Lawton v. Town of Brattleboro, 63-69

Decision Date03 June 1970
Docket NumberNo. 63-69,63-69
Citation128 Vt. 525,266 A.2d 816
PartiesEdgar L. LAWTON v. TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO, Harry K. Shepard, Inc., and Rescue, Inc.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Robert Grussing, III, Brattleboro, for plaintiff.

John S. Burgess, and Kenneth V. Fisher, Jr., Brattleboro, for Town of Brattleboro.

Parker, Ainsworth & Richards, Springfield, for Harry K. Shepard, Inc.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.

HOLDEN, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, an aggrieved taxpayer, presents this appeal from a decree which denied the relief sought in his petition for a declaratory judgment. The action was initiated against the town of Brattleboro where he resides. The defendant corporations were subsequently joined as parties who are interested in the plaintiff's grievances.

It appears from the agreed facts, upon which the case was submitted to the chancellor, that the Representative Town Meeting, convened March 16, 1968, as provided in its charter (1959, No. 302 § 3 et seq.), voted to exempt from taxation the real estate within the town of Brattleboro owned by Rescue, Inc. The subject of this particular exemption was not included in the warning of that meeting. Although the question was ruled out of order by the moderator, his ruling was appealed and an exemption granted for the year 1968, under Article 28, which called for 'other business.' This exemption is the subject of the first grievance advanced by the plaintiff.

At the next annual town meeting, and after this proceeding was initiated, the town voted to exempt the lands of Rescue, Inc. for the year 1969. It also voted affirmatively to ratify the exemption granted in 1968. The question was presented in Article 11:-To see if the Town and Town

School District will vote to ratify and reaffirm the action of the Representatives taken at the Annual Representative Town Meeting held on March 16, 1968 when they voted to exempt Rescue, Inc. from taxation for a period of one year from April 1, 1968, upon its lands and buildings at 52 Canal Street (corner of Clark Street), all of which action was taken upon motion made under Article 28 of the Warning for the Annual Representative Town Meeting held on March 16, 1968. (By request.)

At the time of oral argument the defendant town moved to dismiss this aspect of the plaintiff's appeal on the ground the vote of ratification in 1969 rendered the question moot.

Although the facts concerning the action taken at the 1969 meeting are not disputed, they do not relieve us from the question of the 1968 exemption. The plaintiff contends the vote of ratification to be invalid as inconsistent with 24 V.S.A. § 740.

This statute affords a means for validating the vote of a municiaplity which was improperly warned. The section as it relates to our question provides:

When any of the requirements as to notice or warning of an annual or special meeting of a municipal corporation have been omitted or not complied with, such omission or noncompliance, if the meeting and the business thereat transacted is otherwise legal and within the scope of its corporate powers, may be corrected and legalized by the vote at a regular meeting or special meeting of such municipal corporation called and duly warned for that purpose. The question to be voted upon shall substantially be, 'Shall the action taken at the meeting of this town (or city, village or district) held on (state date) in spite of the fact that (state the error or omission), and any act or action of the municipal officers or agents pursuant thereto be re-adopted, ratified and confirmed.'-24 V.S.A. § 740.

We think the corrective action taken by the town in 1969 complied with the spirit and purpose of the curative procedure afforded by section 740. To be sure, the text of the question did not follow the language suggested in the statute. But the question proposed is clear and the answer expressed in the vote is unmistakable. To demand precise compliance with the language of the statute would only frustrate and defeat the vote of the electorate. This is the evil which the Legislature sought to correct. See Conn v. Town of Brattleboro, 120 Vt. 315, 322, 140 A.2d 6, concerning 24 V.S.A. § 1756, a comparable bonding validation statute. We find no error in the chancellor's determination that the tax exemption granted to Rescue, Inc. was valid.

The plaintiff seeks to avoid a refuse disposal agreement between the town of Brattleboro and the defendant Shepard corporation. Over the past forty years the town of Brattleboro has undertaken the task of disposing of the refuse accumulated by its inhabitants. The town has performed this function through private contractors. In the year 1928 and later, from 1939 through 1946, the contracts were approved by the voters at town meeting for those particular years. In 1967 the contract was let to Grey Goddard, who later asked to cancel at the end of that year.

The board of selectmen invited competitive bids and specifications for a contract for the year 1968. In the two bids received, the defendant Harry K. Shepard, Inc. was the successful bidder. Accordingly, on December 6, 1967 a refuse collection agreement for a period of three years was signed by the Shepard Company and the Brattleboro selectmen. It provided for the annual payment of $34,600 to the contractor for performance of the contract according to its terms.

The plaintiff contends the selectmen acted without authority in this undertaking. His contention is based on the Brattleboro charter. No. 161 § 4 of the Acts of 1927, as amended. By this enactment the town of Brattleboro is granted authority-'To provide for the collection and disposition of garbage, waste and other refuse material.' 1943, No. 180 § 13 (amending 1927, No. 161 § 4(g)). The selectmen, on the other hand, are only authorized to '-regulate and control the collection and disposition of garbage.' 1943, No. 180 § 13.

From this,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • City of Montpelier v. Barnett
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 11, 2012
    ...this vein. There are two possible sources of this power: the City's charter and the general statutes.4 See Lawton v. Town of Brattleboro, 128 Vt. 525, 529–30, 266 A.2d 816, 819 (1970); City of Montpelier Charter, 24 V.S.A.App. ch. 5, § 101. The City relies upon the former and contends that,......
  • Kirchner v. Giebink
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 13, 1988
    ...on their authority, the selectmen have the general supervisory power over town matters. 24 V.S.A. § 872. In Lawton v. Town of Brattleboro, 128 Vt. 525, 529, 266 A.2d 816, 819 (1970), this Court A formal vote of the electorate is not an indispensible prerequisite to the authority of the sele......
  • L'Esperance v. Town of Charlotte
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • October 3, 1997
    ...and authorized by the statutory law concerning the safety, convenience and health of their townspeople." Lawton v. Town of Brattleboro, 128 Vt. 525, 529, 266 A.2d 816, 819 (1970). Although the Legislature can create exceptions to this broad authority, see Kirchner v. Giebink, 150 Vt. 172, 1......
  • Brochu v. Brown, 153-69
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • July 22, 1970
    ...and give effect to the intentions of the legislature. Noble v. Fleming's Estate, 121 Vt. 57, 59, 147 A.2d 889. In Lawton v. Town of Brattleboro, Vt., 266 A.2d 816, 818, the question of ratification arose. The article relating to this question was not in the precise language provided by the ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT