Leahan v. Stroh Brewery Co.
Decision Date | 28 December 1984 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 69604,No. 8,8 |
Citation | 359 N.W.2d 524,420 Mich. 108 |
Parties | , 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2496 John P. LEAHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The STROH BREWERY COMPANY, an Arizona Corporation, and Peter W. Stroh, Individually, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Beier, Howlett, Hayward, McConnell, McCann, Jones, Kingsepp & Shea by Eric J. McCann, Bloomfield Hills, for plaintiff-appellant John P. Leahan.
Harvey, Kruse & Westen and Milan, P.C. by John A. Kruse, Michael F. Schmidt, Detroit, for defendants-appellees The Stroh Brewery Co. and Peter W. Stroh.
This is an action in which the plaintiff, a former employee of defendant Stroh Brewery Co., made several claims based on the termination of the employment relationship. Defendants relied on a release executed by the plaintiff. The circuit court and Court of Appeals have rejected the plaintiff's challenge that the release was induced by duress on the ground that the plaintiff had not tendered back the consideration received for the release. We agree, and affirm.
The plaintiff filed this action on April 15, 1980, alleging that he had worked for the corporation from 1966 through 1978, eventually becoming a senior corporate vice president and president of two subsidiary companies. He alleged that on December 4, 1978, he was presented with a letter of resignation that had been prepared by attorneys for defendant and signed by defendant Peter W. Stroh, President of the Stroh Brewery Company. 1 He was compelled to sign the document under threats that if he refused to do so he would be summarily dismissed with the loss of all compensation and benefits. Plaintiff claimed that his discharge amounted to unlawful age discrimination 2 and breach of an employment contract. Further, he claimed damages for slander and "ridicule" on the ground that after the termination, the defendants had made false communications to prospective employers and had improperly characterized the termination as his having been "fired" rather than his having "resigned".
The defendants filed a motion for partial accelerated judgment as to the age discrimination and employment contract claims, relying on the language of the resignation letter purporting to release Stroh Brewery Co. from all claims arising out of the employment relationship and its termination:
In response to the motion, the plaintiff maintained that the resignation letter was the product of duress, and thus voidable. 3
In turn, defendants responded that the plaintiff could not seek to set aside the release on grounds of duress because he had not tendered back the consideration he had been paid for the release.
To this argument, the plaintiff replied that he need not return the consideration since the consideration was not for the release but for the other terms of the letter agreement.
The circuit court agreed with defendants' position regarding the requirement of tendering back the consideration and entered accelerated judgment for the defendants, stating:
"[B]ecause the plaintiff has not tendered back the consideration received under the release of December 4, 1978, and therefore his claim is barred by said release."
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 4 As to the requirement of tendering back consideration paid for a release, the court said:
The court then turned to the plaintiff's claim that the consideration he received was for portions of the termination agreement other than the release:
"Plaintiff's argument that none of the benefits received by him pursuant to the resignation agreement were consideration for the release agreement is directly contrary to the express language of the release agreement within the contract, and without merit."
We granted the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal. 417 Mich. 1039 (1983).
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...under the circumstances of the case. Basing its analysis on an examination of Leahan, the Court of Appeals held: [T]he consequence of the Leahan decision is that if a release recites that consideration was paid and if money was in fact paid, a plaintiff may not argue that the money was not ......
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