Layman v. State

• Decision Date: 18 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20S04–1509–CR–548.,20S04–1509–CR–548.
• Parties: Blake LAYMAN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). Levi Sparks, Appellant (Defendant below), v. State of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

42 N.E.3d 972

Blake LAYMAN, Appellant (Defendant below)

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Levi Sparks, Appellant (Defendant below)

v.State of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 20S04–1509–CR–548.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Sept. 18, 2015.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 2015.

Cara Schaefer Wieneke, Joel C. Wieneke, Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Plainfield, IN, Attorneys for Appellant Blake Layman.

Vincent M. Campiti, Nemeth Feeney Masters & Campiti, P.C., South Bend, IN, Attorney for Appellant Levi Sparks.

Scott F. Bieniek, Jeffrey A. Boggess, P.C., Greencastle, IN, Marsha Levick, Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center, Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth And Children's Law Center, Inc.

Joel M. Schumm, Matthew Hayes, Michelle Langdon, Danielle Teagarden, Shea Thompson, Certified Legal Interns, Larry Landis, Indiana Public Defender Council, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Indiana Public Defender Council.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Joseph Ho, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A04–1310–CR–518

RUCKER, Justice.

In this consolidated appeal juvenile cohorts Blake Layman and Levi Sparks challenge their convictions for felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

On the morning of October 3, 2012 sixteen-year-old Blake Layman and seventeen-year-old Levi Sparks were present at the home of sixteen-year-old Jose Quiroz. At some point, the trio discussed committing burglary in the neighborhood. They decided to search for a house where the residents were away because they were aware that the presence of a homeowner during a burglary could result in injuries and more severe legal consequences. Sparks knocked on the door of the first house targeted. When the juveniles heard dogs barking they ran away. Someone was home at the second house they targeted.

Believing no one was home at the time, the juveniles finally settled on the house across the street from where Quiroz lived, which belonged to Rodney Scott. They then contacted their friends, eighteen-year-old Anthony P. Sharp, Jr., and twenty-one-year-old Danzele Johnson, to “help to get into the house.” Tr. at 925. Unbeknownst to them, however, Scott was actually asleep in an upstairs bedroom. Unarmed, the group proceeded to break into Scott's house. While Sparks stayed at Quiroz's house serving as a lookout, Layman, Johnson, Sharp, and Quiroz entered Scott's home by kicking in the rear door to the kitchen. Scott was awakened when he heard a “boom, and [his] whole house just shook.” Tr. at 1058. After hearing a second loud boom, Scott immediately grabbed his handgun and cell phone and ran loudly downstairs to scare away any intruders. When Scott reached the bottom of the stairs he saw Sharp run out the back door. He then saw three of the intruders standing near a downstairs bedroom door. Scott began firing his weapon and Layman, Johnson, and Quiroz ran into the bedroom closet. Scott then held the young men at bay in the closet and called 911. While Scott was on the phone the closet door opened and Scott saw Johnson fall to the floor. Quiroz, whom Scott recognized as a neighbor, told Scott that Johnson had been shot. Shortly thereafter Layman yelled that he also had been shot.

When the police arrived, Quiroz attempted to flee. He ran out of the closet and crashed through a glass window. One of the officers pursued Quiroz on foot and he was soon after taken into custody. In the meantime other officers entered the house and arrested Layman who was treated for a gunshot wound to his leg. Johnson's body was found on the bedroom floor just outside the closet. He died at the scene from a gunshot wound. Scott's wallet and watch, which were previously located on the kitchen counter, were retrieved from the closet in which Layman, Johnson, and Quiroz had been hiding.

The State charged Layman, Sparks, Quiroz, and Sharp with felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. And although Layman, Sparks, and Quiroz were juveniles¹ the State filed the charges directly in the criminal court because the “juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over an individual for an alleged violation of ... murder” where “the individual was at least sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the alleged violation.” I.C. § 31–30–1–4(a) (2012). Over defense objections, Layman, Sparks, and Sharp were tried jointly. Quiroz pleaded guilty as charged and received a fifty-five-year sentence with ten years suspended to probation. He testified at the co-defendants' jury trial which began August 19, 2013, at the conclusion of which the jury found each of the defendants guilty as charged. Thereafter the trial court sentenced Layman and Sharp to fifty-five years and sentenced Sparks to fifty years.

In a consolidated appeal, Layman and Sparks raised several constitutional claims.² In addition they also contended: (1) the felony murder statute was incorrectly applied in this case; and (2) their sentences were inappropriate. Separately, Sparks argued that because he never entered the house the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Concluding the felony murder statute was properly applied and rejecting Sparks' separate claim, the Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion with each judge writing separately, affirmed the convictions but revised the sentences such that ten years of Layman's sentence was suspended to probation and five years of Sparks' sentence was suspended to probation for executed terms of forty-five years—the same sentence imposed on co-defendant Quiroz. Layman v. State, 17 N.E.3d 957 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). In the lead opinion, Judge Bailey declined to address Appellants' constitutional claims on the grounds they were not raised at trial and were thus forfeited. In a concurring opinion, Judge May addressed some aspects of Appellants' constitutional claims concluding they had not been forfeited. In dissent, Judge Kirsch concluded that our felony murder statute was not properly applied in this case. We now grant transfer thereby vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Discussion

I.

On transfer Layman and Sparks advance many of the same constitutional claims raised before the Court of Appeals. We decline to address them for two reasons.

First, neither party raised these claims at trial. They are thus waived for appellate review. It is certainly the case that “appellate courts are not prohibited from considering the constitutionality of a statute even though the issue otherwise has been waived.” Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Indiana, Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53–54 (Ind.2013). Indeed “a reviewing court may exercise its discretion to review a constitutional claim on its own accord.” Id. at 54. But we decline to exercise any discretion here because the very breadth and scope of Appellants' claims demand further development on an evidence-based trial record. The theme woven throughout Appellants' arguments is that juveniles are different from adults and thus should be treated differently. And as the State correctly points out, Appellants are seeking to rewrite Indiana's felony murder statute to accommodate defendants with alleged diminished capacity; see Br. of Layman at 10–13; Br. of Sparks at 5–6; and they also advance the argument that trial courts should impose alternative sentences below the range imposed for murder when the facts of a murder warrant a finding of “recklessness.” See Br. of Layman at 40–41; Br. of Sparks at 28. Setting aside that such sweeping revisions are best left to the Legislature, we are of the view that judicial intervention to address constitutional claims for the first time at the appellate level is not appropriate, especially here where for the most part Appellants' claims are dependent on potentially disputed facts. See, e.g., Br. of Layman at 21–22 (challenging the constitutionality of the direct filing statute on an “as applied” basis); Br. of Sparks at 12–14 (same); Br. of Layman at 9, 10–13 (challenging the constitutionality of the direct filing statute on grounds of adolescent brain development and its effect on juvenile criminal activity); Br. of Sparks at 5–7 (same).

Second, and more importantly, it is long established that “a constitutional question unnecessary to a determination of the merits should not be decided.” Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Scott, 497 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind.1986) (quoting Passwater v. Winn, 248 Ind. 404, 229 N.E.2d 622, 623 (1967) ; accord Hammond City Ct. v. State ex rel. Hofbauer, 247 Ind. 300, 208 N.E.2d 682, 684 (1965) ); see also Greene v. Holmes, 201 Ind. 123, 166 N.E. 281, 284 (1929) (“The Supreme Court will not consider constitutional questions when the determination thereof is not necessary to dispose of the appeal.”). Indeed it is “the duty of the court not to enter upon the consideration of a constitutional question where the court can perceive another ground on which it may properly rest its decision.” Scott, 497 N.E.2d at 559 (quoting Applegate v. State ex rel. Bowling, 158 Ind. 119, 63 N.E. 16, 18 (1902) ). As discussed in more detail below the propriety of the Appellants' convictions may be resolved on non-constitutional grounds.

II.

Indiana Code section 35–42–1–1(2) (2012) provides in relevant part: “A person who kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit ... burglary ... commits murder, a felony.” We had occasion to apply this statute in Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124 (Ind.1999). In that case a parolee had recently been released from jail after being apprehended on a new charge. Summoned to report to his parole officer and expecting to be arrested, the parolee asked the defendant to accompany him. At the parole office, correctional officers attempted to arrest and handcuff the...