Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.

Decision Date25 July 1989
Docket NumberCiv. No. JFM-89-371.
Citation717 F. Supp. 368
PartiesRobert LAYTON, et al. v. AAMCO TRANSMISSIONS, INC.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

A.J. Hohman, Jr., Hope, Hohman & Georges, San Antonio, Tex., and Mitchell Stevan, Weinstock, Stevan & Harris, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

David B. Isbill, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

MOTZ, District Judge.

This action arises out of a dispute concerning an AAMCO franchise. Plaintiffs are the franchisees, Robert and Sue Layton and Ste-Mar Inc., a corporation owned by the Laytons; the defendants are AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. and Robert Morgan and Abraham Bernstein, who were during the times relevant to this suit directors and, respectively, the chairman and president of AAMCO. Plaintiffs assert claims for common law fraud, violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of an implied contractual duty of good faith and violation of the Maryland Franchise Act. Defendants have moved for dismissal of some of the claims and for summary judgment as to others.

FACTS

In July 1985, Robert Layton wrote to AAMCO expressing his interest in becoming an AAMCO franchisee. In October 1985 he met with an AAMCO account executive and was provided with information about AAMCO franchises. He was also given disclosure documents required under the Maryland Franchise Act and the rules of the Federal Trade Commission. On December 2, 1985 he submitted a franchise application, and on December 16, 1985, in accordance with AAMCO's established procedure, a board (composed of various AAMCO officials) held a hearing to determine if his application should be approved. Layton attended the hearing, and the proceedings were transcribed. On December 18th he was notified that his application had been approved.

The Laytons decided that Sue Layton should be made a co-franchisee, and (after she had been given the required disclosure documents) she submitted an application in her name. A second formal board of review hearing was held, and her application was approved.

The Laytons' original intention was to open a new AAMCO facility in the Baltimore area, and in April 1986 AAMCO approved a specific site which they proposed. The Laytons subsequently changed their plans and decided to purchase an existing AAMCO facility from one Sidney Cooper. On November 17, 1986, a third board of review hearing was held on the Laytons' application for a franchise at that site and after their application was approved, the Laytons closed their purchase agreement with Cooper. On December 30, 1986, they began operations. On January 9, 1987, Ste-Mar, Inc. was added as a franchisee.

In October 1986, while the Laytons' applications were pending, developments began to occur on another front which provide the basis for the Laytons' claims in this case. On October 4, 1986, the Attorney General of Missouri wrote to AAMCO concerning customer complaints which he and other Attorneys General had received about AAMCO franchisees. During the next several months AAMCO became involved in negotiations with the Attorneys General of fourteen states (not including Maryland) concerning the resolution of these customer complaints. At AAMCO's request the negotiations were kept secret.

In February 1987 AAMCO and the Attorneys General agreed to enter into consent judgments which, inter alia, placed the burden upon AAMCO to enforce its policies and procedures and to assure that its franchisees complied with all applicable law. The consent judgments also required AAMCO to modify a practice which theretofore had frequently been followed by its franchisees: disassembling a transmission for diagnostic purposes before giving a firm price quotation to the customer and requiring the customer to pay the disassembly and reassembly costs in the event that he chose not to have the repair service performed by AAMCO. Under the modified procedure (currently in effect) an AAMCO franchisee is required to provide full disclosure to the customer concerning potential costs before disassembling a transmission. When it decided to enter into the consent judgments in February, 1987, AAMCO also decided to require all of its franchisees, wherever located, to follow the modified procedure.

The gravamen of plaintiffs' claims here is that AAMCO, Robert Morgan and Abraham Bernstein unlawfully concealed from them, while their franchise applications were pending, the facts that customer complaints had been filed against AAMCO and that AAMCO was negotiating the resolution of the complaints with the Attorneys General of various states. Plaintiffs also complain of the imposition upon them of the procedural modification borrowed from the consent judgments.

I.

Defendants Morgan and Bernstein move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion is well-founded.

The only contacts which plaintiffs allege Morgan and Bernstein personally had with Maryland are a letter sent by Morgan to Robert Layton in Maryland welcoming him as an AAMCO franchisee and a form letter sent by Morgan and Bernstein to the Laytons in Maryland updating them on the consent judgments and procedural modification. Plaintiffs contend that the sending of these letters is sufficient to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 6-103(b)(1) and 6-103(b)(3) of the Maryland Long Arm Statute. See Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., Section 6-103. However, both of those sections require the performance of acts within the state. Thus, the express statutory language does not permit application of the so-called "effects" test which plaintiffs urge. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984).

Plaintiffs' reliance upon the "conspiracy" theory of jurisdiction also fails. Plaintiffs acknowledge that corporate officers cannot conspire with their own corporation, see Marmott v. Maryland Lumber Co., 807 F.2d 1180, 1184 (4th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 3214, 96 L.Ed.2d 700 (1987), and AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. is the only defendant alleged to have performed acts within Maryland.

II.

Three counts of the Complaint are subject to dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

1. Plaintiffs are not "consumers" and therefore have no cause of action under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. See Maryland Code Ann., Section 13-101(c)(1); Boatel Industries v. Hester, 77 Md.App. 284, 550 A.2d 389, 397-399 (1988); compare State v. Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc., 75 Md.App. 647, 542 A.2d 859 (1988).

2. A franchisor/franchisee relationship is not fiduciary or confidential in nature, and plaintiffs therefore have stated no claim for breach of a duty arising from such a relationship. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 860 F.2d 1341, 1349 n. 4 (6th Cir.1988); Premier Wine & Spirits v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 846 F.2d 537, 540-41 (9th Cir.1988); Picture Lake Campground v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F.Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va.1980).

3. Plaintiffs have no claim under the Federal Trade Commission's franchise disclosure rules since those rules do not give rise to a private cause of action. See, e.g., Days Inn of America Franchising, Inc. v. Windham, 699 F.Supp. 1581 (N.D. Ga.1988); Freedman v. Meldy's, Inc., 587 F.Supp. 658 (E.D.Pa.1984).

III.

AAMCO is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs' three remaining claims.

Fraud Claim

Plaintiffs contend that AAMCO made misrepresentations to them concerning (1) AAMCO's good reputation in the industry, (2) its excellence in the transmission field, (3) its valuable good will and (4) plaintiffs' probabilities of success as owners of an AAMCO franchise. Such representations were not "susceptible of exact knowledge at the time they were made" and thus, as a matter of law, cannot constitute actionable fraud. See Vaughn v. General Foods Corp., 797 F.2d 1403, 1411 (7th Cir.1986). Furthermore, the record establishes that plaintiffs cannot prove that they relied upon any such misrepresentations. The franchise agreement contained an integration clause in which the Laytons acknowledged that they had no relief upon any representations made in the agreement. Although this fact alone would not bar a claim for fraud, see e.g., Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 554 F.2d 623, 630 (4th Cir.1977), at each of AAMCO's board of review hearings the Laytons stated that they had relied upon no representations not mentioned during the hearing. Since none of the representations upon which they presently base their claims were made during any of the hearings, it is apparent that as an evidentiary matter the Laytons cannot meet their burden of proving reliance by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984), cert. denied 300 Md. 88, 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1215, 105 S.Ct. 1190, 84 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985).

Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that they cannot prevail under a theory of affirmative misrepresentation. Thus, they contend that the alleged misrepresentations to which they allude established a context in which AAMCO's failure to disclose its negotiations with the fourteen Attorneys General constituted the fraud. The fallacy in this contention is that there was no relationship of trust between the parties that created any duty on the part of AAMCO to make any disclosures. See, e.g., Martin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, 639 F.Supp. 931, 935 (D.Md.1986); Equitable Trust Co. v. G & M Const. Corp., 544 F.Supp. 736, 743-44 (D.Md. 1982).1

The uncontradicted record establishes another flaw in plaintiffs' fraud claim. Although plaintiffs contend that their net profits have been less than they anticipated, it is undisputed that plaintiffs' gross revenues have exceeded their own estimates and the performance of Sidney Cooper at the facility which they purchased from him. Since adverse impact of unfavorable publicity...

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