Layman v. City of Peoria
| Decision Date | 08 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:18-cv-1269 |
| Citation | 352 F.Supp.3d 874 |
| Parties | Jeremy LAYMAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PEORIA, ILLINOIS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Shane Michael Voyles, Police Benevolent Labor Committee, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiff.
Donald B. Leist, Chrissie Lynn Peterson, City of Peoria, Peoria, IL, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court to determine whether it will hear Plaintiff Jeremy Layman's action for declaratory judgment. Plaintiff alleges he was fired from the Peoria Police Department based on statements he made on social media. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that those statements were protected under the First Amendment. In reviewing, and rejecting, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 5), the Court became concerned about pending parallel arbitration proceedings. (Doc. 8). Although the Court determined the arbitration proceedings do not make the suit unripe, the Court remained concerned and ordered the parties to brief the question of whether it was appropriate for this Court to hear the case. (Doc. 10 at 4–5). The parties have briefed the issue and the Court will now decide whether to exercise its discretion under Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. , 515 U.S. 277, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995), to dismiss the case.
Plaintiff seeks relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. "[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants." Wilton , 515 U.S. at 286, 115 S.Ct. 2137. The Court has decided to determine whether that discretion will be exercised at the outset to ensure efficient use of judicial resources. "If a district court, in the sound exercise of its judgment, determines after a complaint is filed that a declaratory judgment will serve no useful purpose, it cannot be incumbent on that court to proceed to the merits before staying or dismissing the action." Id. at 288, 115 S.Ct. 2137 ().
The circumstances of this case are not the normal situation in which declaratory judgment is sought. Plaintiff is, in the parlance of declaratory judgment actions, the "natural plaintiff," which is to say that in a coercive action on this dispute, Plaintiff would remain the plaintiff and Defendant would remain the defendant. See Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Coco , 302 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2002). The parties are currently awaiting arbitration by a private arbitrator, apparently because Plaintiff desires the ability to sue for breach of contract under Illinois law. (Doc. 9 at 2–3). Plaintiff acknowledges that whether the speech was protected will be determined by the pending arbitration unless this Court chooses to hear his case. (Doc. 11 at 4). In considering whether to exercise its jurisdiction, the Court is particularly aware that the arbitration at issue was not only contractually agreed to, but also mandated as the default mechanism of dispute resolution by Illinois law. 5 ILCS 315/8 (). However, if Plaintiff had brought a coercive action seeking restoration to his position or damages, or both, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court would clearly have jurisdiction and be obligated to hear the case.
To determine if exercising jurisdiction to hear an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act is proper, several considerations are necessary: (1) whether the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act would be served; (2) whether federalism and the comity owed by the Court to States would be undermined by the exercise of federal jurisdiction; and (3) the enumerated factors considered by the Seventh Circuit in NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas de Occidente, S.A. de C.V. , 28 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 1994) ).
The reformers who pushed Congress to enact the Declaratory Judgment Act sought to remedy three problems with traditional relief: (1) "the plight of a person embroiled in a dispute who ... could not have the controversy adjudicated because the opposing party had the sole claim to traditional relief and chose not use it"; (2) avoiding harm to parties caused by traditional remedies "forcing them to wait an unnecessarily long time before seeking relief"; and (3) avoiding "the harshness of damage and injunctive awards" deterring parties from utilizing the legal system. Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking , 36 UCLA L. Rev. 529, 552–53 (1989) ; see also Med. Assur. Co. v. Hellman , 610 F.3d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 2010) (); 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2751 (3d ed. 1998) (quoted in Med. Assur. Co. , 610 F.3d at 377 ) ("The remedy made available by the Declaratory Judgment Act ... relieves potential defendants from the Damoclean threat of impending litigation which a harassing adversary might brandish while initiating suit at his leisure—or never.").
None of these goals would be met in the instant case. Plaintiff is not helplessly waiting below a Damoclean sword—he controls the pace of this litigation and could file for coercive relief in this Court at his leisure within the applicable statute of limitations. And Plaintiff is clearly not deterred by the harshness of coercive remedies since he is seeking reinstatement through labor arbitration. (Docs. 1 at 3, 12 at 1).
"If traditional remedies are sufficient ... courts may properly dismiss a declaratory judgment claim, and if the alleged damage has already occurred, declaratory judgment is not appropriate." Field v. Housing Auth. of Cook Cty. , No. 17-cv-02044, 2018 WL 3831513, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2018) ; see also Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail , 407 F.2d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1969). An adjudication here would not be early; the alleged harm has occurred. Plaintiff urges that his damages are accruing, not past. (Doc. 11 at 4). However, it is not clear how a mere declaration would stop any continuing harm. To be sure, this Court has discretion to follow a declaration "after reasonable notice and hearing" with "[f]urther necessary and proper relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2202. Or, Plaintiff may be counting on the arbitrator applying a declaration from this Court in his favor. But regardless of these speculations about the future, a mere declaration would not end any harm Plaintiff is currently suffering.
Moreover, Plaintiff seems to be uncertain whether the allegedly protected statements are the sole basis for his termination. Compare (Doc. 1 at 1–2 () with Doc. 11 at 3 () ).1 To the extent Defendant had a reason for terminating Plaintiff other than the speech at issue, the arbitration and any subsequent proceedings will still need to occur, so a declaratory judgment in this case will not spare Plaintiff the wait.
Additionally, an arbitration hearing is currently set for January 23, 2019. (Doc. 12 at 2). Were the Court to allow this case to continue, there is no guarantee that a decision would be reached before then. See CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(5)(2–3) ().
In sum, the goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act would not be served by hearing this case. But the mere fact that a case is not being brought for the reasons envisioned by Congress does not, on its own, make the Court unwilling to hear cases pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Court will therefore look to the other two considerations to determine whether there are other factors which counsel abstention.2
"A judge asked to enter a declaratory judgment that as a practical matter will dispose of some other case should consider whether a multi-track course of litigation is the best way to resolve the dispute." Klene v. Napolitano , 697 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2012). The "classic example of when abstention is proper occurs where ... solely declaratory relief is sought and parallel state proceedings are ongoing." Envision Healthcare, Inc. v. PreferredOne Ins. Co. , 604 F.3d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 2010). This case does not fall perfectly into the mold of the classic example. For one thing, the typical scenario is a case premised upon diversity jurisdiction rather than a case in which a question of federal law is presented. Wilton , 515 U.S. at 290, 115 S.Ct. 2137. For another, the typical case presents a state court action, rather than an arbitration proceeding.
The first issue is whether Wilton abstention applies to cases raising federal questions. The Court does not think the fact that Plaintiff has requested a declaration of federal law determinative. "A concern for comity underlies this doctrine." Arnold , 752 F.3d at 707. Wilton abstention is often thought of solely in terms of state courts having the ability to interpret their own law. E.g. Wilton , 515 U.S. at 283, 115 S.Ct. 2137 ...
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