Lawtone-Bowles v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | 16-CV-4240 (AJN) |
| Parties | Nicole Lawtone-Bowles, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The City of New York, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiffs, six Motor Vehicle Operators ("MVOs") employed by the New York City Department of Homeless Services ("DHS"), brought an action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated alleging that Defendant City of New York failed to comply with various provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. ("FLSA"). First Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl."), Dkt. No. 14. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the City failed to properly compensate them for overtime, incorrectly calculated their rate of overtime pay, and failed to pay overtime in a timely manner. Id. Defendant moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint ("Br."), Dkt. No. 18.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion to dismiss.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 724 F.3d 256, 261 (2d Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the following statement of facts is drawn from the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs are, and at all material times have been, employed as MVOs by DHS. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Named Plaintiffs Nicole Lawtone-Bowles, Ramzan Alli, Gib Brown, Lance Predmore, Dennis Tobin, and Charles Smith all worked at DHS's Prevention Assistance and Temporary Housing (PATH) center in the Bronx, and they bring the action on behalf of all MVOs who work or have worked for DHS at the material times. Id. ¶ 7. MVOs transport homeless individuals and families to temporary housing placements, train stations and airports, and transport DHS employees between DHS facilities, among other duties. Id. ¶ 9. MVOs are generally scheduled for 5 shifts of 8 hours and 30 minutes each week, of which 30 minutes each day is automatically deducted for uncompensated meal period; thus, Plaintiffs are scheduled to work 40 hours per week. Id. ¶ 10.
According to the Amended Complaint, the City's approach to compensating MVOs for overtime violates the FLSA in three ways.
First, Plaintiffs plead that MVOs frequently work uncompensated overtime hours. Plaintiffs "frequently work overtime on their scheduled work days and weekends" because they "frequently work through the unpaid meal periods without compensation," and "frequently work additional hours before the official start time and after the official end time of their regularly scheduled shifts," causing them to "work in excess of 40 hours in each week that they perform off-the-clock duties." Id. Plaintiffs allege that they "regularly work these additional uncompensated hours in workweeks in which they work over 40 hours." Id. The Amended Complaint goes on to plead more specifics about uncompensated overtime, which the Court addresses below. Id. ¶¶ 11-19, 25-29.
Second, Plaintiffs allege a miscalculation of the rate of MVOs' overtime pay. When MVOs work the "night shift," they are entitled to receive "night shift differential pay" equal to ten percent of their basic rate of pay, but Defendant fails to include this in the regular rate of pay when calculating overtime. Id. ¶ 20. The Amended Complaint goes on to plead more specifics about improperly calculated overtime rates, which the Court addresses below. Id. ¶¶ 20, 31-36.
Third, Plaintiffs claim that when they are paid overtime compensation in cash, Defendant improperly delays the payment beyond the next pay period. Id. ¶ 22. The Amended Complaint goes on to plead more specifics about delayed overtime payment, which the Court addresses below. Id. ¶¶ 23, 38-42.
Plaintiffs seek to recover liquidated damages equal to their unpaid compensation, interest on their unpaid compensation, attorney's fees and costs, and declaratory judgment. Id. at 17.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it may not rest on mere labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action, and the factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Determining whether a plausible claim has been pled is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679) While allegations made upon information and belief satisfy the pleading standards, especially when "facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant," Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), that the defendant possesses the exact records does not allow plaintiffs to shirk their pleading obligations. Angiulo v. Cty. of Westchester, No. 11-CV-7823(CS), 2012 WL 5278523, at *3, n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2012).
The FLSA requires that "for a workweek longer than forty hours," an employee who works in "excess of forty hours" shall be paid for that excess work "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Therefore, "in order to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of 40 hours." Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013).
Defendant analyzes Plaintiffs' claims of uncompensated overtime using two separate groups of Plaintiffs. The complaint pleads more detail in relation to one group than the other. The Court addresses each in turn.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly plead a FLSA overtime claim with respect to four of the named Plaintiffs - Lawtone-Bowles, Alli, Smith, and Brown. Br. at 12. For all named plaintiffs, and for those similarly situated, Plaintiffs plead that they are scheduled for five shifts of 8 hours and 30 minutes each week, for which 30 minutes is uncompensated meal time. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs therefore are scheduled to perform a minimum of 40 hours of work per week. Id. The overtime work arises, according to the complaint, when Plaintiffs "frequently" work through their unpaid meal periods and "frequently" work additional time before the official start and end of their scheduled shifts. Id. Plaintiffs "regularly work these additional uncompensated hours in workweeks in which they work over 40 hours." Id.
As to the pre-shift work, all plaintiffs are more specifically alleged to "begin work 10 minutes to 30 minutes before the official start time of their shifts and perform pre-shift activities, including but not limited to the [usual tasks discussed above] as well as preparing for their shift by retrieving equipment and vehicle keys, walking to the parking garage to retrieve the vehicle, cleaning the vehicle and taking the vehicle for repairs, for which they are not properly compensated." Id. ¶ 11.
Uncompensated post-shift work activities occur "approximately 2 to 4 times a week" and include MVOs' normal tasks "as well as transporting families and individuals, solving problems with placement sites, helping families unload their luggage, driving through heavy traffic, refilling the vehicle's fuel tank, cleaning the vehicle, returning the vehicle to the parking garage, finalizing trip sheets and submitting receipts." Id.
Plaintiffs provide that they work through their 30-minute meal periods "approximately 2 to 4 times a week, performing the [usual tasks discussed above] for which they are not compensated, such as transporting families and individuals to various locations." Id.
The Complaint then proceeds to give specific examples as to the four above-named plaintiffs. For Lawtone-Bowles, she "arrives and begins working approximately 30 minutes before the start of every shift," preparing by "retrieving equipment for her work vehicle, retrieving the work vehicle keys, walking to the parking garage to pick up her work vehicle, cleaning the vehicle and filling it with gas." Id. ¶ 12. She also works after the end of her shift "approximately 2 to 3 times a week for approximately 30 to 90 minutes," as she is still "transporting families and individuals to placement sites." Id. This may be caused by "traffic," a "problem with the placement site," or if "the family has a lot of luggage to unload." Id. After her shifts, Lawtone-Bowles also "refills the vehicle's fuel tank, cleans the vehicle, returns the vehicle to the parking garage and walks 2.5 blocks from the garage to PATH." Id. At PATH, "she organizes receipts and finalizes her trip log before she clocks out." Id. Plaintiffs continue that these tasks cause her to work in excess of 40 hours per week without compensation, and offer two specific weeks - February 2, 2014 to February 8, 2014 and December 27, 2015 to January 2,2016 - in which she worked more than 40 hours while not being compensated for 2 hours and 1.5 hours of overtime respectively. Id. Moreover, the Complaint alleges that during these weeks in which she performed "off-the-clock...
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