Lawuary v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 24 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-3299.,01-3299.
• Parties: Charlie LAWUARY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

199 F.Supp.2d 866

Charlie LAWUARY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

No. 01-3299.

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division.

April 24, 2002.

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Charlie Lawuary, Greenville, IL, pro se.

David E. Risley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Springfield, IL, for Respondent.

OPINION

RICHARD MILLS, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on Petitioner's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

BACKGROUND

On November 5, 1997, Petitioner was charged in a two-count indictment with possession of cocaine base (crack), with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).

On May 11, 1997, Petitioner was arrested after officers conducted a search and discovered a baggie containing 21.3 grams of cocaine base located in Petitioner's overalls. Count I of the indictment charged Petitioner with possession of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B).

On August 24, 1997, Petitioner ran from a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. Officers eventually tackled Petitioner in an effort to subdue him. As he was tackled, Petitioner threw a baggie containing 64.3 grams of cocaine base. Count 2 charged Petitioner with possession of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Count 2 of the indictment on March 9, 1998. In the plea agreement, Petitioner reserved the right to appeal the Court's denial of his motion to suppress and to contest any finding that his prior criminal record subjected him to a mandatory life sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). After admitting that he had two previous convictions for felony drug offenses, Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison.

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that this Court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the Government failed to provide adequate notice of the previous convictions upon which it was relying to enhance Petitioner's sentence. Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in an opinion issued May 1, 2000. United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372 (7th Cir.2000).

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court was denied on October 2, 2000. On September 30, 2001, Petitioner filed this Petition.

ANALYSIS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255:

A prisoner in custody under sentence ... claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court, which imposed the sentence, to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, a petitioner may not raise constitutional errors in a § 2255 motion unless he has raised these errors on direct appeal. "Constitutional errors not raised on direct appeal may not be raised in a § 2255 motion unless the defendant can demonstrate either: (1) both good cause for his failure to raise the claims on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the failure to raise those claims; or (2) that the district court's refusal to consider the claims would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice." McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.1996). Petitioner asserts several grounds for his § 2255 Motion.

I. Petitioner Claims the Court refused to Allow him to Maintain his Not Guilty Plea

First, Petitioner alleges that the Court acted in violation of the Fifth Amendment when it refused to allow Petitioner to maintain his not guilty plea. In essence, Petitioner is asserting that his guilty plea was involuntary. Petitioner failed to raise this issue on direct appeal, so his ability to raise it here depends upon whether he can prove good cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (holding that without a showing of cause and prejudice, "the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review only if first challenged on direct review"). Petitioner has made no attempt to establish cause and prejudice in relation to this claim.

At the change of plea hearing, Petitioner interrupted the hearing to inform the Court that he wanted to plead not guilty and proceed to trial. The following is taken from the change of plea hearing transcript:

                Mr. Miller (Petitioner's counsel): Judge, he's advised me that he wishes to go to court
                The Court:      I beg your pardon
                Mr. Miller:     He had advised me now that he wishes to go to court. To go to trial
                The Court:      That he wishes to go to trial
                Mr. Miller:     That's right
                The Court:      So that you do not wish to proceed to a plea of guilty at this time; is that
                                 right —
                Mr. Lawuary:    That's right
                The Court:      — Mr. Lawuary
                Mr. Lawuary:    That's right.
                The Court:      Mr. Lawuary, you realize, do you not, that you have signed a plea agreement
                                 in which you are admitting that you committed this offense? Do you realize
                                 that?
                Mr. Lawuary:    Yes, sir.
                The Court:      And now you want to stop the proceedings and go back and go to trial by jury
                                 is that your point?
                Mr. Miller:     Yes, sir, seems like it, sir.
                The Court:      What do you think that you will gain by that? You see, Mr. Lawuary, the
                                 reason why we have this mandatory life is not because of this offense, but
                                 because of your prior offenses.
                Mr. Lawuary:    I have only been convicted of one prior offense.1
                The Court:       Well, we have one that is in 1993 and another conviction in 1995.
                Mr. Lawuary:    That's what I have been trying to explain to my lawyer. I went to penitentiary
                                 for 1995. When I copped out to the case in 1995, I copped to all drug
                                 cases known and unknown. So that should have covered all that, Your
                                 Honor. You could never — they double jeopardied me like that. When I
                                 copped out to them, I didn't get busted no more for no more drugs or
                                 nothing during that time.
                                                                ***
                                That should be one strike, that's what I'm trying to say.2
                

                Mr. Risley (Assistant U.S. Attorney): Your Honor, it may be that the thing Mr. Lawuary is
                                  concerned about — we're talking about mandatory life. By entering this
                                  plea agreement, he is concerned he is alleging — we are going from the
                                  records we have. His attorney, Mr. Miller, has carefully negotiated an
                                  exception clause in this plea agreement that says that the Defendant, while
                                  he's acknowledging that we allege he's facing a mandatory life sentence,
                                  that he reserves the right to deny that and to contest it.
                Mr. Miller:     That's correct.
                Mr. Risley:     And if he's correct that he only has one prior drug conviction —
                The Court:      It is not necessarily mandatory.
                                                                ***
                Mr. Lawuary:    That's what I'm saying. Could it be valid? I mean I only copped — when I
                                  copped out to that one time, how they going to get two out of it?
                The Court:      If this agreement indeed is limited only to the plea and acknowledges the
                                  Government's position of two, but gives you the opportunity to show the
                                  Court we're only talking about one, then it would definitely have an affect
                                  upon your ultimate sentence. No question about that.
                                                                ***
                Mr. Risley:     And the Defendant can contest that. And that, of course, is an issue we will
                                 resolve later on before sentencing. If the Defendant wants to proceed to
                                 trial, that certainly —
                Mr. Lawuary:    That was my main thing, what he just said, you know.
                The Court:      That you can contest whether it's one or two?
                Mr. Lawuary:    One or two.
                The Court:      At the time of sentencing.
                Mr. Miller:     We carefully reserved that.
                The Court:      How's that?
                Mr. Miller:     We carefully identified that issue and Mr. Risley and I negotiated that. And
                                 that's set forth rather carefully in the plea agreement. But when a man
                                 stands in front of the court, he gets a little nervous and it is legitimate
                                 nervousness and anxiety.
                                                                ***
                The Court:      All right. Now, we've got it all understood?
                Mr. Lawuary:    Okay.
                The Court:      We're talking about a plea to Count 2. It's not until we get down to sentencing
                                 that we're going to worry about one or two priors?
                Mr. Lawuary:    Right.
                The Court:      And at that time, you're going to be free to show me that there's only one,
                                 rather than two, right?
                Mr. Lawuary:    Right.
                The Court:      And that, of course, will make a vast difference in the ultimate sentence.
                Mr. Lawuary:    Yes, sir.
                The Court:      Now, we are all agreed up to this point?
                Mr. Lawuary:    Yes, sir.
                The Court:      Now, with that understanding, then, do you want to continue —
                Mr. Lawuary:    We can continue.
                The Court:      with the plea?
                Mr. Lawuary:    Yes, sir.
                

(Change of Plea Hearing, March 9, 1998, Pages 15-20). Once Petitioner learned that he could address his concerns before sentencing, he was satisfied with his decision to plead guilty.³ The Court proceeded to instruct Petitioner about the possible penalties he would face under either scenario — whether he had been convicted of one or two prior felony drug offenses. After describing the...