League of Women Voters v. Diamond

• Decision Date: 19 February 1997
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 96-0052-B.
• Citation: 965 F.Supp. 96
• Parties: The LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. G. William DIAMOND, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

965 F.Supp. 96

The LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. G. William DIAMOND, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 96-0052-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

February 19, 1997.

Stephen E.F. Langsdorf, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, Augusta, ME, David Soley, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, Portland, ME, for Plaintiffs.

Thomas D. Warren, Attorney Generals Office, Augusta, ME, for State Defendants.

John Hubbard Rich, III, Perkins, Thompson, Hinckley & Keddy, Portland, ME, for Governmental Reform.

Samuel W. Lanham, Jr., Cuddy & Lanham, Bangor, ME, Stephen J. Safranek, Detroit, MI, for U.S. Term Limits.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BRODY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters, the Maine Counsel of Senior Citizens, two Maine state legislators, and four Maine voters, challenge the constitutionality of the Maine Term Limitation Act of 1993 (hereinafter "the Act"). 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 551-554 (Supp.1995). Plaintiffs seek to prevent enforcement of the Act by Defendants, G. William Diamond, the former Maine Secretary of State, and Andrew Ketterer, the Maine Attorney General (hereinafter "Governmental Defendants").¹ Intervenor Defendants, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. and the Committee for Governmental Reform, joined the case in support of the Governmental Defendants. Plaintiffs and the Governmental Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Intervenor Defendants each filed memoranda in support of the Governmental Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I. Background

The factual background of this case is largely set forth in the Court's April 8, 1996, Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (hereinafter "Preliminary Injunction Order"). See League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 923 F.Supp. 266 (D.Me. 1996), aff'd per curiam, 82 F.3d 546 (1st Cir.1996). The facts related therein are supplemented here to the extent necessary to update this case to its current posture.

The Act imposes a limitation of four consecutive terms in office on various state officials, including all members of Maine's bicameral legislature. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 553. Plaintiffs' Complaint contains four counts challenging this new limitation on public service. Count I alleges that the Act violates Maine's Constitution because a limitation on the terms of Maine's law makers cannot be accomplished by citizen initiative or legislation but, rather, requires amendment to the Maine Constitution. Counts II and III allege that the Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The final Count, Count IV, requests a declaratory judgment that the Act be applied only prospectively so that each law maker begins accruing terms toward the Act's four term limitation with service in the 118th Legislature.

This Court certified two questions to the Maine Law Court to resolve the state law claims, Counts I and IV. In September of 1996, the Law Court concluded that a state constitutional amendment is not required to impose term limits on state legislators and that the Act disqualified state legislators who had served four consecutive terms in office as of the November 1996 election, i.e., retroactive application is appropriate. League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769 (Me.1996). Since Maine's highest court determined these matters of state law, only the federal constitutional claims, Counts II and III, are currently before the Court.

II. Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate in the absence of a genuine issue of any material fact, when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Facts may be drawn from "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits." Id. The parties agree that no controversies regarding the material facts of this case remain. The only remaining decision is whether Maine's term limits law is constitutional. This is a matter of law for the Court.

III. Federal Constitutional Claims

A. Legal Framework

There has been little change in the legal landscape of this area of constitutional law since the Court's Preliminary Injunction Order. Whether state term limit laws violate voters' and candidates' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights has not been decided by the Supreme Court. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 784, 836, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1846, 1871, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). This Court must rely, therefore, on the Supreme Court's determination in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992), and its predecessors. The Court is also aided by many well reasoned determinations issued by both the federal and state court systems.

It is undisputed that there are few rights more precious than the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice as well as the concurrent right to compete for the privilege to represent one's constituency in a state legislature.² The Supreme Court has stated that:

Both [the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right to cast a vote effectively] rank among our most precious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that the freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment. And of course this freedom protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. Similarly we have said with reference to the right to vote: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."

Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 534-35, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964)); see also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 990, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) ("[V]oting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (right to vote is "preservative of all rights"). However, despite the importance of the right to vote and run for office, such fights cannot be exercised in any manner that the voter or the politician desires. Under the Constitution, states retain the power to regulate and control their elections. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2402, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) ("The authority of the people of the states to determine the qualifications of their most important governmental officials ... lies `at the heart of representative government.'"); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 199, 107 S.Ct. 533, 539-40, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 217, 107 S.Ct. 544, 550, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2850, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). In addition, there is no fight to vote for a particular candidate. E.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir.1991), aff'd, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) ("Although Burdick is guaranteed an equal voice in the election of those who govern, Burdick does not have an unlimited right to vote for any particular candidate.") The question is, therefore, at what point does a state's right to regulate its elections give way to the voters' and candidates' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of speech and association?

In Burdick, the Supreme Court considered whether Hawaii's complete prohibition of write-in voting unreasonably infringed upon its citizens' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In holding that this prohibition did not violate these Amendments to the Constitution, the Court issued its most recent pronouncement on how courts are to assess the constitutionality of state regulation of voting for state officers. The Burdick Court started with the premise that "[e]lection laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters." Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063. All rules regulating the election process, whether designating balloting locations, dictating the requisite age of eligible candidates, or imposing residency requirements, limit in some way the voters' and law makers' right to vote and right to associate with others for political ends. See id. There is no dispute that such regulations are legitimate and must be complied with by all wishing to participate in a state's electoral system.

The Burdick Court next determined that the standard to be applied to First and Fourteenth Amendment voting cases is the "flexible standard" promulgated in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789-792, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570-72, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983).³ Anderson presented a First and Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an Ohio filing deadline that kept certain independent candidates off the ballots. Id., at 782, 103 S.Ct. at 1566-67. Anderson set forth a balancing test that weighs the magnitude of the asserted infringement on a plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the interests asserted by the state justifying the burden imposed by its law. Id. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570. The Anderson Court stated that:

a court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate...