Lazarus v. New York Cent. R.R.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1921
• Parties: LAZARUS et al. v. NEW YORK CENT. R.R.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

271 F. 93

LAZARUS et al. v. NEW YORK CENT. R.R.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 4, 1921

On Rehearing, March 29, 1921.

Laurence A. Sullivan, of New York City, for plaintiff.

William Mann, of New York City, for defendant.

LEARNED HAND, District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

I find it necessary to decide only two out of the three questions raised in this case: (a) May the carrier take advantage of the provisions of its bill of lading, as filed, without showing that the shipper had accepted it, or even that the carrier had issued any bill at all? (b) Does section 206(f) of the Federal Transportation Act extend the time, fixed by the bill of lading as filed, within which action may be brought?

Before the Cummins Amendment (Comp. St. Secs. 8592, 8604a) it was settled that, when the carrier published and filed its regulations and schedules in accordance with section 1 subdivision 4, of the Interstate Commerce Act (Comp. St. Sec 8563), and conformed with the pertinent regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it was not necessary to incorporate a limitation of liability into a passenger ticket or to prove any contract with the passenger, in order to take advantage of the limitation of liability contained in the schedules. Boston & Maine R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97, 34 Sup.Ct. 526, 58 L.Ed. 868, L.R.A. 1915B, 450 Ann. Cas. 1915D, 593. And it was also settled that it was not necessary to issue any bill of lading at all in the case of goods. Atchison, etc., Ry. v. Robinson, 233 U.S. 173, 34 Sup.Ct. 556, 58 L.Ed. 901. In the second case it is true that a bill of lading was issued containing the limitation relied upon, but that was after the shipment (a horse) had started on its way, and the case was treated as depending only upon the original oral contract of carriage. While all limitation of liability has since been made illegal by the Cummins Amendment, that does not affect the applicability of the doctrine there established in respect of such limitations as still remain open to the carrier, of which the period within which suits may be brought is one. Regardless of the terms of the receipt or bill of lading delivered, and regardless even of the fact that none at all is given, the regulations governing the relations of the shipper and the carrier are to be found in the schedules published and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, subject to its approval or disapproval within the jurisdiction given it by statute. Therefore, when the defendant received the tin at Chicago or Buffalo, it was not necessary to go through the empty form of issuing a new bill of lading, which indeed it would not have delivered to any one, if it had, nor was the equally futile formality necessary at Seattle when the first domestic carrier received it from the ship.

The next question is open on authority and must be settled on principle. It turns upon the effect to be given to section 206(f) of the Transportation Act of 1920, which went into effect more than two years after the loss occurred and some months after the action had been commenced. It is divisible into two parts: First, whether the section covers this case in its meaning; second, whether it is valid, when applied to defenses already completed, established by the lapse of time. The section is as follows:

Sec. 206: '(f). The period of federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers * * * for causes of action arising prior to federal control.'

The defendant argues that the phrase 'periods of limitation' must refer only to limitation by statute, and cannot include a limitation such as this derived from the bill of lading filed with the Commission. In corroboration of that construction it appeals to section 206(a), which reads in part as follows:

'Such actions (actions arising out of federal control), suits, or proceedings may, within the periods of limitation now prescribed by state or federal statutes, but not later than two years from the date of the passage of this act, be brought,' etc.

There is good reason for interpreting the phrase 'periods of limitation' in the same way in each subsection, and I accept the defendant's argument pro tanto. But I believe that, at least in the absence of a contract with the...