Lazaro v. Abbott Med. Optics, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIV. NO. 16-1248(PG) |
| Parties | ALBERTO M. LAZARO, et al. Plaintiffs, v. ABBOTT MEDICAL OPTICS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Before the court is defendant Abbott Medical Optics' ("defendant") motion for partial dismissal, and plaintiffs Alberto M. Lazaro ("Lazaro") and Vanessa Aymerich's ("Aymerich")(collectively, "plaintiffs") opposition thereto.1 See Docket Nos. 5 and 9. For the reasons specified below, defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
On February 12, 2016, plaintiffs filed a civil suit, alleging that Lazaro sustained serious injuries directly caused by a contact lens disinfectant solution, the Complete MoisturePlus Multi Purpose Solution ("CMMPS"). The solution is manufactured, marketed, and distributed by defendant. See Docket No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that, less than twenty-four hours after first using CMMPS on April 23, 2014, Lazaro's lower half of the right eye filled with pus and swelled to the point where he could not open it. Plaintiffs claim Lazaro suffered severe pain and was diagnosed with Acanthamoeba Keratitis, an infection they aver has led to permanent corneal scarring and loss of vision.
Plaintiffs raise several causes of action, among them a claim for breach of implied warranty. To that effect, plaintiffs allege that defendant represented to the general public that CMMPS was of "merchantable quality" and "safe and fit for its intended use." Lazaro relied upon the "skill, judgment and implied warranty of the defendant" and bought CMMPS. However, plaintiffs claim CMMPS was unsafe when applied for its intended use, and was not of merchantable quality as warranted by defendant.
On April 18, 2016, defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therein, defendant argues that both the partnership's and Aymerich's claims are time-barred. Defendant also avers that the breach of implied warranty claim advanced by plaintiffs is time-barred and, alternatively, insufficiently plead.
Plaintiffs opposed defendant's motion. They argue that the partnership's and Aymerich's claims are timely brought because the statute of limitations period for these claims was tolled by a letter counsel sent to defendant on February 17, 2015 ("the letter"). Furthermore, plaintiffs claim that subsequent conversations between counsels for both parties further put defendant on notice as to the legal claims all of the plaintiffs intended to raise in court. Counsel for plaintiffs submitted, as an exhibit attached to the opposition to defendant's motion, a statement under penalty of perjury ("the affidavit") attesting the conversations that took place in late March and early April of 2015, alerting defendant of Aymerich's and the partnership's legal claims. See Docket No. 9-3. On June 15, 2015 plaintiffs tendered a settlement demand. Copies of the letter and the settlement demand were submitted to the court as exhibits to plaintiff's opposition. See Docket Nos. 9-1 and 9-4.2
Defendant, in turn, replied to plaintiff's opposition. See Docket No. 13. Defendant argues the statute of limitations was not tolled as to any of the partnership's and Aymerich's claims because the letter references neither of them. Defendant also categorizes the affidavit as a last-ditch attempt to preserve the partnership's and Aymerich's claims through a self-serving declaration that was tailor-made to survive defendant's motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, defendant does not challenge the validity of the letter as an extrajudicial tolling mechanism for Lazaro's claims.
Plaintiffs rely on materials extraneous to the pleadings to oppose defendant's claim that the partnership's and Aymerich's claims are time-barred. Thus, defendant's motion to dismiss will be partially converted into a motion for summary judgment. Defendant's challenge to plaintiffs' action for breach of implied warranty will not undergo such conversion because there are no extraneous materials regarding that matter for the court to consider.
The court will first assess the challenge to plaintiffs' implied breach of warranty claim under a motion to dismiss standard. Then, it will address the conversion, and consider the timeliness of the partnership's and Aymerich's claims under a summary judgment standard.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. "To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Garcia-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir.2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court must "ask whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir.2014)(citing Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir.2014)) (internal quotations marks omitted). Additionally, courts "may augment these facts and inferences with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice." A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. v. Esevier Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.2013) (citing Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011).
"To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must 'plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106 (citing Maloy 744 F.3d at 252). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... , on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations marks omitted). That is, the court "need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1960). "A complaint 'must contain more than a rote recital of the elements of a cause of action,' but need not include 'detailed factual allegations.'" Rodriguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps of Puerto Rico, 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir.2014) (citing Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2013)). "Non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951).
"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Nevertheless, when evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim, a court may not "attempt to forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if ... a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12-13 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). As a result, courts should read the complaint "as a whole" and be cautious not to apply the plausibility standard "too mechanically." See Rodriguez-Vives, 743 F.3d at 283 (citing Garcia-Catalan, 734 F.3d at 101, 103).
Defendant challenges both the timeliness and the sufficiency of plaintiffs' breach of implied warranty claim. However, the court need not consider these arguments. Plaintiff's claim is merely the chariot's fifth wheel. Because breach of warranty claims based on personal injury are tantamount to strict liability claims, pleading both is wholly unnecessary. See Kunkel v. Motor Sport, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 198, 210 (D.P.R. 2004)(citing Mendoza v. Cerveceria Corona, 97 P.R.R. 487 (1969)).
How Puerto Rico courts approach breach of implied warranty claims depends on if they are of an ex delicto or an ex contractu nature.3 See In re Dupont-Benlate Litig., 877 F. Supp. 779, 787 (D.P.R. 1995); Ramos Santiago v. Wellcraft Marine, 93 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.P.R. 2000).
If they are ex contractu in nature - claims that stem from a contractual obligation - then they arise from Article 1373 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 3841. These claims rely on contractual law and must observe a six-month statute of limitations period. See Torres-Mas v. Carver Boat Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 253, 257 (D.P.R. 2002) On the other hand, if they are ex delicto creatures - claims that stem from a tort - courts analyze them pursuant to the tenets of strict liability theory, and apply the one-year statute of limitations proscribed for those actions under Puerto Rico law. See In re Dupont-Benlate Litig., 877 F. Supp. at 787; Ramos Santiago, 93 F. Supp. 2d 112.
Plaintiffs' claim of breach of implied warranty is an ex delicto claim because it stems from a personal injury. Accordingly, this court must apply the one-year statute of limitations to plaintiffs' breach of implied warranty claim.
Plaintiffs raise claims of strict liability and negligence in their complaint, as well as a...
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