League of Women Voters of Fla., Inc. v. Lee

• Decision Date: 17 December 2021
• Docket Number: Case No.: 4:21cv186-MW/MAF
• Citation: 576 F.Supp.3d 1004
• Parties: LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Laurel M. LEE, in her official capacity as Florida Secretary of State, et al., Defendants, and National Republican Senatorial Committee and Republican National Committee, Intervenor-Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

576 F.Supp.3d 1004

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v. Laurel M. LEE, in her official capacity as Florida Secretary of State, et al., Defendants,andNational Republican Senatorial Committee and Republican National Committee, Intervenor-Defendants.

Case No.: 4:21cv186-MW/MAF

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.

Signed December 17, 2021

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Mark E. Walker, Chief United States District Judge

This Court has considered, without hearing, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. This Order addresses the motion filed by Defendants Lee, Moody, Doyle, and Hays and Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. This Court addresses Defendants Latimer and White's motion for summary judgment by separate order.

This is a voting case. Plaintiffs have challenged several laws either enacted or amended by the Florida Legislature in Senate Bill 90 ("SB 90"). Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims, asserting Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge these laws, and in the alternative, that no dispute of material fact exists as to each claim, and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, move for partial summary judgment as to only certain claims. This Order addresses each argument, starting with whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated standing at the summary-judgment stage.¹

I

To establish standing, Plaintiffs must show (1) that they have suffered an injury-in-fact that is (2) traceable to Defendants and that (3) can likely be redressed by a favorable ruling. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). And they must do so for each statutory provision they challenge. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta , 451 F.3d 1257, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that courts have an "independent obligation ... to ensure a case or controversy exists as to each challenged provision even in a case where the plaintiffs established harm under one provision of the statute"). Plaintiffs proceed under two theories of standing, organizational standing and associational standing. This Court discusses each in turn.

An organization may have standing to assert claims based on injuries to itself if that organization is affected in a tangible way. See Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood , 342 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (N.D. Fla. 2004) ("An organization has standing to challenge conduct that impedes its ability to attract members, to raise revenues, or to fulfill its purposes." (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) )). Here, Plaintiffs proceed under a diversion-of-resources theory. "Under the diversion-of-resources theory, an organization has standing to sue when a defendant's illegal acts impair the organization's ability to engage in its own projects by forcing the organization to divert resources in response." Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State , 772 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014).

In addition to organizational standing, an organization may sue "on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec'y of State of Ala. , 992 F.3d 1299, 1316 (11th Cir. 2021) (" GBM "). As discussed below, Plaintiffs’ members have standing as to SB 90's challenged provisions. Additionally, this lawsuit is germane to Plaintiffs, whose core purposes involve registering voters, voter education, encouraging electoral participation, and advocating for accessibility for Florida voters. Finally, neither the claims asserted, nor the relief requested requires the participation of the individual members in this lawsuit. See Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton , 324 F.3d 1229, 1244 (11th Cir. 2003) ; GBM , 992 F.3d at 1316 n.29 ("[P]rospective relief weigh[s] in favor of finding that associational standing exists.").

"The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving standing." Bischoff v. Osceola Cnty., Fla. , 222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2000). Critically, "each element of standing ‘must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.’ " Id. (quoting Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ). Accordingly, "when standing is raised at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must ‘set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken as true.’ " Id. (quoting Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ).

In this case, Defendants Lee, Moody, Hays, and Doyle assert that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated injuries sufficient to confer standing at the summary-judgment stage. ECF No. 321-1 at 12–20. But Plaintiffs respond that they are injured by each of the challenged provisions, "which make it harder for them and their members to vote, require them to divert resources from other critical tasks, and both prevent them from engaging in expressive activity they would like to engage in and require them to say things they do not want to say." ECF No. 352 at 7.

This Court recognized Plaintiffs’ cognizable injuries at the pleading stage, ECF No. 274 at 12–19, and now Plaintiffs have put meat on the bones to show that their injuries, both organizational and associational, are grounded in fact. See, e.g. , ECF No. 352 at 14–23. To start, Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that, because of the challenged law, they have had to "divert personnel and time from other activities to educating volunteers and voters on compliance with the requirement[s]." Jacobson v. Fla. Sec'y of State , 974 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning , 522 F.3d 1153, 1166 (11th Cir. 2008) ). Namely, Plaintiffs Black Voters Matter and the League have demonstrated their injuries-in-fact based on a diversion of resources as to the challenged provisions at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g. , ECF No. 350-15 at 28–29, 42, 62–67, 72, 74–76; ECF No. 350-19 at 38–42, 71. In addition, Plaintiffs have demonstrated individual injuries and associational injuries with respect to each of the challenged provisions.² See, e.g. , ECF No. 350-11 at 18–19, 39; ECF No. 350-12 at 20–21, 25–26; ECF No. 350-13 at 23–26, 39, 45–46, 60–61; ECF No. 350-14 at 33, 69–70, 78, 84–85, 89–90, 151–53; ECF No. 350-16 at 2–3; ECF No. 350-17 at 6; ECF No. 350-18 at 10–11; ECF No. 350-21 at 14, 25, 54, 57; ECF No. 350-22 at 2–3.

Lastly, Defendants do not raise any infirmities with respect to traceability or redressability. Upon review of the evidence in the record, nothing has changed that would affect this Court's conclusions as to both standing requirements from the pleading stage. See ECF No. 274 at 19–30. Accordingly, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom demonstrate that Plaintiffs have standing to proceed at the summary judgment stage.³

II

The parties already know the standard this Court applies in addressing a summary-judgment motion. On cross-motions, that standard remains the same. This Court evaluates the cross-motions separately, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant.

With that in mind, this Court starts with those claims on which only Defendants move for summary judgment; namely, Plaintiffs’ undue burden claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Plaintiffs’ First Amendment speech claim. Then, this Court turns to the claims on which both sides move for judgment; that is, Plaintiffs’ compelled speech, vagueness, and overbreadth claims.

A

Starting with Plaintiffs’ undue burden claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, this Court must apply the standard set out in Anderson v. Celebrezze , 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) and Burdick v. Takushi , 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). The Anderson – Burdick standard requires this Court to weigh Florida's interest in promulgating the challenged provisions against the burdens those provisions impose on Florida's electorate.

In moving for summary judgment, Defendants try to reformulate Anderson – Burdick to suit their needs. Having already tackled the issue at the motion to dismiss stage, this Court will address these arguments only briefly.

First , regarding Defendants’ "broader point" that "burdens that do not affect voters generally are never relevant under" Anderson – Burdick , ECF No. 321-1 at 23, Defendants point to no authority suggesting that this Court should reevaluate its prior ruling, and this Court has found none. To the contrary, only weeks ago the Eleventh Circuit applied Anderson – Burdick to evaluate the burdens a law placed on a specific group. Libertarian Party of Ala. v. Merrill , No. 20-13356, 2021 WL 5407456, at *4 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021) (evaluating the burden a law placed on "minor political parties"). See also Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups , 554 F.3d 1340, 1354 (11th Cir. 2009) (weighing "the burden imposed on Georgia voters who lack photo identification").

Second , Defendants’ "narrow" point—that, assuming Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge, they must do more than show that SB 90 imposes an unjustified burden on some voters—misapprehends the standard that applies to facial challenges. This is because Defendants’ "focus on ... electors who are unaffected by [the challenged] provisions overlooks the Supreme Court's instruction that when reviewing a facial challenge we do not consider instances in which a statute ‘do[es] no work.’ " Ga. Muslim Voter Project v. Kemp , 918 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2019) (Jill Pryor, J., concurring) (quoting ...