Layden v. Target Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-3467 (BRM)(LHG)
• Parties: DONNA LAYDEN, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

DONNA LAYDEN, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 15-3467 (BRM)(LHG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

June 25, 2018

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is Defendant Target Corporation's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff Donna Layden ("Layden") opposes the motion. (ECF No. 27.) Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court did not hear oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Layden was a customer at Defendant's retail store ("Target") in Middletown, New Jersey on April 7, 2014,¹ where she alleges she slipped on a piece of plastic and fell. (Compl. (ECF No. 1-1) ¶ 1; D.'s Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 26-1) ¶¶ 1, 8; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 1, 8.) Layden claims Defendant "negligently and carelessly failed to make proper and timely inspections," which caused her to trip and sustain serious personal injuries. (ECF No.1-1 ¶ 5.) Specifically, Layden claims "trash, debris and other items including plastic hangers" were allowed to remain on the floor "after a period of time that would reasonably" give Defendant notice of a slip and fall hazard. (Id. ¶ 3.)

Layden contests several issues of fact asserted by Defendant and challenges the credibility of Defendant's witnesses. While the Court ultimately finds there is no genuine issue for trial as to any of the material facts, the Court addresses Layden's challenges below and draws all justifiable inferences in her favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (noting that disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment); Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) ("In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence 'is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).)

A. Layden's Alleged Incident

On April 7, 2014, at 12:30 p.m., Layden allegedly slipped on a piece of plastic and fell in Defendant's store. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 1, 8; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 1, 8.) Layden testified:

I picked [a comforter] up and put it into the cart and walked over to the scanner that was on the main aisle on the pillar pole and I went to go lift the comforter out of the cart and my foot slipped out from under me and I went down.

(Layden Dep.² at Tr. 39:19-21.) Layden did not see anything on the ground before she fell but observed a "piece of small plastic hanger" on the floor while she was laying on the ground. (Id. at Tr. 50:7-17, 79:21-23). She claims to have seen only two employees and no other guests in the store that day. (Id. at Tr. 48:9-12.) Nevertheless, she did not report the incident until the next day.

See infra, Section I. C. ("Reporting the Incident"). The fall injured Layden's right shoulder. (Id. at Tr. 86:14-25; ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 26; ECF No. 27 ¶ 26.)

B. The Object in Question

The parties dispute what, if anything, Layden slipped on. Although Layden testified to seeing a "piece of small plastic hanger" on the floor after she fell, she did not pick it up after she fell. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 31-32; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 31-32.) Instead, in the week following the incident, Layden's daughter-in-law, Lori Conklin ("Conklin"), went to Target, picked up a piece of plastic hanger from the floor, and gave it to Layden. (Layden Dep. at Tr. 51:1-7.) While Layden testified she did not ask Conklin to retrieve a piece of plastic from the store, Conklin testified Layden did make such a request of her. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 35, 41-42, 45; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 35, 41-42, 45.) Months later, Conklin "returned [to the store] to look for a white piece [of plastic hanger]," retrieved "[a] little white hooked hanger," and also "gave it to [Layden]." (Conklin Dep. (ECF No. 26-3, Ex. H) at Tr. 25:14, 29:1-4.) Conklin eventually conceded the "hangers" she produced were not from the floor but were holding up pieces of merchandise on the wall. (Id. at Tr. 22:14, 28:17-29:4.)

At her deposition, Layden could not identify whether the piece presented to her was the one that caused her fall, but stated it was "something like it." (Layden Dep. at Tr. 53:11, 54:18-21; ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 59-61; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 59-61.) She produced a photograph of a piece of plastic similar to the one on which she slipped (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 37, 61; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 37, 61), but Defendant denies using it in its store at the time of the incident. (ECF No. 26-3, Ex. J; ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 62-63, 100-02.)

Further, Layden argues, based on the employee's handling of the hangers, a reasonable jury could infer Defendant's liability. Before the store opens, an overnight crew restocks the merchandise, and an outside contractor cleans the floor after the overnight crew completes their work. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 95-98; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 95-98.) When merchandise arrives at the store, itcomes pre-hung on hangers, but the employees "take them off when we put the merchandise on the racks." (DeMarco Dep.³ at Tr. 24:20-25:1.)

Defendant argues this statement (and all testimony regarding "hangers") is irrelevant and misleading, because Layden ultimately testified, as discussed above, that she saw a small hooked-shaped piece of plastic on the ground. (ECF No. 28 at 3.) Defendant claims employees do not place, replace, or remove any hangers or hooks on the merchandise and the merchandise is pre-hung and attached to the hangers when it arrives to the store. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 85-87.) Defendant also contends customers leave the store with the hangers attached to the merchandise, along with the price tag, when they purchase the product. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 88-91.)

C. Reporting the Incident

Layden did not report the incident until the following day on April 8, 2014, at which time, a Guest Incident Report ("Incident Report") (ECF No. 26-2, Ex. B) and Investigation Report (ECF No. 26-2, Ex. C) were prepared by Donna DeMarco ("DeMarco"), ⁴ a Target employee and executive team leader, responsible for day-to-day operations on the sales floor. (DeMarco Dep. at Tr. 8:3-6, 20-24; ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 2, 64, 72; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 2, 64, 72.). According to the Incident Report, Layden was at the "[s]canner in HBA/Paper Area-A39" when she "stepped on something and it scooted out from under [her] foot." (ECF No. 26-2, Ex. B.) The Incident Report states: (1) the cause of Layden's fall was an "unknown object (tiny) on the floor"; (2) it was "unknown at the time" whether "the floor/ground [was] clean and dry"; and (3) a "tiny piece of plastic" wasinvolved. (Id.; ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 5-6, 24; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 5-6, 24.) In the Investigation Report, DeMarco indicated she could not "determine the source of the substance or condition" because the "[r]eport [was] taken 1 day later - object gone." (ECF No. 26-2, Ex. C.) Layden's signature appears at the bottom of the Incident Report. (ECF No. 26-2, Ex. B.)

Layden challenges DeMarco's credibility and reliability as to what she reported. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 10-12; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 10-12.) Layden claims DeMarco "did not inspect the area where [she] fell and . . . it is likely that she failed to inspect the accident site and only testified as such to protect her job." (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 11-12.) Layden further challenges DeMarco's testimony regarding how long, if at all, the object was on the floor, and whether Defendant's employees were aware of it. DeMarco testified, on the day of the incident, Defendant had safety procedures in place and that every team member was responsible for customer safety. (DeMarco Dep. at Tr. 13:9-11 and 16:9-12.) She also testified team leaders, designated as Leaders on Duty ("LODs"), were required to walk the sales floor at least once an hour, help guests, monitor team members, inspect floors, and make sure the store was safe. (DeMarco Dep. at Tr. 17:4-18:3.) The LOD would have been advised if someone in the store fell. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 104; ECF No. 27 ¶ 104.)

Stephanie Lembke ("Lembke") was the LOD on the day of the incident and claims she was not made aware of anyone falling near the scanner at the time of the incident. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 81-82, 103; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 81-82, 103.) Lembke received safety training and acknowledged her responsibility to address any guest or safety issues in the building while on duty, including picking things up from the floor. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 83-84, 92, 99; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 83-84.) Layden also questions Lembke's credibility and disputes whether each employee fulfilled their obligations to ensure customer safety. (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 92-93, 99.)

The day after the incident, DeMarco viewed an hour and half of videotape surveillance,along with Michael Triolo ("Triolo"), a former executive team leader of asset protection for Target. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 71, 108-10.) They did not observe anyone falling near the scanner (id.), but Layden argues Triolo and DeMarco failed to view footage of the location where the fall occurred (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 71, 108-10). The parties dispute whether the incident occurred by the scanner in the main aisle in front of the building across from the household appliance products, as alleged by Defendant based on the Incident Report, or in the main aisle near the scanner by the bedding section, as alleged by Layden in her opposition to her Motion. (ECF No. 26-1 ¶¶ 65-70; ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 65-70.) Significantly, but without making any findings of fact, a review of the record indicates the parties may be referring to the same scanner. However, to the extent the facts are in dispute, the Court notes Layden's argument—that the accident happened by a scanner other than the one noted in the Incident Report and viewed by Defendant the next day—is not expressly supported by the portion of the record...