Leach v. Carlile

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CLARKE
• Citation: Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 42 S.Ct. 227, 66 L.Ed. 511 (1922)
• Decision Date: 27 February 1922
• Docket Number: No. 105,105
• Parties: LEACH v. CARLILE, Postmaster

258 U.S. 138

42 S.Ct. 227

66 L.Ed. 511

LEACH

v CARLILE, Postmaster.

No. 105.

Submitted Jan. 18, 1922.

Decided Feb. 27, 1922.

Mr. Lee D. Mathias, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Messrs. Assistant Attorney General Crim, Solicitor General James M. Beck, and Harry S. Ridgely, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant, doing business in the name of 'Organo Product Company,' in his bill prayed for an injunction restraining the Postmaster at Chicago from giving effect to a 'fraud order' against him, issued by the Postmaster General on August 15, 1919, pursuant to authority of Revised Statute, §§ 3929 and 4041 (Comp. St. §§ 7411, 7573). The order was in the usual form, prohibiting the delivery of mail or payment of money orders to appellant, and directing the disposition of mail which should be addressed to him. The District Court, refusing the injunction, dismissed the bill, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its decree. Leach v. Carlile, 267 Fed. 61.

The appellant was engaged in selling what he called 'Organo Tablets,' which he advertised extensively through the mails as 'recommended and prescribed by leading physicians throughout the civilized world for nervous weakness, general debility, sexual decline or weakened manhood and urinary disorders * * * sleeplessness and rundown system,' and various other ailments.

Appellant is an old offender, a prior fraud order having been issued against him, under another name, in April, 1918, as a result of which he changed his trade-name and modified in a measure his advertising matter.

The order complained of was entered after an elaborate hearing, of which the appellant had due notice and at which he was represented by counsel, and introduced much evidence.

The only error assigned in this court is the affirming by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the decree of the District Court, refusing the injunction and dismissing the bill. In argument it is contended that the question decided by the Postmaster General was that the substance which the appellant was selling did not produce the results claimed for it, that this, on the record, was a matter of opinion as to which there was conflict of evidence, and that therefore the case is within the scope of American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23 Sup. Ct. 33, 47 L. Ed. 90. Without considering whether such a state of facts would bring the case within the decision cited, it is sufficient to say that the question really decided by the lower courts was, not that the substance which appellant was selling was entirely worthless as a medicine, as to which there was some conflict in the evidence, but that it was so far from being the panacea which he was advertising it through the mails to be, that by so advertising it he was perpetrating a fraud upon the public. This was a question of fact which the statutes cited committed to the decision of the Postmaster General, and the applicable, settled rule of law is that the conclusion of a head of an executive department on such a question, when committed to him by law, will not be reviewed by the courts where it is fairly arribed at and has substantial evidence to support it, so that it cannot justly be said to be palpably wrong and therefore arbitrary. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 108, 109, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed. 894; Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53, 58, 33 Sup. Ct. 6, 57 L. Ed. 119; Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U. S. 479, 484, 39 Sup. Ct. 332, 63 L. Ed. 717; United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 413, 41 Sup. Ct. 352, 65 L. Ed. 704, and cases cited.

An examination of the record fully justifies the conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals that it not only fails to show that the Postmaster General had no warrant of law for his order but that, on the contrary, it shows there...