League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Edwards Aquifer Auth.
| Citation | 313 F.Supp.3d 735 |
| Decision Date | 18 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. SA–12–CA–620–OG |
| Parties | LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC), et. al., Plaintiffs and City of San Antonio, acting by and through the San Antonio Water System, Intervenor–Plaintiff v. EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, Defendant and City of San Marcos, City of Uvalde, County of Uvalde, New Braunfels Utilities and Guadalupe Blanco River Authority, Intervenor–Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Luis Roberto Vera, Jr., Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera & Associates, P.C., Manuel Escobar, Jr., Attorney at Law, San Antonio, TX, David R. Richards, Richards Rodriguez & Skeith, LLP, Austin, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Julie Anne Ford, R. James George, Jr., George Brothers Kincaid & Horton, LLP, Max Renea Hicks, Law Office of Max Renea Hicks, Austin, TX, Phil Steven Kosub, Legal Dept., San Antonio, TX, for Intervenor–Plaintiff.
Deborah Clarke Trejo, Kemp Smith LLP, Austin, TX, Mark N. Osborn, Mitzi T. Shannon, Kemp, Smith LLP, El Paso, TX, for Defendant.
Michael J. Cosentino, San Marcos, TX, William M. McKamie, McKamie Krueger, LLP, Mark J. Cannan, Clemens & Spencer, P.C., San Antonio, TX, Deborah Clarke Trejo, Kemp Smith LLP, Molly Jan Cagle, Thomas R. Phillips, Baker Botts L.L.P., Austin, TX, Mark N. Osborn, Kemp Smith LLP, El Paso, TX, for Intervenor–Defendants.
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' One Person, One Vote Equal Protection Claim, filed by the Edwards Aquifer Authority ("EAA"). Docket no. 119. Intervenor–Defendants Guadalupe–Blanco River Authority, City of Uvalde, County of Uvalde, City of San Marcos, and New Braunfels Utilities have joined in the EAA's motion for summary judgment. Docket nos. 117, 122, 124, 129, and 137. The Texas Farm Bureau and Past and Current Members of the EAA Board of Directors have filed amici briefs in support of the EAA's motion for summary judgment. Docket nos. 166, 182. The LULAC plaintiffs and San Antonio Water System ("SAWS") filed a joint response in opposition to the EAA's motion for summary judgment (docket nos. 140–158) and the EAA filed a reply (docket no. 169). LULAC and SAWS also filed a response to the current and former board members' amicus brief. Docket no. 183.
Also pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on One Person, One Vote Equal Protection Claim. Docket no. 168. The EAA filed a response (docket no. 169) and Intervenor–Defendants Guadalupe–Blanco River Authority, New Braunfels Utilities, City of San Marcos, City of Uvalde, and County of Uvalde joined in the EAA's response (docket nos. 170, 171, 172, 173, 174). Plaintiffs also filed a reply in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. Docket no. 175.
After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that the EAA's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' One Person, One Vote Equal Protection Claim (docket no. 119) should be granted and Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on One Person, One Vote Equal Protection Claim (docket no. 168) should be denied.
Statement of the case
A. The parties:
This lawsuit was filed by the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), Marie Martinez, Jesse Alaniz, Jr. and Ramiro Nava (collectively "the LULAC plaintiffs") against the Edwards Aquifer Authority in June 2012. See docket no. 1. The City of San Antonio, acting by and through the San Antonio Water System ("SAWS") sought permission to intervene as a plaintiff in August 2012, and permission was granted. Docket nos. 8, 10. The LULAC plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint in January 2013 (docket no. 28) and their Second Amended Complaint in March 2013 (docket no. 38). The LULAC plaintiffs added the Secretary of State as a party defendant in their Second Amended Complaint. Docket no. 38. In August 2013, SAWS filed its First Amended Complaint in Intervention, also adding the Secretary of State as a defendant. Docket no. 70. All claims against the Secretary of State were dismissed on March 31, 2014. Docket no. 165. Several other governmental entities have intervened as defendants and are aligned with EAA, including the City of San Marcos, City of Uvalde, County of Uvalde, New Braunfels Utilities and Guadalupe Blanco River Authority. The City of Victoria, Past and Current Individual Members of the EAA Board of Directors, and the Texas Farm Bureau are not parties but they have filed amici briefs.
B. The claims:
The LULAC plaintiffs bring two causes of action challenging the current apportionment plan for the single member districts used to elect directors to the EAA. The first claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the second claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1973, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, for alleged dilution of minority votes. Docket no. 38. Intervenor–Plaintiff SAWS brings only a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (). Docket no. 70. Both LULAC and SAWS seek declaratory and injunctive relief and a statutory award of attorneys fees and costs. Docket nos. 38, 70. The parties have agreed to stay LULAC's cause of action under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and proceed with LULAC and SAWS' Equal Protection claim. Docket no. 68. The motions for summary judgment address only the Equal Protection claim.
Summary judgment standard
Summary judgment is proper when the evidence shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Rule 56"mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party. who fails ... to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Curtis v. Anthony , 710 F.3d 587, 594 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ).
The Court must draw reasonable inferences and construe evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Although the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a nonmovant may not rely on "conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence" to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Freeman v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice , 369 F.3d 854, 860 (5th Cir. 2004).
The general rule: one person, one vote
In 1963, Justice Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court, stated that "[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote." Gray v. Sanders , 372 U.S. 368, 381, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963). The justiciability of a claim based on this principle was first recognized in Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The Supreme Court extended the application of the one person, one vote principle to state legislatures in Reynolds v. Sims , 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), and local governmental units such as counties and cities in Avery v. Midland County , 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968).
In Reynolds v. Sims , the Alabama Legislature had failed to reapportion itself since 1901. 377 U.S. at 540, 84 S.Ct. 1362. After 60 years of population growth, the legislative districts were severely malapportioned. Id. Because the vote of individuals in overpopulated districts carried less weight than the vote of individuals in underpopulated districts, the voters in disfavored areas were being deprived of their right to an equal vote. Id. at 562–568, 84 S.Ct. 1362. The Court found the districting schemes in Alabama to be unconstitutional and held that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races." Id. at 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362. Thus, "the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." Id. This means that the State must "make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable." Id. at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362. The Court stated that "the overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State."
Id. at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362. The Court did note that state legislative districts far outnumber congressional districts so more flexibility is permitted in apportionment of state seats. Id. at 578, 84 S.Ct. 1362. The Court further noted that any deviations in population must be based on clearly rational state policy. Id. at 582, 84 S.Ct. 1362.
Subsequent cases tested the limits of constitutionally permissible population deviations in apportionment plans, and the results differ based on the proffered explanation for the deviation and whether the record supports the explanation. See Connor v. Finch , 431 U.S. 407, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977) (); see also Brown v. Thomson , 462 U.S. 835, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983) (...
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