doors of the post office and another set of doors leading to the post office lobby—and inspected it for hazards. He found none.

Sometime later that afternoon, Ms. Lawson visited the post office to pick up a registered letter that had been sent to her at her daughter's address. On her way into the post office, Ms. Lawson did not notice anything on the floor of the entranceway. When it was herturn to be helped, the postal worker asked for her daughter's address to retrieve the registered letter, but Ms. Lawson could not remember it. So Ms. Lawson immediately left the post office, got her daughter's address from her car, and then started on her way back into the post office. Ms. Lawson did not notice anything on the floor of the entranceway when she exited the post office to retrieve her daughter's address from her car.

When Ms. Lawson returned from her car, she stepped over the threshold into the entranceway, pulled open the front door, and slipped and fell on her bottom and hip, landing with her left leg buckled under her and spraining her left knee. While lying on the ground after her fall, Ms. Lawson noticed that the floor was "wet" and "had sand on it." (Deposition of Bessie Lawson ("Lawson Dep.") at 41:5-13, Doc. #20-1.) Ms. Lawson testified that she guessed the substance was water because it was "wet," but stated that it could have been "water, pee, I don't know. It was wet." (Lawson Dep. at 41:18-22.) She further noted that, while the floor was wet, it was not "dripping wet[.]" (Lawson Dep. at 42:5-6.) There is no evidence as to the color, size, or specific location of the substance on which Ms. Lawson claims to have fallen. There is no evidence that Ms. Lawson's clothes were wet after her fall. There was also no floor mat in the area of floor where Ms. Lawson fell. (Lawson Dep. at 42:7-15.)

Sometime after Ms. Lawson's fall, Mr. Nelson was called to inspect the entranceway and the other customer service areas for hazards, but he did not find any liquid substances or other debris on the floor of either area. While the record does not establish exactly how much time elapsed between the time of Ms. Lawson's fall and the time Mr. Nelson wascalled to inspect the entranceway, it is undisputed that Mr. Nelson observed Ms. Lawson sitting in a meeting room as he walked to the site of her accident that day. Until the time of Ms. Lawson's fall, Mr. Nelson had not been notified on the day of the accident of any hazards in the entranceway or lobby. On days when it is not raining, Mr. Nelson routinely walks in and out of the lobby and inspects it for hazards. On rainy days, it is Mr. Nelson's practice to inspect the entranceway and lobby about every hour (or as needed) for accumulations of water, to mop up any puddles he sees, and to clean up any other debris that customers may have tracked in. No one, not even Ms. Lawson, can recall if it was raining on the day of Ms. Lawson's accident. (Lawson Dep. at 22:13-20; Declaration of Mark Nelson ("Nelson Decl.") at ¶ 2, Doc. #20-2.)

V. DISCUSSION

Ms. Lawson alleges that Defendant was negligent in failing to clean up the hazardous substance she alleges was in the entranceway and for failing to warn customers about it. In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Ms. Lawson cannot present any evidence that it had notice of the hazard¹ or that it created the hazard, either of which impose a duty on Defendant to clean up the substance or to warn customers of its presence.

A. Federal Tort Claims Act and Applicable Law

The United States, as sovereign, is generally immune from suit unless it waives its immunity. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Monzon v. United States, 253 F.3d 567, 570 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the FTCA, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity in actions by private parties for torts committed by employees acting on behalf of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). That statute authorizes suits

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Claims brought under the FTCA are governed by the substantive law of the state where the alleged act or omission giving rise to liability occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The alleged act or omission in this case occurred at the post office in Enterprise, Alabama. Thus, Alabama law applies.

B. Ms. Lawson's Negligence Claims

Under Alabama law, the elements of negligence in a premises liability case "are the same as those in any tort litigation: duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate or legal cause, and damages." Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted). A store or business like the Enterprise post office is "under a duty to exercise reasonable care to provide and maintain a reasonably safe premises" for itsinvitees—its customers.² Maddox v. K-Mart Corp., 565 So. 2d 14, 16 (Ala. 1990); see also Lilya v. Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc., 855 So. 2d 1049, 1054 (Ala. 2003) ("The duty owed to an invitee by [a business] is the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition."). Moreover, if the premises is in a dangerous condition, and the business knew or should have known of the condition, the business owner has a duty "to give sufficient warning so that an invitee might avoid danger by the use of ordinary care." Banks. v. Bayou Bend II, Ltd., 552 So. 2d 1070, 1071 (Ala. 1989). But a store owner...