Laydon v. Town of Woodbridge, No. 4008012 (Conn. Super. 7/18/2006), 4008012
| Decision Date | 18 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 4008012,4008012 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Laura Christine Laydon v. Town of Woodbridge et al. Opinion No.: 94339 |
The dispositive issue in this zoning appeal involves the rule that a zoning commission, except under certain circumstances, cannot grant an application for a special permit when it previously denied an earlier application seeking the same relief.
The plaintiff, Laura Christine Laydon, appeals from the decisions of the defendant Woodbridge planning and zoning commission (commission), granting an application for a subdivision and an application for a special permit to the defendants Betty and Sanford Soufrine (the defendants).1
The record reflects that the defendants are the owners of a horizontally long and narrow parcel of land measuring approximately 17.9 acres located at 118 Newton Road in Woodbridge. On September 28, 2004, the defendants filed an application to subdivide this parcel. The eastern portion of the parcel, on which the defendants' home is situated and which borders Newton Road, was designated proposed lot 3 and contained 5.253 acres. The lot immediately to the west of lot 3 was designated proposed lot 2 and contained 3.016 acres. The subdivision application further proposed that the remaining land, amounting to 9.644 acres just west of lot 2, be conveyed to the defendants' son, Michael Jay Soufrine, the present owner of an existing parcel designated on the application as lot 1, which borders proposed lot 2 to the west.
Lot 2 did not border a public road. The application provided, however, that lot 2 would include an access way, twenty-five feet wide and approximately fifty-four feet long, to a public road known as Soundview Avenue. The application further provided that lot 1 would be given a right-of-way, presumably an easement, in this access way. Under the regulations, lot 2, therefore, would be a "rear lot." A rear lot is defined by the regulations as "a lot accessible only over a private right-of-way or driveway at least 20' but not more than 50' in width."
Under §3.43 of the regulations, a rear lot requires a special permit. Specifically, §3.43 of the regulations provides:
The defendants filed an application for a special permit for a rear lot relying on subparagraph (b) of §3.43, and contemporaneously filed an application for subdivision approval. In their application, the defendants claimed that a rear lot was made necessary by the "unusually elongated configuration" of the property.
The commission held a public hearing on the defendants' applications. At the public hearing and the subsequent work session, the commission members expressed various concerns about the defendants' request for a rear lot, principally pertaining to (1) whether there were any unusual features peculiar to the land necessitating the use of a rear lot, as required by §3.43; (2) the right of way given to lot 1 in the lot 2's access way to Soundview Avenue, and (3) the distance of lot 2 from Soundview Avenue. The right-of-way given to lot 1 was of particular concern, in light of the proposal to convey 9.644 acres to lot 1. Some commission members were concerned that this acreage might be the subject of a future application by the owner of lot 1 for another rear lot. Moreover, as some commission members opined, such a right-of-way in favor of lot 1 appeared to violate §3.431 of the regulations.2
On December 6, 2004, the commission voted unanimously to deny the applications for a special permit and for subdivision approval. The single reason that the commission formally adopted for its action was that "the proposed rear Lot #2 was not made necessary by any unusual features peculiar to the land in question as set forth in §3.43(b)" of the regulations. No appeal was taken from the commission's denial.
On December 30, 2004, little more than three weeks later, the defendants submitted a revised plan and replied to the commission for a special permit and subdivision approval. In the revised plan, the distance between lot 2 and Soundview Avenue, that is, the length of the access way, was reduced to twenty-five feet. In addition, the right-of-way in the access way previously given to lot 1 was eliminated.3 Although this application initially relied on §3.43(a) for approval of the rear lot the defendants amended their application to again rely on §3.43(b) of the regulations.
On February 7, 2005 the commission held a public hearing and subsequently approved both applications. The commission adopted, as the reason for the commission's action, the grounds stated in the defendants' application for a special permit, that the "property has a difficult configuration, with limited road frontage, which provides an unusual feature peculiar to the subject land, making the use of the rear lot necessary."4 From this action, the plaintiff has appealed.
Although the plaintiff alleged several claims for reversal in her appeal, the single issue briefed by her is whether the commission, in approving the defendants' second applications for a special permit and subdivision, illegally reversed the decision it had made only two months earlier. The other claims alleged by the plaintiff, but not briefed, are deemed abandoned.5 See Cybulski v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 43 Conn.App. 105, 109 n.3, 682 A.2d 1073, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 949, 686 A.2d 123 (1996); Practice Book §5-2.6
General Statutes §8-8(b) provides that "any person aggrieved by any decision of a board . . . may take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which the municipality is located." "[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402, 409, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002). An "aggrieved person includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) General Statutes §8-8(a)(1). The plaintiff alleges that she owns property within 100 feet of the disputed property. Based on the undisputed evidence presented at trial, the court finds that the plaintiff does own land within 100 feet of the defendants' 17.9-acre parcel and, therefore, is statutorily aggrieved pursuant to General Statutes §8-8(a)(1). See Caltabiano v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 560 A.2d 975 (1989).
The standard by which this court reviews an action of a zoning commission is well settled. "The Superior Court's scope of review is limited to determining only whether the board's actions were unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal . . . Where a zoning agency has stated its reasons for its actions, the court should determine only whether the assigned grounds are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations which the [commission] was required to apply under the zoning regulations . . . It is well settled that a court, in reviewing the actions of an administrative agency, is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency or to make factual determinations on its own." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R&R Pool & Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 257 Conn. 456, 470, 778 A.2d 61 (2001). "The burden of proof to demonstrate that the [commission] acted improperly is upon the [plaintiff]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 206, 658 A.2d 559 (1995).
"When an appeal is taken to this court from the granting of a special permit or site plan, this court's standard of review generally requires considerable deference to the decision of the commission." Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 627-28, 711 A.2d 675 (1998) (); A. Aiudi & Sons, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 72 Conn.App. 502, 506, 806 A.2d 77 (2002), aff'd, 267 Conn. 192, 837 A.2d 748 (2003) ().
The present appeal implicates the rules prescribing, and proscribing, when a zoning authority may reverse a prior decision. Although the appeal does not involve an application for a variance,7 the rules governing the reversal of a prior decision begin in that context. "In considering a subsequent variance application where it has already denied a similar prior one, [a] zoning board of appeals is generally precluded from reversing a prior decision unless [1] there has been a material change of conditions, or [2] other considerations have intervened affecting the merits, and no vested rights have arisen . . ....
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