League of Conservation Voters v. Trump

• Decision Date: 29 March 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG
• Citation: 363 F.Supp.3d 1013
• Parties: LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Donald J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants, and American Petroleum Institute and State of Alaska, Intervenor-Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Alaska

363 F.Supp.3d 1013

LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Donald J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants,andAmerican Petroleum Institute and State of Alaska, Intervenor-Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG

United States District Court, D. Alaska.

Signed March 29, 2019

Eric P. Jorgensen, Earthjustice, Juneau, AK, Erik Clifford Grafe, Earthjustice, Anchorage, AK, Jacqueline Miya Iwata, Pro Hac Vice, Washington, DC, Nancy S. Marks, Pro Hac Vice, New York, NY, Nathaniel S.W. Lawrence, Pro Hac Vice, Olympia, WA, for Plaintiffs.

Eric Grant, Sarah Dale Himmelhoch, U.S. Department of Justice/ENRD/EES, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

Bradley Keith Ervin, Steven Joseph Rosenbaum, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, James D. Linxwiler, Christina A. Rankin, Guess & Rudd P.C., Bradley Edward Meyen, State of Alaska, Office of the Attorney General, Jennifer Ellen Douglas, Alaska Department of Law, Anchorage, AK, for IntervenorDefendants.

ORDER RE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Sharon L. Gleason, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court at Docket 50 is Plaintiffs Alaska Wilderness League, Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Greenpeace, Inc., League of Conservation Voters, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands, Sierra Club, and The Wilderness Society's ("Plaintiffs")motion for summary judgment.DefendantsDonald J. Trump, Ryan Zinke—later replaced by David Bernhardt¹ —and Wilbur Ross("Federal Defendants") opposed and moved for summary judgment at Docket 55.Intervenor-defendant American Petroleum Institute ("API") opposed Plaintiffs' motion and cross-moved for summary judgment at Docket 58.Intervenor-defendantState of Alaska("Alaska") opposed Plaintiffs' motion and moved for summary judgment at Docket 60.Plaintiffs replied in support of their motion at Docket 62.Federal Defendants replied in support of their motion at Docket 63.API replied in support of its motion at Docket 65.Alaska replied in support of its motion at Docket 67.²Oral argument was held on November 9, 2018 in Anchorage, Alaska.³

BACKGROUND

In 1953, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA" or "the Act") was enacted into law.⁴When enacted, OCSLA had two stated purposes.⁵The first purpose was "[t]o provide for the jurisdiction of the United States over" OCS lands.⁶The second purpose was "to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease such lands for certain purposes."⁷OCSLA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to "provide for the assignment or relinquishment of leases, for the sale of royalty oil and gas" on OCS lands.⁸This case concerns Section 12(a) of the Act, which provides as follows: "The President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf."⁹In 2015 and 2016, President Obama issued three memoranda and one executive order withdrawing certain areas of the Outer Continental Shelf from leasing.¹⁰On April 28, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13795, which purported to revoke the 2015 and 2016 withdrawals.¹¹

On May 3, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case.Plaintiffs brought two claims: an alleged violation of the Constitution's Property Clause,¹² and an alleged violation of the President's statutory authority under Section 12(a).¹³On July 21, 2017, the Court granted API's motion to intervene.¹⁴On September 1, 2017, the Court granted Alaska's motion to intervene.¹⁵On March 19, 2018, the Court denied Federal Defendants', API's, and Alaska's motions to dismiss.¹⁶On June 8, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their summary judgment motion.¹⁷On July 18, 2018, Federal Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment.¹⁸On August 2, 2018, API and Alaska filed their cross-motion and motion, respectively, for summary judgment.¹⁹

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

LEGAL STANDARD

This case requires the Court to interpret a statute.²⁰When interpreting a statute, a court looks first to the statute's text, and then, if necessary, to the context in which the statute was enacted.It is a "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme."²¹

I.Statutory Text

Courts"begin with the understanding that Congress says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there."²²Judicial "inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous."²³

II.Context

If the text of the statute is ambiguous, a court may rely on contextual clues to discern Congress's intent.²⁴A judge may look to a statute's structure, as a "statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant."²⁵Courts may also find congressional intent in legislative history,²⁶ in how Congress treated a term in prior statutes,²⁷ and in Congress's stated purpose in enacting the statute.²⁸In addition, although a court may consider actions subsequent to the statute's enactment, "subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its enactment."²⁹

DISCUSSION

I.Federal Defendants' Procedural Challenges

Federal Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs fail to overcome several procedural hurdles: standing, ripeness, sovereign immunity, and the lack of a private right of action.³⁰The Court previously found for Plaintiffs as to each of these issues at the motion to dismiss stage.³¹

"In response to a summary judgment motion, ... the plaintiff ... must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true."³²Here, Plaintiffs have set forth sufficient specific facts to support their standing and right to pursue a private cause of action.³³Accordingly, the Court declines to reconsider these issues at the summary judgment stage.³⁴

II.The Text of Section12(a)

At issue in this case is the meaning of Section 12(a) of OCSLA: "The President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf."³⁵Plaintiffs maintain that this text only authorizes a President to withdraw lands from disposition; it does not authorize a President to revoke a prior withdrawal.Plaintiffs assert that under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the authority to revoke a prior withdrawal was not delegated by this statute to the President and thus remains vested solely with Congress.³⁶

Federal Defendants respond that "Section 12(a) does not cabin the President's authority in any way, other than to clarify that lands must be unleased in order to be withdrawn."³⁷Federal Defendants maintain that "Plaintiffs' reading of Section 12(a) renders the phrase ‘from time to time’ unnecessary" because the phrase "may ... withdraw" implies the ability to do so "from time to time."³⁸API asserts that Section 12(a)'s "discretionary formulation—authorizing action that ‘may’ be taken ‘from time to time’—carries with it a power to revise action previously taken under the delegated authority."³⁹

The text of Section 12(a) refers only to the withdrawal of lands; it does not expressly authorize the President to revoke a prior withdrawal.Congress appears to have expressed one concept—withdrawal—and excluded the converse—revocation.Furthermore, the phrase "from time to time" appears to clarify the President's withdrawal authority by giving him the discretion to withdraw lands at any time and for discrete periods; the phrase does not specifically give the President the authority to revoke a prior withdrawal.⁴⁰In any event, some withdrawals appear to have been intended to be permanent; others, for a limited time.⁴¹President Obama's 2015 and 2016 Executive Orders each stated it was intended to apply "for a time period without specific expiration," and contained language indicating that all future leasing was intended to be prohibited in the areas encompassed by the withdrawals.⁴²The wording of President Obama's 2015 and 2016 withdrawals indicates that he intended them to extend indefinitely, and therefore be revocable only by an act of Congress.

Federal Defendants, API, and Alaska cite to various nonbinding authority to suggest that the phrase "from time to time" in Section 12(a) gives the President the power to revoke a prior withdrawal.Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. United States is one example.⁴³Congress had enacted laws that granted the State of Illinois certain rights of way on certain federal public lands to construct a railroad.But previous laws had reserved certain federal public lands for military purposes.At issue was whether the subsequent land grant to Illinois included the land previously reserved in military fortifications.In particular, the Court of Claims referenced a 1798 law that "enable[d] the President to erect fortifications in such places as the public safety should, in his opinion, require; and he was authorized to cause them to be erected under his direction, from time to time, as he should judge necessary."⁴⁴The Court of Claims noted that in light of the statute's grant of authority for the President to erect fortifications, "it may be the proper construction of the acts of Congress that they, by implication, confer on him the power also, when the place designated and reserved becomes no longer necessary for the purposes of the reservation, to direct its abandonment by the War Department[.]"⁴⁵But the Court of Claims did not directly resolve this issue, as it determined that the President had not directed the abandonment of the reserved military lands at issue in that case.⁴⁶Illinois Central 's dicta regarding the maintenance of...