Laylah K., In re
| Decision Date | 07 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | G009027,Nos. G009026,s. G009026 |
| Citation | 229 Cal.App.3d 1496,281 Cal.Rptr. 6 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re LAYLAH K. and Sombrah K., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAYLAH K. and Sombrah K., Defendants and Appellants. |
After being declared wards of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602), sisters Laylah K. and Sombrah K. were placed on probation and ordered to comply with certain terms and conditions. On appeal, they challenge the imposition of those terms, arguing they bear no reasonable relationship to the offenses and to their social histories. 1
On April 27, 1989, Laylah, Sombrah, and two other girls accosted a woman walking her dog along a street. Demanding to know why she was wearing an article of red clothing, they shouted obscenities and challenged her to fight. Layla hit the woman twice in the face and, when apprehended by the police, presented false identification.
Laylah admitted violating Penal Code sections 415, subdivision (1) () and 148.9 (providing false identification to a police officer). Assault and battery charges were dismissed. Sombrah admitted violating Penal Code section 415, subdivision (3) (), and the alleged violation of section 415, subdivision (1) was dismissed.
As a condition of their probation, the minors were ordered to comply with provisions specified on a preprinted form entitled "Gang Terms and Conditions of Probation." They contend the following terms were unlawfully imposed and should be stricken:
Term # 4: Prohibits minors from being out of their homes between 8 p.m. and 5 a.m.
Term # 8: Prohibits minors' presence at any known gathering area of the Crips gang.
Term # 9: Prohibits association with known members of the Crips gang.
Term # 10: Prohibits possession of weapons and association with persons who are in possession of weapons.
Term # 11: Orders submission to warrantless search and seizure.
Term # 12: Orders submission to chemical testing.
Term # 15: Prohibits presence at a court proceeding unless minor is a party, defendant, or witness.
Term # 16: Prohibits wearing clothing or emblems affiliated with membership in the Crips gang.
Relying on People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545, the minors argue these conditions were not reasonably related to their crimes or to their rehabilitation. They also contend the terms infringe on their constitutional rights of speech and association and prohibit lawful conduct.
In Lent, the Supreme Court determined (Id. at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.) Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, when a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on a delinquency petition, the court "may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." This provision has been broadly interpreted.
(In re Frankie J. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1153, 244 Cal.Rptr. 254.)
In view of the unique role of the juvenile court in caring for the minor's well-being, it must consider "not only the circumstances of the crime but also the minor's entire social history" in fashioning conditions of probation. (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20, 169 Cal.Rptr. 625.) Thus, in Todd L., a condition forbidding the minor to consume alcoholic beverages or to be present where another person is consuming alcohol was upheld even though the minor had not committed an alcohol-related offense. (Ibid.)
The minors contend there is no evidence they were members of a gang. They point out the only evidence the crime was gang-related was the reference to the victim's red clothing. They claim statements in the probation report that this indicated "gang overtones," and by the minors' aunt that they were associating with gangs, were merely speculative. 2
However, both minors admitted they had friends who were members of the Crips gang and Layla admitted one of the girls with them during this offense was a Crips member. In arriving at the recommendations to the court, the probation officer was entitled to rely upon the conclusion of a family member that "if they were not gang members, they were at least gang associates." And, the court reasonably relied upon the probation officer's conclusion Laylah and Sombrah participated in an apparent defense of what they perceived to be a symbolic challenge to Crips' territorialism.
Moreover, the minors' history reflects increasingly undirected behavior. Both were runaways and out of their parents' control. Sombrah had stopped attending school because of pressures there to join the Crips gang. Laylah was also a frequent truant and tended to get into fights at school.
The minors' contention that mere association with gang members does not justify terms aimed at known gang members is extremely shortsighted. Association with gang members is the first step to involvement in gang activity. And, under section 186.22, active participation in a street gang, defined as a criminal enterprise, is a crime. In section 186.21, the Legislature expressly found "that the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs whose ... activities, both individually and collectively, present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected."
This court has previously held that probation conditions designed to curb dangerous associations with gangs were not unreasonable. (In re Michael D. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1610, 1617, 264 Cal.Rptr. 476.) While Michael D. had admitted gang affiliations, we see no logical or beneficial reason to require a court to wait until a minor has...
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