League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott

• Decision Date: 25 February 2019
• Docket Number: No. 5:18-CV-175-DAE,5:18-CV-175-DAE
• Citation: 369 F.Supp.3d 768
• Parties: LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, League of United Latin American Citizens of Texas, Joseph C. Parker, Jr., Hector Flores, Sanford Levinson, Yvonne M. Davis, Mary Ramos, Gloria Ray, Guadalupe Torres, Ray Valarde, and Doris Williams, Plaintiffs, v. Gregory Wayne ABBOTT, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Texas, and Rolando Pablos, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Texas, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

369 F.Supp.3d 768

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, League of United Latin American Citizens of Texas, Joseph C. Parker, Jr., Hector Flores, Sanford Levinson, Yvonne M. Davis, Mary Ramos, Gloria Ray, Guadalupe Torres, Ray Valarde, and Doris Williams, Plaintiffs,

v.Gregory Wayne ABBOTT, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Texas, and Rolando Pablos, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Texas, Defendants.

No. 5:18-CV-175-DAE

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.

Signed February 25, 2019

Allison M. Vissichelli, Pro Hac Vice, James R. Martin, Pro Hac Vice, Jennifer Duncan Hackett, Pro Hac Vice, Zelle LLP, Amy J. Mauser, Pro Hac Vice, Hamish Hume, Pro Hac Vice, James P. Denvir, Pro Hac Vice, Karen L. Dunn, Pro Hac Vice, Lisa L. Barclay, Pro Hac Vice, Amy L. Neuhardt, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Washington, DC, David Boies, Pro Hac Vice, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, L.L.P., Armonk, NY, Jack Allen Simms, Jr., Karen S. Vladeck, Katherine Patrice Chiarello, Maria Amelia Calaf, Ryan A. Botkin, Wittliff Cutter Austin PLLC, William Reid Wittliff, Marco Kelly Guerrero, Mary Melissa Whittle, Guerrero & Whittle PLLC, Austin, TX, Nafees Syed, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Samuel Issacharoff, Pro Hac Vice, Law Office, New York, NY, Luis Roberto Vera, Jr., Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera & Associates, P.C., San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Patrick Strawbridge, Pro Hac Vice, Consovoy McCarthy Park, PLLC, Boston, MA, Patrick K. Sweeten, Todd Lawrence Disher, Matthew Hamilton Frederick, Adam N. Bitter, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Austin, TX, William S. Consovoy, Pro Hac Vice, Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC, Arlington, VA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. # 21)

David Alan Ezra, Senior United States District JudgeBefore the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Greg Abbott—Governor of Texas—and Rolando Pablos—Secretary of State of Texas—("Defendants"). (Dkt. # 21). On February 13, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, David Boies, Esq. and Luis R. Vera, Jr., Esq. represented Plaintiffs and Matthew H. Frederick, Esq., Patrick K. Sweeten, Esq., and Todd L. Disher, Esq. represented Defendants. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. After careful consideration of the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, as well as the arguments advanced at the hearing, the Court—for the reasons that follow—GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.¹ (Id. )

BACKGROUND

In presidential elections, Article 2 of the United States Constitution prescribes that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct , a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress ...." U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). This action challenges Texas' "winner-take-all" ("WTA") method for selecting Presidential Electors. Texas, along with 47 other States and the District of Columbia, has adopted statutes under which its 38 Electoral College Electors for president are appointed on a WTA basis. See Tex. Elec. Code § 192.005 ("The set of elector candidates that is elected is the one that corresponds to the candidates for president and vice-president receiving the most votes.").

Under the WTA system, all of a state's Electors are chosen by the political party whose candidate received the most votes in the State's presidential election. For instance, in the 2016 election President Donald Trump received 52.2% of the Texas vote, and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton received 43.2% of the vote. (Dkt. # 1 at 2.) Yet the Republican Party selected all 38 of Texas' Electors, and the Democratic Party selected none.

On February 21, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit in this case, asserting three causes of action: (1) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because by "discarding" the votes cast for the losing candidate, the WTA system "unconstitutionally magnifies the votes of a bare plurality of voters by translating those voters into an entire slate of presidential Electors" (Dkt. # 1 at 5); (2) violation of the First Amendment because the WTA system "burdens ... the right of association and ... the right to have a voice in presidential elections through casting a vote" (id. at 6); and (3) violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") because the WTA system works in the same way as at-large voting districts in allowing "white voters to ... defeat all Electors slated for Hispanic and African-American preferred candidates" (id. ).

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on April 9, 2018. (Dkt. # 21.) Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition on May 7, 2018. Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion on May 21, 2018. A hearing was held on Defendants' motion on February 13, 2019.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Review is limited to the contents of the complaint and matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). In analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "[t]he court accept[s] ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ " In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) ).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

DISCUSSION

Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution vests plenary power in the state legislatures to determine and implement the manner by which a state chooses its Electoral College Electors. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35, 13 S.Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892). Thus, "[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote" for Presidential Electors, and the State legislature "may, if it so chooses, select the Electors itself." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000). However, in spite of this plenary power in the State legislature, Article 2, Section 1 does not "give[ ] the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other constitutional provisions."² Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). Once "the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote ... is fundamental ...." Bush, 531 U.S. at 104, 121 S.Ct. 525.

Against this backdrop, Plaintiffs challenge the State of Texas' decision to have all of its State's Electors chosen by the political party whose candidate receives the greatest number of votes as being in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and Section 2 of the VRA. In response, Defendants argue their motion to dismiss should be granted on one or both of two bases: (1) Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by binding precedent; and even if not (2) they are entitled to dismissal on the merits of each of Plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. Settled Precedent and "One Person, One Vote" – Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

Defendants begin by pointing to several prior decisions of the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit that they argue preclude all of Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of settled law. McPherson v. Blacker upheld a district-based mechanism³ for electing presidential Electors as against challenges that it violated Article 2, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 146 U.S. at 3, 24, 42, 13 S.Ct. 3. However, McPherson is not controlling. McPherson dealt with the question of the constitutionality of a district-based system; it did not address the question of WTA, beyond pointing out as a matter of historical practice that many States up to that point had implemented such a system. See id. at 29–33, 13 S.Ct. 3.

Defendants rely on language from McPherson that "if [Electors] are elected in districts where each citizen has an equal right to vote, the same as any other citizen has, no discrimination is made." Id. at 40, 13 S.Ct. 3. However, this holding predates by more than seventy years the revolution in the Supreme Court's thinking on the issue of voter equality that occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s and the establishment of the "one person, one vote" principle. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963) ("The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–10, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (finding malapportionment claims under the Fourteenth Amendment justiciable).

The principle that where each citizen has an equal right to vote, no discrimination is made has undoubtedly survived. But what is required before it can be said that a citizen's right to vote is in fact equal has undoubtedly evolved from the time McPherson was handed down. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562–64, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (requiring state legislative districts be roughly proportional); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–9, 84 S.Ct....