Laycock v. United States

Citation230 F.2d 848
Decision Date06 March 1956
Docket NumberNo. 14858.,14858.
PartiesGladys LAYCOCK, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Seitz, Easley & Whipple, Norman L. Easley, Stewart M. Whipple, Portland, Or., for appellant.

Perry W. Morton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harold S. Harrison, Roger P. Marquis, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., C. E. Luckey, U. S. Atty., James W. Morrell, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for appellee.

Before POPE and LEMMON, Circuit Judges, and MATHES, District Judge.

MATHES, District Judge.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing appellant's action for damages alleged to have been sustained as a proximate result of enforcement of the statutes and regulations relating to the sale of gold. See: Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 337, 31 U.S.C.A. § 440; 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 95a, 213; Executive Order 6260, as amended 12 U.S.C.A. following § 95a; United States Treasury Department Gold Regulations, 31 CFR, Part 54, §§ 54.1-55.2, 19 F.R. 4309-4316 (1954).

Stated in summary, the allegations of appellant's complaint are: that she is a substantial owner of certain patented lode mining claims in Grant County, Oregon; that "in the past said mine has been greatly developed and large quantities of gold have been extracted therefrom"; that "at present approximately 243,000 tons of ore are blocked out therein, but said ore cannot be economically processed at the present arbitrary price set for gold"; that the Government has fixed "an arbitrary and artificial price of 35 irredeemable and inconvertible paper dollars per troy ounce of fine gold as the authorized price for the purchase and sale of gold"; that "in the free markets of the world the price of fine gold has been and now is greatly in excess of $35.00 per troy ounce."

Appellant further alleges that the statutes and regulations requiring that gold recovered from natural deposits in the United States be sold to a Government mint at $35.00 per ounce, less mint charges, deprive appellant of her property "without due process of law and without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution in that they allow condemnation and acquisition of gold at a price other than the fair value"; that "during the last two years" these statutes and regulations have prevented appellant "from charging a price for her gold sufficient to render the operation of her mine economically feasible", and have caused appellant's gold mine "to depreciate in value and to remain closed", and have "directly and proximately resulted in a loss of profits to her and a depreciation in value of her said property in excess of $10,000, all to her damage in said sum."

The Government moved to dismiss on three grounds: (1) that the complaint "fails to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction * * * over the * * * United States of America", Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 12(b) (2), 28 U.S. C.A.; (2) that the action is barred by the six-year period of limitations specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a); and (3) that the complaint "fails to state a claim or cause of action upon which relief can be granted." Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 12(b) (6).

Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a) (2), contending that Government action under the gold program amounts to a "taking" of appellant's property for which "just compensation" is due under the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Central Eureka Mining Co. v. United States, Ct.Cl., 1956, 138 F.Supp. 281.

The United States of America, as sovereign, has consented to be sued under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a) (2), says appellant, in cases "where private property is taken * * * in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, but without condemnation proceedings." Jacobs v. United States, 1933, 290 U.S. 13, 54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 1884, 112 U.S. 645, 5 S.Ct. 306, 28 L.Ed. 846.

True, but such consent is limited to cases where the alleged taking is lawfully authorized and the claimed damages proximately result from an exercise of the power of eminent domain. United States v. North American Transportation & Trading Co., 1920, 253 U.S. 330, 40 S.Ct. 518, 64 L.Ed. 935; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 1919, 251 U.S. 146, 40 S.Ct. 106,...

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6 cases
  • Laycock v. Kenney
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • October 21, 1959
    ...acquisition of gold having been expressly withdrawn by an Act of Congress, 49 Stat. 938, 939, 31 U.S. C.A. § 773b. See Laycock v. United States, 1956, 9 Cir., 230 F.2d 848, certiorari denied 351 U.S. 964, 76 S.Ct. 1028, 100 L.Ed. Subsequently appellant initiated the present action challengi......
  • Crain v. Krehbiel
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • February 3, 1978
    ...violations by the Government of Federal Constitutional rights. Schillinger v. United States, 1894, 155 U.S. 163." Laycock v. United States, 230 F.2d 848, 850 (9 Cir. 1956); Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia, 353 F.Supp. 1249, 1253-1254 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 162 U.S.App.D......
  • Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • January 22, 1973
    ...jurisdiction is lacking in suits not based upon a Congressionally created cause of action. As the court stated in Laycock v. United States, 230 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 964, 76 S.Ct. 1028, 100 L.Ed. 1484 (1956): "It is axiomatic that: `Consent alone gives jurisdiction to ......
  • MONOLITH PORTLAND M. CO. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • August 30, 1960
    ...recovery of such compensation. The United States may withhold, withdraw, or condition that consent any way it chooses. Laycock v. United States, 9 Cir., 230 F.2d 848, 850. Here the United States had conditioned such consent upon compliance with the procedure prescribed in section 105. That ......
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