Lay v. State, Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 74560,74560
• Citation: 23 Kan.App.2d 211,928 P.2d 920
• Parties: Dwight D. LAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, and Secretary of Transportation, E. Dean Carlson, Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 920

928 P.2d 920

23 Kan.App.2d 211

Dwight D. LAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, and Secretary of Transportation, E. Dean Carlson, Appellees.

No. 74560.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Dec. 20, 1996.

Review Denied Feb. 4, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. Negligence exists where there is a duty owed by one person to another and a breach of that duty occurs. Further, if recovery is to be had for such negligence, the injured party must show: (1) a causal connection between the duty breached and the injury received; and (2) he or she was damaged by the negligence. Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Whether the duty has been breached is a question of fact.

3. Although the question of whether a defendant's actions proximately caused a plaintiff's injury is normally a question of fact for the jury, where the facts of a case are susceptible to only one conclusion, the question is one of law and may be properly subject to summary judgment.

4. In order to recover in a negligence action, the breach of duty must be the actual and proximate cause of the injury. The proximate or legal cause of an injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable consequences of the wrongful act.

5. Traffic signage regulations are intended to warn road travelers of particular risks or types of danger. Regulations such as these do not create duties to other classes of persons or for other risks.

6. Under the facts of this case, the Kansas Department of Transportation's duty was to warn of a stop sign controlled intersection. The risk that the duty to warn protected against was unrelated to this accident. Although there was negligence on the part of Kansas Department of Transportation, it was not a proximate cause of this accident. It was "negligence in the air," which is not actionable negligence under Kansas law.

7. In a negligence action, the "but for" theory of causality and liability is incompatible with the proximate cause analysis in Kansas.

Dan Lykins, of Bryan, Lykins & Hejtmanek, P.A., Topeka, for appellant.

Vicky S. Johnson, of the Kansas Department of Transportation, for appellees.

Before PIERRON, P.J., and GERNON and GREEN, JJ.

PIERRON, Presiding Judge:

Dwight D. Lay appeals the district court's granting of summary judgment to the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT) in this personal injury case. We affirm.

Plaintiff was driving his 1982 Datsun automobile west on Jackson County Road 142. He was very seriously injured when he rolled his car after failing to negotiate a curve east of the intersection of Jackson County Road 142 and State Highway 75.

There is a hill and curve on County Road 142 as one approaches highway 75 from the east. With the exception of the stop ahead sign and stop sign at Highway 75, which are under the jurisdiction of KDOT, County Road 142 is under the control and maintenance of Jackson County. The stop ahead sign, which was maintained under contract with KDOT, was obscured at the time of the accident by trees and vegetation. There is no evidence a curve warning was not erected because there was a stop warning sign.

There has never been a curve warning sign on County Road 142 east of Highway 75. Ron Karn, a Jackson County Road and Bridge Supervisor, testified that an engineering study had been done of the location prior to plaintiff's accident which concluded a curve warning sign was not required.

KDOT's summary judgment motion and plaintiff's response do not contest that KDOT would not have been responsible for any curve warning sign on County Road 142 because its responsibility was limited to the stop and stop ahead signs, and if a curve sign was needed based on an engineering study on County Road 142, it would be the county's responsibility to place it.

Plaintiff filed suit against various entities of the Nissan Corporation, the Jackson County Board of Commissioners, and KDOT. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the Jackson County Board of Commissioners and settled with Nissan. The remaining defendant, KDOT, was granted summary judgment based on a finding that plaintiff could not show that KDOT had a duty to warn of the roadway feature that was involved in the accident or that a causal connection existed between the breach of duty plaintiff alleged and the accident.

Before turning to the issues on appeal, we note the well-established rules relating to the granting of summary judgment in a negligence action:

"The burden on the party seeking summary judgment is a strict one. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal we apply the same rule, and where we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. [Citations omitted.]" Mitzner v. State Dept. of SRS, 257 Kan. 258, 260-61, 891 P.2d 435 (1995).

The importance of motor vehicle traffic safety has led to many efforts to establish and standardize its regulation. Pursuant to K.S.A. 8-2003, KDOT is required to adopt a manual which conforms as much as possible to the most recent edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) for streets and highways. All parties agree that the 1988 edition was legally applicable on September 30, 1992. It sets forth certain warrants or specifications describing the physical requirements necessary to justify the authorization and use of the various warning signs recommended. Pertinent sections of the manual provide in part:

2A-30. "All traffic signs should be kept in proper position, clean and legible at all times. Damaged signs shouldbe replaced without undue delay."

....

"Special attention and necessary action should be taken to see that weeds, trees, shrubbery and construction materials do not obscure the face of any sign." p. 2A-12.

2C-1. "Warning signs are used when it is deemed necessary to warn traffic of existing or potentially hazardous conditions on or adjacent to a highway or street." p. 2C-1.

2C-3. "Since warning signs are primarily for the benefit of the driver who is unacquainted with the road, it is very important that care be given to the placement of such signs. Warning signs should provide adequate time for the driver to perceive, identify, decide, and perform any necessary maneuver." p. 2C-2.

2C-5. "The Curve sign (W1-2R or 2L) may be used where engineering investigations of roadway, geometric, and operating conditions show the recommended speed on the curve to be greater than 30 miles per hour and equal to less than the speed limit established by law or by regulation for that section of highway. Additional protection may be provided by use of the Advisory Speed plate (sec. 2C-35)." p. 2C-3.

2C-15. "A STOP AHEAD sign is intended for use on an approach to a STOP sign that is not visible for a sufficient distance to permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop at the STOP sign. Obstruction(s) causing the limited visibility may be permanent or intermittent." p. 2C-8.

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred by finding he failed to establish a causal link between his injury and KDOT's breach of duty. His states his claim is derived from the general liability for negligence created by the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq. He alleges negligent inspection of KDOT's stop ahead sign on County Road 142, and negligent maintenance of KDOT's stop ahead sign on County Road 142. He argues the evidence shows that but for the obscured sign, the accident would not have occurred.

Plaintiff cites C.J.W. v. State, 253 Kan. 1, Syl. p 1, 853 P.2d 4 (1993), where the court explained the general principles of a cause of action based on negligence:

"Negligence exists where there is a duty owed by one person to another and a breach of that duty occurs. Further, if recovery is to be had for such negligence, the injured party must show: (1) a causal connection between the duty breached and the injury received; and (2) he or she was damaged by the negligence. Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Whether the duty has been breached is a question of fact."

Ordinarily, causation, like negligence, is determined by a jury. St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 417, 781 P.2d 1043 (1989). Usually, a determination of the presence or absence of negligence should be left to the trier of fact. Stetler v. Fosha, 9 Kan.App.2d 519, 522, 682 P.2d 682, rev. denied 236 Kan. 877 (1984); see also Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 232 Kan. 11, 27, 651 P.2d 585 (1982) (negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are all issues for the jury's determination). Although the question of whether a defendant's actions proximately caused a plaintiff's injury is normally a question of fact for the jury, where the facts of a case are susceptible to only one conclusion, the question is one of law and may be properly subject to summary judgment....