Layne v. Portland Traction Co.

Decision Date11 February 1958
Citation212 Or. 658,321 P.2d 312
PartiesWally S. LAYNE, Respondent, v. PORTLAND TRACTION COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant.
CourtOregon Supreme Court

Lamar Tooze, Lamar Tooze, Jr., and Phillips, Coughlin, Buell & Phillips, Portland, for appellant.

Bert E. Joachims and Harry G. Spencer, Portland, for respondent.

Before PERRY, C. J., and ROSSMAN, LUSK and WARNER, JJ.

ROSSMAN, Justice.

A petition for a rehearing, filed by the plaintiff-respondent, challenges our decision, particularly our holding that the circuit court erred when it overruled the defendant's motion to withdraw from the jury's consideration the charge that defendant's train crew failed to maintain an adequate lookout.

Although the plaintiff-respondent offers several criticisms of our review of the testimony given by the defendant's engineer and fireman, it leaves virtually unmentioned the following statement which forms a part of our decision :

'The plaintiff presented no direct evidence indicating that the members of the defendant's train crew did not see his vehicle as it drew near the railroad crossing and, therefore, when he rested, the presumption that the defendant had exercised due care in the maintenance of a lookout remained unimpaired so far as the plaintiff's direct evidence upon the subject bore.'

It is obvious that unless the record contained evidence capable of supporting a finding that the train crew failed to maintain an adequate lookout, the plaintiff's charge upon that subject could not be submitted to the jury. Criticism of the testimony given by the train crew and of our report of it, even though the criticism is so meritorious that it entirely obliterates the crew's testimony, does not establish that the crew did not maintain a lookout.

Plaintiff-respondent says that we erred when we made the following statement:

'Masloskie swore that he saw the plaintiff's car when the engine was 550 feet from the crossing.'

Masloskie was the engineer. It was the fireman, and not Masloskie, who made the statement that the plaintiff's car was seen when the engine was 550 feet from the crossing. Masloskie testified that he saw the plaintiff's car when it was 550 feet from the crossing. The fireman, William H. Green, referring to the plaintiff's car, gave this testimony:

'Q. About where was the car, Mr. Layne's car-- when I say 'car' I mean pickup truck--about how far from the crossing was it when you first saw it? A. Well, when I first saw it was when we were way back, probably 500 or 600 feet.

'Q. And about how far from the crossing was the car at that time? How far from the crossing was Mr. Layne's truck? A. He was about the same distance.'

Under cross-examination Green gave a detailed account of the movement of the three cars in 92nd Avenue and of his train as the four vehicles approached the crossing. Upon the request of plaintiff's counsel he placed marks upon a large chart which indicated where the vehicles were at succeeding stages of their movement. Masloskie's testimony upon the subject was as follows:

'Q. When did you first see the automobile or any automobile? A. Well, I judge he was back there about 550 feet when I first saw the headlight.

'Q. You mean he was 550 feet from the crossing? A. Yes, 550 from the crossing.

'Q. Now when you say 'he' you are referring to the plaintiff, the man that was injured? A. The man that was driving the pickup.'

Since the speed of the train was at least as great as that of plaintiff's car, it may be inferred that the latter was possibly 550 feet or more from the crossing when Masloskie saw it. But we shall not rest upon that. We misstated the testimony that Masloskie gave. Although we made that error, we do not believe that it requires a holding that our previous decision was unsound.

The petition for rehearing states that the engineer, Masloskie, did not notice that a collision was impending until his engine was within 25 feet of the crossing. Masloskie died before the trial occurred. However, before his death a short examination of him was made by plaintiff's counsel in order to preserve Masloskie's testimony. He testified that when the train 'was 25 feet away from the crossing' he was aware that plaintiff's car would not stop. At that point, according to his further testimony, 'I just dynamited it--we call it dynamited--put it in full operation.' Shortly he was asked:

'Q. Up to the time you dynamited it, you made no attempt to slow down? A. Yes, I drawed off a little air to hold her down so that I could stop.'

The fireman, Green, under cross-examination, gave this testimony:

'Q. Now, you said to the jury that Masloskie noticed an impending accident when the train was 50 feet from the crossing. A. That's right.

'Q. How do you know that? A. Well, by--from the crossing to just one car length would be just about 50 feet.

'Q. How do you know that he knew the accident was impending at that particular time? A. Well, I can explain that to you, too, because the last whistle that he was making was interrupted on account of it, and instead of the regular whistle, why, he started a succession of short whistles.

'Q. He gave an emergency whistle? A. Yes.

* * *

* * *

'Q. Now, I believe you testified you could tell by watching the engineer that he knew the car was--a collision was imminent when the train was about 50 feet from the crossing; isn't that correct? A. That's right.

'Q. And did you make that observation because you saw the engineer at that time throw the train into full operation? A. I could tell by the sound of his whistle that there was going to be an accident.

'Q. A collision. And that's when the train was about 50 feet from the crossing; is that correct? A. Yes.

'Q. Now he had before that time made an emergency application of his brakes? A. You mean----

'Q. (interposing) I mean did he first make the emergency application? I believe you call it dynamiting, don't you? A. That's right.

'Q. Did he dynamite before he blew the emergency whistle? A. He was blowing the whistle and throwing it in emergency all at the same time.

'Q. All at the same time. A. It was just instantaneously.'

Green also testified (cross-examination):

'Q. Now, as you approached the 92nd crossing, I believe you testified that you--the train was--you threw the throttle off. A. Yes.

'Q. That is, you operated without the full power of the engine? A. Yes.

'Q. And I take it you were drifting? A. That's right.'

For the sake of complete accuracy, we add that the course was slightly downgrade.

Green, the fireman, testified that as the train approached the crossing Masloskie 'was sitting just like this with his head out the window.' The engine cab had a broad expanse of glass on all four sides which enabled the crew to see over a wide range. A photograph of one of the locomotives in which a member of the engine crew had his head out the window indicates that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Larson v. Heintz Const. Co.
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • October 30, 1959
    ...of a fictitious person, the non-payment of money, and other negative facts.' In Layne v. Portland Traction Co., 212 Or. 658, 319 P.2d 884, 321 P.2d 312, both parties depended in part upon negative testimony and neither questioned the persuasiveness of that type of Lovett v. Gill, 142 Or. 53......
  • Whinston v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp.
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1990
    ...North. Railway Co., 261 Or. 66, 491 P.2d 190 (1971); Layne v. Portland Traction Co., 212 Or. 658, 319 P.2d 884 (1957), reh. den. 212 Or. 658, 321 P.2d 312 (1958). Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals properly reinstated the verdict in this case because one of his allegations of neglig......
  • Shoup v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • January 31, 2003
    ... ...         Peter R. Chamberlain, of Bodyfelt, Mount, Stroup & Chamberlain, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With him on the brief was Jennifer ...         Neither does this court's decision in Layne v. Portland Traction Co., 212 Or. 658, 319 P.2d 884 (1957), which Whinston also cited, support ... ...
  • Wills v. Petros
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1960
    ...of the case. Prauss v. Adamski, 1952, 195 Or. 1, 21, 244 P.2d 598; Layne v. Portland Traction Co., 1957, 212 Or. 658, 675, 319 P.2d 884, 321 P.2d 312. This court has consistently held that the judge who presides over the trial is in a better position to determine in the exercise of his soun......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT