Leach v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 07 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2015-CA-001598-MR,2015-CA-001598-MR |
| Parties | CHASSIDY G. LEACH APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
During the afternoon hours on November 14, 2014, Officer Nicholas Love and Officer David Bruner, both of the Highland Heights Police Department in Campbell County, Kentucky, were working as part of a highway drug interdiction detail called "November Blitz." The detail involved many officers from multiple area police departments. At approximately 3:39 p.m., Officers Love and Bruner were patrolling eastbound on I-275 in Campbell County, when they stopped a Chevrolet Prizm because the driver, Brandy Keith, was not wearing a seat belt. Besides the driver, there were three other people in the vehicle. The appellant, Chassidy Leach, was sitting in the front passenger seat, while Keith's eight-or nine-year-old daughter and Leach's eight-month-old child sat in the back seat.
Officer Love spoke to the driver, Brandy Keith, and asked her where she was driving to and from that day. Keith stated that they were coming from the hospital in Cincinnati, where they were visiting a member of Leach's family. Officer Love asked Keith to step outside her vehicle. Officer Love then informed Keith about the narcotics operation and requested permission to search Keith's person. Keith consented. During the search, Officer Love discovered a "cut straw" with residue in one of Keith's pockets. A "cut straw" is typically used to snort narcotics. Officer Love also discovered a small quantity of a substance thathe believed to be heroin. At this point, Keith was placed into custody in the back of the police cruiser. The entire interaction with Keith was very brief, lasting only about two or three minutes.
Officer Love then approached the passenger side of the vehicle and asked Leach if she would step out of the car. Leach consented and walked with the officers to a safe location behind Keith's car, away from the highway traffic. Officer Love asked Leach the same questions he had asked Keith, about where had they been that day. Leach gave the same initial response as Keith - they had been visiting family at the hospital. Officer Love then began asking more specific follow-up questions to test the veracity of Leach's story. These questions included asking which hospital they had visited, what room, how long they were there, and so forth. Leach either could not or would not answer Officer Love's follow-up questions. Officer Love did not believe Leach, and informed her that he would contact the hospital to confirm the information he had received. At this point, Leach admitted they did not actually go to the hospital, but instead had purchased heroin in Cincinnati. When Officer Love asked Leach if she had any contraband on her person, she admitted to possession of a cut straw in her bra, and offered to produce it for the officers. A female officer, who had just arrived on the scene to assist, told Leach that she would retrieve the straw. The female officer then reached into Leach's bra where she found a cut straw with residue and a plastic bag containing a substance suspected to be heroin. A further search of Leach and thevehicle revealed no other contraband. Leach was then formally arrested, handcuffed, and taken into custody.
Leach's own recollection of this incident is somewhat different. She testified that the female officer performed an intrusive search underneath her clothing and within her pockets, before she admitted to having any contraband on her person. She testified it was only when the female officer was midway through her search, and discovery of the items seemed inevitable, that she stated, "what you are looking for is in my bra; it is in the left side of my chest." During her testimony, Leach stated that she did not feel free to leave, nor was she read her Miranda1 rights prior to Officer Love's questioning. Nonetheless, she admitted in her testimony to possessing heroin and going with Keith to purchase it.
Leach was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance2 and possession of drug paraphernalia.3 She filed a motion in Campbell Circuit Court on March 15, 2015, to suppress evidence. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion in a written order entered September 21, 2015. Leach thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal her suppression issues. The Campbell Circuit Court entered final judgment onSeptember 28, 2015, sentencing Leach to two years' incarceration with the Department of Corrections, probated for two years.
This appeal followed.
"The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government." Brumley v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 280, 284 (Ky. 2013). A criminal defendant who believes her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by a warrantless search may move the trial court to suppress any evidence obtained during the illegal search. Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Ky. 1992). Following a motion to suppress, the trial court must make both findings of fact and legal conclusions based on those findings.
As a reviewing court, we must apply constitutional standards to the facts of the case. Goben v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.3d 890, 903 (Ky. 2016). This requires us to apply a dual standard of review: "de novo for legal questions and clear error for questions of fact." Id. Under this dual standard, we first examine the trial court's findings of fact. We must "defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are not clearly erroneous." Commonwealth v. Jennings, 490 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Ky. 2016). Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence. Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290(Ky. 2016). Assuming that the facts were correctly decided, we then "undertake a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts to determine whether its decision to deny the motion to suppress was correct as a matter of law." Id.
Leach presents three issues on appeal. The first two issues stem from the denial of her motion to suppress. First, she argues the traffic stop in this case was impermissibly extended, as there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to focus upon her as a passenger in the stopped vehicle. Second, she contends Officer Love impermissibly conducted a custodial interrogation of her without providing a reading of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona. For her third issue, which was not presented below, Leach argues the circuit court erred in assigning court costs and a public defender fee as part of her sentencing. We will address these arguments in turn.
"It has long been considered reasonable for an officer to conduct a traffic stop if he or she has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Commonwealth v. Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Ky. 2013) (citing Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745 (Ky.2001)). The officer's subjective motivations are irrelevant so long as there is probable cause to make the stop. Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d at 291. In addition, an officer may detain a vehicle's occupants beyond completion of the initial traffic stop, if "somethinghappen[s] during the stop to cause the officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity [is] afoot." Id. at 292.
Leach does not contest the validity of the initial traffic stop. Thereafter, Keith was ordered out of the car and questioned. There is nothing unconstitutional about asking a driver to step out of the car and questioning her during a stop. During the questioning, which lasted only a few minutes, Keith gave the officers permission to search her person. During that search, they discovered contraband. At this point, the dynamics of the situation changed. What began as a routine traffic stop transformed into a drug-related arrest. After placing Keith into the police cruiser, the officers were left with a vehicle that contained two minor children and another occupant. Given the fact that drugs were located on Keith's person, it was entirely reasonable for the officers to ask Leach to step out of the car and briefly question her. Therefore, we disagree with Leach that the officers unduly prolonged the stop when they asked Leach to step outside the car for further questioning. See Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Ky. App. 2005); Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 542 n.43 (Ky. App. 2003); United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2003). There was no error in denying the motion to suppress evidence regarding the extension of the traffic stop. Officer Love had just arrested the driver of the vehicle, and also had reasonable articulable suspicion that further criminal activity was afoot. He did notviolate Leach's rights under the Fourth Amendment by asking her questions as part of his investigation.
This brings us to Leach's next contention that she was unlawfully searched. She asserts that the officers began searching her person and belongings without her consent. Based on the evidence, the trial court concluded that the officers' testimony that Leach consented to the search was more credible. "It has long been held that the trier of fact has the right to believe the evidence presented by one...
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